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TO DRAW A LINE: On the Integrity of Marks 
LINE
7
1  Catherine Ingraham writes: ‘The path from model, template, or drawing to building 
has always been linear – nothing appears to be lost or gained in the translation from 
these modes of representation to the actual building. I have found however that here 
is nothing succinct – everything is tortuous – about the idea of the line and linear 
representation in architecture’.  Catherine Ingraham,  Architecture and the Burdens of 
Linearity (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998), p. 4.
2  Alberti’s “lineaments” were described as intellectual linear constructs projected “in 
the mind”, as opposed to the material constructions in the world. They acquired form 
and figure yet were independent to the material world, suggesting a kind of stylistic 
equilibrium of form as a criterion of ‘harmony’ for the building. See Alberti, Leon 
Battista, The Art of Builidng in Ten Books (1485), trans. Joseph Rykwert , Neil Leach 
and Robert Tavernor (Cambridge Mass.:  MIT Press, 1988), p. 7.
3  This idea is reminiscent of Jacques Derrida’s analysis of the “structurality of 
strucutre” as discussed in the essay ‘Structure, Sign, Play in the Discourse of the 
Human Sciences,’ in and in response to Catherine Ingraham’s proposition of the 
disciplinary role of the line for architecture. See Jacques Derrida, ‘Structure, Sign, 
Play in the Discourse of Social Sciences’ (1967), in Writing and Difference (London 
and New York: Routledge, 2005).
As the archetypal written mark, the line has marked architecture’s form and modes of operation. As 
Catherine Ingraham writes, linearity is an integral characteristic of architectural practice, not only with 
regard to architecture’s notational language – a language of both record and composition- but also 
with regard to the process of architectural thinking as a linear  genealogy of thought that ‘promises’ a 
direct passage from the architectural idea to the architectural object.1 The line emerges in architecture 
in multiple ways: as the contour of the real, the note of the drawing or the ‘lineament’ of the mind.2 
Considered in this manner, it exemplifies the function of the signifier in architectural form, but most 
importantly within architectural drawing, where it stands as the delineation of a material presence, 
of which the transference into drawing (as a field of architectural thinking and spatial enunciation) it 
facilitates. Architecture’s dominantly linear notations thus pose as ‘guarantors’ of a spatial integrity, 
rendering and, in a sense, establishing presence as indisputable, measurable, tangible, through 
drawing conventions. 
In its vectorial nature, the line may denote the dynamism of a direction, of a beginning and an end. 
But the architectural line can be considered a connector as much as a divider and therefore a path of 
movement as much as a stabilizer. A boundary between the record of the certain and the speculation of 
the contingent, what it delineates, both in architectural space and in drawing, is the end of the ‘already 
real’ and the beginning of the architectural. The passage that is signified by architectural notations, is 
both figural and conceptual, iconic and symbolic. This dual register of the architectural line as form and 
process, raises thus the question of what can be considered as the ‘line’s linearity’:3 an integrity that 
is, in the propriety of signification, theoretically reflected in the wholeness, as well as the impartiality 
Weaving Lines - Looming Narratives was presented in a room at the 
Newcastle School of Fine Art on February 2013, in the form of a large 
scale installation. Despite this, it was conceived as a drawing, as part of my 
enquiry into drawing and into the kinetic character of the city, through 
drawing. As the first step towards an urban representation that sought 
to investigate the boundaries of the kinetic character of the city against 
the limitations of architectural representation, this first project became 
concerned with the transcription of a small urban site that would allow for 
the testing out of techniques and practices of observation, documentation 
and notation, before attempting to approach the complexity of the scale 
of the urban. Before any writing occurred, the transcription begun with 
the question of lines. Even while seeking to overcome or negotiate the 
preconceptions of architectural representation, it seemed inevitable that 
lines, limits, and rules of engagement with regard to both the ground of 
the city and the drawing had to be drawn, if this endeavour was to assert 
its validity within an architectural way of thinking. There were therefore 
– at least – two kinds of lines to be drawn. One was to define what would 
come to ‘play’ in the representation; what was to be drawn and thus be 
made present within the drawing. The other was about the how of the 
drawing; the modes of notation. It can thus be said that the lines of the 
former kind were concerned with the premises of the reading of the city, 
while the latter were concerned with the process of writing the script of 
the drawing. Both kinds of lines carried what Ingraham would describe 
as a significant ‘burden’: to maintain the integrity of this endeavour as 
architectural representation. 
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4  Euclid, Elements of Geometry (ca. 300 BC), trans. Richard Fitzpatrick (Richard 
Fitzpatrick, 2008). 
The first lines were thus drawn to delimit the site. This attentive reading 
of the site was not to dissect the space in question by means of the sight 
of an observer as the conventions of an architectural plan commonly 
dictate, neither was it concerned with offering the aerial panoptic view 
of an urban planner. In a manner similar to an archaeological dig, it was 
rather concerned with ‘cutting’ through the various levels of action of 
the site, disregarding conventional limitations such as the segregation 
of things according to degrees and scales of materiality, visibility or 
temporality. In this way, this investigation sought to excavate the multiple 
instantiations of the urban that escape attention and representation 
within architectural drawing. In the fashion of an excavation, a fifteen 
by fifteen metre rectangular grid was hence introduced, which divided, 
measured and normalized the city as the ground of an excavation [L1]. 
Anchored to the Cartesian grid, the chosen site came to constitute 
‘square (0, 0)’, a provisional datum for a fragment of the city, which 
included both public and private, indoors and outdoors spaces  [L2-L3]. 
Once the ground was defined what remained was the figure. Drawing 
from the understanding of the city as a textual discourse rather than a 
finite script, the project placed focus on the kinetic instead of the static 
elements of the site. In this way, a transversal representation of the site 
was to take place through a recording of the negotiations that occurred 
between the human and non-human operating actors, which ‘inhabited’ 
and configured the space. This transversal section from air to ground 
sought to reveal the intricacy of the ‘illegible’ textuality of urban space 
by offering an insight into the variety of movements, interactions and 
reconfigurations that take place within an urban site, as small as 15x15 
meters, and the ways in which these could be accommodated within a 
frame of architectural representation. 
The multiplicity of the site was sampled by six characters, both animate 
and inanimate, which were selected across both physical and temporal 
scales, in an attempt to overcome the preconceptions of normative 
architectural representations and graphic scales. The line of inclusion 
was thus already stretched beyond solid-void dualisms, which was 
challenged by the traditional understanding of presence and perception 
as anchored to notions of constancy and visibility. Moreover it was 
of the ‘translation’ it entails. Yet the sign is never whole as presence. Always an abstraction, a trace 
rather than a replication, the architectural mark is in its linearity materially minimum and visually 
laconic: “without breadth” and “without depth”.4 Considered as such, architecture’s linearity ultimately 
traces a trajectory that reveals architectural representation as a ‘non-linear’ process of signification, 
where integrity is substituted by an operative partiality of both form and intention. This partiality 
suggests an understanding of architectural drawing as a ‘place’ woven out of lines as detours, rather 
than a definite destination. It is by means of this partiality that the line of architectural drawing, as 
both figure and concept, marks the passage across the boundary between the architectural and the 
non-architectural, even if this is a boundary that it has itself created. In this sense, the mark of the 
architectural line is what assigns things to architecture and architecture to things.
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5  Catherine Ingraham, Architecture and the Burdens of Linearity (New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press, 1998).
6  Ibid., p. ix.
7  Ibid., p. 2.
8  Ibid., p. 51.
9  In Vitruvius: “Architectura est Scientia”. Quoted in Werner Oechslin, ‘Geometry 
and Line: The Vitruvian “Science” of Architectural Drawing,’ Daidalos 1 (1981) pp. 20-
35; p. 21. 
10  Ibid., p. 21.
11  “Il principio dell’arte e universal e non sottoposto ai sensi humani bence per via 
dei sensi stato sia ritrovato.” Quoted in Ibid., p. 21. [In-text translation by the author]
12  According to Vitruvius, the architect must be “peritus graphidos” and familiar with 
“graphidis scientiam”. Ibid., p. 21.
13  Ingraham, The Burdens of Linearity, p. 10.
14  John P. Leavy, ‘Preface: Undecidables and Old Names,’ in Jacques Derrida, 
Introduction to Husserl’s Origin of Geometry (1962), trans. John P. Leavy (Lincoln 
and London: University of Nebraska Press,1989), p. 1-21.
15  This reference is in effect produced through effects of representation: the fixing 
of an origin that constitutes, in Jacques Derrida’s terms, an appellation of both the 
i THE BEGINNING OF THE LINE
In the book Architecture and the Burdens of Linearity, Catherine Ingraham discusses the uninterrupted 
impingement of linearity upon the discipline of architecture.5 This foundational attachment is according 
to Ingraham both figural and ‘philosophical,’ as architectural theory and practice intertwine in changing 
and unbalanced compositions.6 The “wielding of the line” has had a both specific and diachronic 
influence upon the structure and ethos of architecture,7 emerging as a disciplinary agent. It persists on 
‘disciplining’ architecture by defining a frame of what Ingraham defines as propriety: to “keep things 
in line” within a proper frame of a linear, rational, Cartesian and orthogonal “intellectualism”.8 This is 
expressed on the one hand, through figural exchanges between the “proper” as defined by convention 
and the building as the architectural object, and, on the other hand, through the canonicity provided 
by a linear inheritance of meaning. Although in this inquiry on architecture’s linearity, Ingraham points 
out the importance of representational codes on more than one occasions, it is the latter notion, of 
linearity as a line of origin and descent, and therefore as delineating a genealogy of thinking, which 
appears to become more integral to her definition of architecture than any other of its manifestations. 
This concept of an architectural integrity of knowledge and practice that is maintained by means of the 
graphic line has been historically prevalent in architectural treatises. Vitruvius’ Ten Books of Architecture, 
marking the beginnings of an architectural epistemology, maintained the understanding of architecture 
as science,9 a notion of science that would be grounded by Vitruvius’ translators, and particularly 
Daniele Barbaro on the principles of geometry as a mathematization and hence rationalization of 
architecture.10 Convinced by Vitruvius’ position which was in agreement with the positivist idea of 
universal truths, Barbaro sought to establish a notion of architectural “dignity” in bringing together 
drawing and geometry as the “cornerstones” of architecture, by distancing art from experience and the 
sensible: “The principle of art is universal and not subject to the human senses although it is through 
the senses that it is retrieved”.11  As Werner Oechslin points out, the term scientia (originally meaning 
in Latin not only science in the modern, disciplinary, sense but high knowledge) is only referenced 
in Vitruvius’ text at one point other than this initial definition of architecture: with reference to the 
necessity of a high command of drawing.12 Despite Barbaro’s attempt to distance it from experience, 
geometry stands for architecture not only as an intellectual grounding in the mathematical but also 
as a performative and physical attachment to the graphic. In any case, it is geometry that emerges as 
architecture’s originary ‘muse’, providing it with a universal epistemological validity. 
Respectively, in Ingraham’s interest, linearity represents a factor of continuity and “propriety” that 
becomes constitutive to the establishment of architecture as discipline by maintaining its integrity as a 
structure of meaning.13 But more than this, linearity emerges in Ingraham’s writing as itself the ground 
of a mutual binding of architecture to the constitution of what is proper, implying an architectural 
function that extends even ‘outside’ normative notions of architecture. Linearity as explained by 
Ingraham challenges the ‘principle of principles,’14 reconsidering the originary tale of geometrical 
convention and revealing for architectural linearity a role that regards not figural (conceptual), nor 
material (sensible) but, more importantly, structural integrity. 
The establishment of the proper still coincides for Ingraham with the ‘founding’ of the discipline: 
the establishment of an origin as a precedent for propriety, and the consequent transference of this 
validity through a continuity that is produced out of the reference to the origin.15 Non-coincidentally, 
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origin and the discipline, and, consequently, the tracing back, the recounting through a linear genealogy 
of knowledge of this lost origin as a stabilising factor. See Jacques Derrida, Introduction to Husserl’s 
Origin of Geometry (1962), trans. John P. Leavy (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 
1989).
16  Ingraham, The Burdens of Linearity, p. 81-82.
17  The notion of the arche-writing, as a writing that precedes speech and thus challenges the 
understanding of writing as a secondary imitative representation of speech, suggests that language 
-and in respect architecture which is presented here through acts of speech and writing- is as a 
structure always already unstable and undecided, contain the notion of ‘difference,’ of the fissure as a 
constitutive element. This fissure is described by Derrida as the “first violence of language”: “To name, 
to give names,… to think the unique within the system, to inscribe it there, such is the gesture of the 
arche-writing: arche-violence, loss of the proper, of absolute proximity, of self-presence, in thruth the 
loss of what has never taken place, of a self-presence, within a system of differences which has never 
been dreamed of and always already split”. Jacques Derrida, Of Grammatology (1967), trans. Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Jons Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 25. 
18  Derrida, ‘The Violence of the First Letter: From Levi-Strauss to Rousseau.’ In Of Grammatology 
(1967), trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Jons Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 112-113.
19  Ingraham, The Burdens of Linearity, p. 40.
20  Derrida, Origin of Geometry, p. 12
21  Ingraham, The Burdens of Linearity, p. 12.
22  The figure and the concept as an opposition emerge in Leavy’s preface through Kant. See Leavy, 
‘Undecidables’, p. 40-41.
displaced from the understanding of the human as privileged body. The 
characters chosen were [1] a fish, [2] a fish-monger, [3] a flat tenant, [4] 
my camera, [5] the constellations crossing the sky, [6] the mass of water 
crossing the street and pavement. The representation aimed to confer 
upon these characters a kind of a visible materiality, by acknowledging 
their existence as agents of both the visual and the spatial. 
Ingraham’s challenging of the 
origin proceeds through the 
questioning of another geometric 
foundation as expressed in 
Jacques Derrida’s Introduction to 
Husserl’s Origin of Geometry.16 
The naming of the origin is 
understood by Derrida in terms of 
an “arche-writing”,17 which defines and, in doing so, precedes the origin, challenging thus its presence 
and propriety by revealing it as a provisional rather than transcendental meaning. The attachment to 
the line of inheritance is in turn understood as a constant inscription upon the discipline, or rather a re-
disciplining of architecture by means of the transcription of the origin. This notion of the announcement 
of the origin, in effect the establishment of architecture’s integrity by means of its linearity as a form 
of writing, reveals the representational nature of architecture and its relation to language and the 
structures of writing. The constitution of architecture as a stable structure of meaning is an event that 
entails a certain “violence”, a break: what Derrida describes in Of Grammatology as the illusion that 
conceals what is in effect an act of “appurtenance” rather than creation:
There was in fact a first violence to be named. To name, to give names that it will on occasion be 
forbidden to pronounce, such is the originary violence of language which consists in inscribing within a 
difference, in classifying, in suspending the vocative absolute. To think the unique within the system, to 
inscribe it there, such is the gesture of the arche-writing: archeviolence, loss of the proper, of absolute 
proximity, of self-presence, in truth the loss of what has never taken place, of a self-presence which 
has never been given but only dreamed of and always already split, repeated, incapable of appearing to 
itself except in its own disappearance. Out of this arche-violence, forbidden and therefore confirmed by 
a second violence that is reparatory, protective, instituting the “moral”, prescribing the concealment of 
writing and the effacement and obliteration of the so-called proper name which was already dividing the 
proper, a third violence can possibly emerge or not (an empirical possibility) within what is commonly 
called evil, war, indiscretion, rape; which consists of revealing by effraction the so-called proper name, 
the originary violence which has severed the proper from its property and its self-sameness [propriety]. 
We could name a third violence of reflection, which denudes the native non-identity, classification as 
denaturation of the proper, and identity as the abstract moment of the concept. It is on this tertiary 
level, that of the empirical consciousness, that the common concept of violence (the system of 
the moral law and of transgression) whose possibility remains yet un-thought, should no doubt be 
situated.18
The constitution of the proper is thus at the same time a loss of the proper, the fixing of meaning and 
knowledge through the forced inscription of a singularity upon the plurality of a system of differences 
such as language and, as it emerges through Ingraham’s text, architecture.19 The paradox that occurs 
in this disciplinary constitution of architecture is the fact that what is ‘founded’ upon this moment, 
is not the discipline but rather the origin. As Derrida writes in his Introduction to Husserl’s Origin of 
Geometry, it is a moment of constitution, not of founding, which takes place through the historicizing 
of a mutable event. This constitution of the origin, the beginning of the line, is what establishes the 
integrity of architecture as an “enduring system of meaning”.20 Yet it is the operation of architecture 
that needs to be necessarily at play already for the ‘making proper’ of this moment: as Ingraham 
writes, “to architect is to make proper”.21 The ‘writing’ of the origin within the system presupposes 
that architecture is already at play for the creation of the originary ideal, such as the line. But it also 
suggests, as Derrida writes, that there is a fault, an ‘improper’, inherent within writing and within 
architecture as constitutive forces of the structure of meaning, from the beginning.22 In this sense, 
it is possible to maintain that although geometry and its breadthless linearity remain integral to 
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23  Derrida, Origin of Geometry, p. 40-41.
24  “As writing is the sign of speech, speech is the sign of intellect, so are the 
mathematical designs and geometric figures the sign of their, i.e. man’s ideas”. 
Daniele Barbaro Quoted in Oechslin, ‘Geometry and Line’, p. 28.
25  Comparing architectural drawing to a painting by Le Corbusier Oecshlin 
concludes that “In the architectural project the ‘geometricizing’ line grows from 
geometric ‘ratio’ in an easily reconstructable process, whereas in painting, it has 
even invaded the represented picture itself – an homage to the line itself”. This 
statement Oechslin follows by Le Corbusier’s own comment that “Geometry is the 
only language we know how to speak”. Oechslin’s conclusion suggests a insistence 
to the external reasoning of geometry as a unique source for the validation and 
‘veracity’ of architectural drawing. Counting on ‘reconstructability’ architectural 
drawing is distinguished here from painting as unable of discovering the line’s own 
effect. Ibid., p. 34.
26  As drawn in the publication Chora L Works and Derrida’s own letter to Peter 
Eisenman. See Jacques Derrida and Peter Eisenman, Chora L Works (New York: 
Monacelli Press, 1997) and Jacques Derrida, ‘A Letter to Peter Eisenman’ (1989), 
trans. Hilary P. Hanel, Assemblage, 12 (August 1990), pp. 6-13.
27  Mark, Wigley, ‘The Translation of Architecture, The Production of Babel’, 
Assemblage 8 (1989), pp. 6-21. See also Instructions, Chapter III.
28  Ingraham writes in particular that architecture is not an “object profession” but a 
profession of “object thinkers”. Ingraham, The Burdens of Linearity, p. 125.
29  Ibid., p. 16-18.
architecture as a kind of writing of the figure of the concept,23 considered, in Barbaro’s terms, as the 
geometric “sign” of the idea,24 linearity’s primary contribution to architecture’s integrity of meaning 
does not operate through a translative delineation that proceeds through the proposition of geometric 
‘ratio’ as a kind of language,25 but of the ability to destabilize and thus redefine the figure by mobilizing 
and redefining the provisional ‘ratio’ that conditions the delineation. Linearity then stands both for the 
figure and the convention that designates the ‘enunciation’ of the figure, bringing the two together in 
a mutable, yet ‘concrete’, continuity of form and meaning.
Ingraham’s argument of the conjunction between structure and architecture offers an insight into 
the widely debated relationship between architecture and philosophy as it has emerged from the 
discussion between Peter Eisenman and Jacques Derrida,26 as well as in the essay The Translation of 
Deconstruction by Mark Wigley.27 As a response, Ingraham argues that architecture is not really about 
building, but thinking, and therefore not a discipline of construction but rather deconstruction.28 It does 
not stabilize structure by founding the ground, but instead sets roots on a plural and mutable ground, 
the dynamic of which it manages to conceal through the ‘cunning’ of representation. Collecting and 
importing materials from other spaces and discourses -such as geometry and philosophy- architecture 
constructs its idea of proper knowledge as it goes,29 an idea of structure of which it becomes the 
philosophical imagery, while presenting the same mutability, the same ‘pathologies’, that it implants 
through its modes of operation into the constitution of structure. There is then a plurality that lies 
within the founding core of architecture which derives from its mutability that allows architecture to in 
turn inhabit and domesticate these external structures for which it provides the datum of a founding 
ground, 30 while concealing this plurality for the sake of its integrity as both structure and a structured 
discipline.31 This constitutional act of writing that both establishes and shakes the stable ground of 
architecture, is then always linear and always representational. As such, it infiltrates architecture as 
a form of thinking, but also reveals the practice of drawing as not merely a material instantiation of 
architecture’s writing, but as the situated experience of a field of action for architectural design and 
thinking 
To return to Vitruvius’ Ten Books of Architecture as itself an originary moment and precedent for 
architecture, the architectural ‘ideas’ that generate design (dispositione) are there described through 
the concepts of ichnographia, orthographia and scaenographia, that is, as forms of writing or rather 
drawing (-graphia from Greek graphe, meaning writing), as linear signs (line in Greek gramme, also 
from graphe and of the same root as gramma, the letter is inherently written). These ‘ideas’, are most 
commonly interpreted as the orthogonal and projective projections of architectural drawings,32 yet, 
considering them as ideas in the Aristotelian sense, it is not possible to simply place them in the realm 
of drawings as material artefacts. These, Aberto Pèrez-Gòmez and Louise Pelletier argue, are:
[…] effectively occupying and revealing a space between Being and becoming. They are mental images 
kindred to oracular dreams that as generators  of architecture, possessed the fixity that we have come 
to associate with drawing and writing, without ever abandoning the ephemerality of the lived world and 
the spoken word.33
In this sense, the lines of architectural drawing can be considered as not a transliteration into another 
language, another form of expression, but as a continuous extension of the cunning architectural 
workings described by Ingraham, into the realm of the sensual, the visual and the material, by means 
of the graphic sign. As an architectural “domestication” of matter, linearity reveals that in architecture 
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the graphic, the philosophical and the conceptual are not ever distinct or opposing but negotiating 
transmutations of architecture’s inherent ability to inhabit difference and thus blur the oppositions 
–between presence and absence, the static and the dynamic– by placing its very own integrity as a 
structuring mechanism under constant revision.34 Linearity then does not separate, but rather binds 
together the conceptual, figural, and material modes of operation of architecture by concealing –and 
thus, here, uncovering– the originless ‘circuitry’ of architecture as an act of representation. Drawing 
then, in its dual nature as symbol and icon,35 as process and artefact, stands as the primary embodiment 
of architecture’s representational cunning mode of operation.
Upon selecting these odd characters to describe the object of the 
representation, it was the connective and domesticating ability of 
the architectural line that was to be tested on bringing these diverse 
‘expressions’ of the urban and their mutual interactions into a coherent 
representation of a spatial reality. This survey had to ‘make room’ for 
elements that, to begin with, were not themselves direct ‘products’ of 
a preceding design (such as pre-existing buildings), neither elements 
of nature that could be accommodated within a pre-existing code of 
notation. Moreover, the characters involved distinct instantiations of 
materiality, and acted within distinct scales of time. Considering this, 
they required distinct modes of documentation as well as transcription 
within the drawing. 
30  With regard to cunning, Ingraham brings up the idea of metis as inherent to 
architecture. This is a notion that is, as we have seen in Instructions, Chapter IV, entailed 
within the operative modes of writing and weaving, and which has also emerged as a 
conscious aspiration for architectural practice in the work of the architectural practice 
Metis. Yet, it is important to note that Ingraham’s notion of metis as a characteristic of 
architecture does not regard a necessarily conscious intelligence but rather a kind of 
agency that is shared among the mental and the material realm of architecture, where the 
mental refers to language and the material to the manual process. Ibid., p. 43.
31  This formative plurality links with the plurality of systems of signification such as 
language, depending on equivocality, undecidability, spaces between, plural opportunities 
for meaning and interpretation. As Ingraham writes “architecture is open to the play and 
danger of ‘meaning’”. Ingraham, The Burdens of Linearity, p. 18.
32  Respectively understood as plan, elevation and perspective. The notion of idea is 
here according to Perez Gomez and Pelletier not to be understood as the concept of 
drawing in the sense of an objectified tradition but interpreted in the Aristotelian sense, 
holding the meaning of an “image-representation” which is neither purely perception nor 
thought, but in any case a “precondition” for drawing. Alberto Perez-Gomez and Louise 
Pelletier, ‘Scenographia and Optical Correction from Vitruvius to Perrault’, in Architectural 
Representation and the Perspective Hinge (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 
1997), p. 46.
33  Alberto Perez-Gomez and Louise Pelletier, Architectural Representation and the 
Perspective Hinge (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1997), p. 97.
34  Ibid., p. 53.
35  On the dual register of drawing, see also Instructions, Chapter III. 
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 [1] ‘Aristipp after a happy landing’, from Jacques Ozanan, Recréation 
mathématique e physique  (1778) 




36  Oecshlin, ‘Geometry and Line’, p. 27.
37  Ibid., p 27.
38  Paul Carter, Dark Writing (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2009), p. 164.
39  Ibid., p. 204.
40  Ingraham discusses this opposition between the animal crooked line and the 
orthogonal lines of the civilized human. Ingraham, The Burdens of Linearity, p. 80-81.
One of the main questions that arised in the process of making this 
drawing was how the habitual, the chanceful and the involuntary, could 
come to inhabit a semiotic and representational space continuous to 
the ‘space’ of the already ‘linear’ elements of the drawing – that is, of 
the elements already attached to representational codes, such as the star 
constellations or even the movement of humans, which were attached 
to precedents of sky mapping and choreographic notation respectively.
II WEAVING THE VOID
Among the originary tales of geometry, one finds the myth of Aristipp. In the tale as reported by 
Vitruvius, the Greek philosopher Aristipp is washed ashore on a coast of the island of Rhodes after a 
shipwreck.36 Unaware of his whereabouts he notices on the sand a set of geometric drawings, which 
he considers an immediate sign of the presence of civilised men: “Let us be hopeful for I see traces 
of men”, he exclaims.37 These, are not just traces of men (in Vitruvius “hominum vestigia”) but as 
specified in Auguste Rode’s translation, “schemata”, that is, consciously manmade (geometric) forms 
(from Greek σχήμα, meaning form, appearance, geometric shape) [fig. 1]. The idea of drawing as 
a trace, as a kind of vestige of a past presence is first encountered in architecture in the Vitruvian 
concept of ichnography as the writing of traces (from Greek ichnos), or perhaps the writing by means 
of creating traces. As such the recognition of the trace as schema entails both the understanding 
of the sensible as a material mark, a visually comprehended form, and a kind of writing (graphe), in 
Derrida’s terms the appellation of an original presence by means of a conscious intellect rather than an 
involuntary animal trace: a material enunciation by means of convention. The traces upon the Rhodean 
shore are geometric, and therefore linear and intentional. They are not accidental remnants, nor the 
sign of an absence but of a meaningful intelligible presence, an “appurtenance” of meaning upon the 
milieu of the real. 
In another interpretation of ichnography, Paul Carter proposes through the notion of ichnos as track 
rather than trace, an understanding of ichnography not as a material inscription but an investigation, the 
study of a field, an archaeological or rather forensic inquiry provoked by the gaps that emerge between 
the signs as partial, fragmentary, remnants.38 Carter’s interpretation expresses his understanding 
of traces as “containers of events”, that have not only individual meaning, but cumulatively reveal 
temporal and sequential connections, finding the linear in the spatiotemporal storyline that they 
collectively unravel:
Tracks are what is left behind they bear witness to something that was never there, but always 
departing, disappearing… They are vestiges of the stride and the instance between two strides… 
To notice them, to make sense of them is to engage with the leftover of history and to harness their 
potential to indicate different paths in the future.39
As opposed to Aristipp’s linear schemata, Carter’s tracks are distanced from the “dignity” of ratio. They 
are more akin to the bestial, involuntary track of the animal,40 placing the intelligible act, and respectively 
the appurtenance as the production of meaning on the side of interpretation, as opposed to the side 
of the preconditioning intellect of the consciously produced lines of geometry. If architecture’s linear 
integrity is not constituted by, but constituting of meaning, and therefore able to function ‘around’ – or 
perhaps even beyond – the limitations of an ideal geometric convention, when does a line become 
architectural? When does a mark ‘enter’ architectural representation? In other words, how does 
architectural drawing outline the 
crossing from the sensible to the 
intelligible, or vice versa? The 
contrast between the intelligible 
sign and the found sensible 
trace defines the two sides of 
architectural representation: 
16
41 Stan Allen, ‘Hunting the Shadow’ in Practice: Architecture, Technique and 
Representation (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 3-8; p. 4. Allen draws this myth 
from Robin Evans. See Robin Evans, ‘Translations from Drawing to Building’, in 
Translations from Drawing to Building and Other Essays (London: Architectural 
Association, 1997), pp. 153-193; p. 163-165.
42  In Della Pittura Alberti describes a drawing device consisting of a square wooden 
frame, lined with a grid of parallel horizontal and vertical threads. At a fixed distance 
from the frame stands a rod of half the height of the frame aimed at aligning the eye 
with the centre of the grid. Alberti, Leon Battista, On Painting (1435), trans. John R. 
Spencer (New Haven: Yale University, 1966), p. 112.
43  Peter Eisenman, Moving Arrows, Eros and Other Errors: An Architecture of 
Absence (London: Architectural Association, 1986), p. 5.
44  The script here acquires a meaning similar to that of écriture as used by Roland 
Barthes. See Instructions, Chapter IV.
45  Nelson Goodman, Languages of Art: An Approach to a Theory of Symbols 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1969), p. 218.
46  The orthogonal here refers to in Le Corbusier’s understanding of the straight line 
and the right angle as rational, entailing all kinds of Cartesian reasoning applied to 
architecture. See Ingraham, The Burdens of Linearity, p. 51.
the symbolic and the iconic. One regards the how of writing and the other the how of reading. The 
integrity of the former relies on the computational and standardised understanding of convention, 
while the effect of the latter requires an investigation not only of the mark but of the convention and 
the discipline as well.
Within the realm of myth, there is also a tale that distinguishes drawing from the geometric rule, shifting 
attention to other qualities of graphic representation. In the myth of Diboutades as narrated in Natural 
History by Pliny the Elder, Stan Allen points out the themes of absence and desire that arise in the 
story:
Diboutades, traces with charcoal the outline of the shadow cast by the head of her departing lover. 
Projection is fundamental to the story. Diboutades traces not from the body of her lover but from his 
shadow – a flat projection cast on the surface of the wall by the soon to be absent body. At the moment 
of tracing, Diboutades turns away from her lover and toward his shadow. Information is always lost 
in projection: the fullness of the body is translated into a two-dimensional linear abstraction... an 
incomplete image to recall a lost presence.41 
The outlining of the shadow is suggestive of both ichnography’s tracings and the projective plane 
of perspective as described by Alberti’s Frame or Albrecht Dürer’s Perspective Machine [fig. 2].42 
Drawing’s operative trait is found here in a projective description that is formed out of the chiasmus 
of the figure of the sensible and the abstraction of the performance. In the conjunction of the two, 
emerges the line which is neither one nor the other, but containing elements of both at the same 
time. What brings together the two sides of mind and matter in a seamless but fluid continuity is the 
performance: a performance that is carried out by both the line and the architect/draughtsman.
The projective line is an act of desire. This desire is always driven by an absence, or in Ingraham’s 
terms a ‘loss’ that does not necessarily concern a past presence but, as Eisenman writes, the 
possibility as well of a possible latent future presence.43 This desire has been traditionally invaded and 
commonly ‘tamed’ by external structures of reasoning, most notably geometry, that pose as validators 
of architecture’s propriety and of the architectural mark’s integrity of meaning. The taming of the 
line entails a taming of architecture’s script through the understanding of representation by means 
of the schema language–speech–writing.44 As Derrida’s arche-writing shows, this idea of principle, 
of a hierarchy between the written and the spoken, is an illusion similar to the one pertaining to 
architecture’s integrity of meaning. As we have seen in Instructions, Chapter IV, the most common 
paradigm that is conferred upon architecture as a result of this schema is the understanding of drawing 
as translation. This paradigm projects upon architectural drawing ‘language-like’ characteristics that 
involve notions of syntax and vocabulary. To the consideration of geometry’s mathematical reasoning 
as the ‘pillar’ of architectural drawing ‘language’ must be added, as the structured expression of this 
reasoning. Together, the one figural and the other symbolic, they form what Nelson Goodman refers to 
as a “curious mixture” of imitation and notation.45 
The language-like aspect of architecture is commonly based on the notational function of drawing, 
assigning syntactical “rules of conduct” to the measurable and ‘orthogonal’ spatiality implied by 
geometry.46 In this way architectural lines do work symbolically, conferring upon notation the concept 
of a structured convention, comprised of discrete functions of meaning. Drawing from Goodman, Allen 
compares architectural drawing to both musical scores and scripts, an assemblage of spatial and 
material notations that follow a code of conventions in order to create an abstracted visualization 
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Technique and Representation (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 41-67; p. 41.
48  Ibid., p. 42-43.
49  On a review of the micromotion studies of Frank and Lilian Gilbreth in relation 
to the architectural development of the diagram see Hyungmin Pai, ‘Scientific 
Management and the Discourse of the Diagram: Architecture, Discourse, and 
Modernity in America’, in The Portfolio and the Diagram (London and Cambridge, 
Mass.: MIT Press, 2002), pp. 162-197.
50  László Moholy-Nagy, The New Vision: From material to architecture (New York: 
Brewer, Warren & Putnam, 1932), p. 134.
51  Evans, ‘Translations from Drawing to Building’, p. 155.
52  Nelson Goodman quoted in Tim Ingold, ‘Language, Music and Notation,’ In Lines: 
A Brief History (London and new York: Routledge, 2007), p. 10.
53  This opposition is further discussed in Instructions, Chapter IV.
The earliest experiments of recording movement can perhaps be traced 
in the almost concurrent chronophotographic practices of Etienne 
Jules Marey and Eadward Muybridge – which foreshadowed the 
development of cinema [fig. 3]. Movement is there captured through 
sequences of temporally equidistant photographs, which describe the 
action through what Bergson describes as “privileged instances” that 
overlook the contnuity duration. Despite this abstraction, photography 
posed in these early experiments of chronophotography as a way 
of fixing the image of movement and thus rendering its temporal 
materially measurable. Overall, photography has had a constant effect 
on the history of motion representation, from chronophotography, to 
the cinematographic animation of the photographic still, and to the 
figural influences of photography upon modernist art. The impact 
of the cinematic as revealing of the inadequacy of the sequential 
fragmentation of movement, is perhaps evident in later approaches 
to the study of movement such as Frank and Lilian Gilbreth’s “micro-
motion” studies [fig. 4].49 In these studies – which were concerned with 
the coding of movement for the purpose of spatiotemporal efficiency 
in industrial production – the recording and coding of the event is 
not based on the photograph as the fixing of an instance but from the 
ability of long exposure photography to capture traces of enduring 
movement, particularly with the use of light as a way of literally 
highlighting figures of gestures and trajectories. A similar attitude can 
be found in Moholy-Nagy’s long-exposure photography, as a kind of 
‘drawing’ with light [fig. 5]. Far from the absolute stillness of Marey’s 
photographs, Moholy-Nagy’s long exposures dissociated the plasticity 
of space from the idea of concrete matter, defining volume through the 
not only the “circumscription of mass”, but also the visual contour of 
motion by means of light.50 Furthermore, his photograms – similarly 
to the Gilbreths’ cyclographs – posed as a way of understanding light 
as a way of not simply drawing with light, but of physical movement as 
drawing in real space. 
In Weaving Lines/Looming Narratives, long exposure photography 
thus offered the possibility of capturing the trace of the ephemeral and 
transitory movements that took place within the site. Aside from the 
star constellations, the paths and positions of which were possible to 
acquire through sky observation software, all other characters were 
initially recorded through long exposure photography, which helped 
of reality.47 Allen disclaims the classical ideas of mimesis as inadequate to understand the full 
range of architectural techniques, proposing that theories of notation in mathematics or time-based 
arts, such as music or dance, are more relevant to architecture’s purposes. Notations are necessarily 
reductive and abstract, but according to Allen they have little to do with traces or imprints. The 
operative aspect of abstraction, the partial loss of representation, is then found for Allen in notation, 
as an opportunity of introducing into drawing not only the concrete but also the intangible qualities of 
space as pure signs rather than resemblances.48 
Commenting on the commonality of 
the analogy between architecture 
and language Robin Evans remarks 
on the potential of all things with 
conceptual dimension to act as 
such. For Evans, architecture may 
be “language-like” but it is not a 
language itself. Evans underlines 
the limitations that such an 
analogy poses for architectural 
representation.51 Both the linguistic 
and the geometric paradigm serve 
to secure a communicability, a 
transferability that will minimize 
the loss entailed in the ‘originary’ 
absence. Yet what is at stake in the 
understanding of notation in terms 
of the musical or choreographic 
score, is the site(s) of performance 
of the discipline. In his conclusion, 
Nelson Goodman notes that “a 
musical score is in a notation 
and defines a work […] a literary 
script is both in a notation and is 
itself a work”.52 This statement 
brings out the diverse expressions 
of language as a system of 
signification, distinctions that, 
as Roland Barthes’ opposition 
between the text and the work 
illustrates,53 are subject not only to 
the system of inscription but also 
to the modalities of performing 
within the system. 
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 [3] Animal Locomotion, Eadward Muybridge (1877)
[4] Descent of Inclined Plane, Etienne-Jules Marey (1882)
[5] ‘Chronocyclograph of golf champion- Francis’, Frank and Lilian Gilbreth 
(ca. 1915) 
[6] Untitled, László Moholy-Nagy (ca. 1936-1946) 
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materialise – and at times properly delineate – the presence of the ‘lived’ 
in-between [L4-L5]. This was not therefore a translation into another 
form of language, but a direct capturing of the site through an expanded 
form of experience, as photography was in effect serving to extend the 
capabilities of my own vision as observer. 
The arresting of the image, and the clear outlines it provided, made the 
transcription into drawing possible.  This was a literal ichnography, 
a fairly straightforward tracing of the figure from the photograph. 
Yet, what was missing from these discrete fragments of duration was 
the thread, or the code that would weave them again together into a 
continuity of time and space within drawing, as in the space they 
occupied upon their initial occurrence. 
As Walter Benjamin notes in the essay The Task of the Translator, translation involves a mode of 
signification that primarily relies on the translatability of the original. This suggests a ‘conclusion’ of 
meaning that is fulfilled within the original and a concurrent intentionality, whose primary concern 
is the reception from the reader.54 Considering this, to reduce drawing’s validity to a process of 
communication is a misconception that forgoes the performative powers of drawing and, consequently, 
architecture altogether on the production of meaning. 
The idea of representation as performance emerges also in the writing of Peter Woods in the essay 
‘Eating in Bed’. According to his view however, it is not really the architect that performs but the 
drawing.55 He foregrounds this performative nature of drawing as action by looking at the work of 
Diller+Scofidio, with particular focus on their Slow House project. Diller+Scofidio have indeed made 
use of architecture as ‘constitutive performance’ in a wide range of expressions that have at many 
points challenged the boundaries between drawing, installation and performance. Installations such 
as The withDrawing Room: Versions and Subversions presents ‘episodes’ of domesticity into an 
installation format that invokes the respective domestication and inhabitation of what acts as an 
intermediary “field” where everyday acts and memories collide with drawing conventions,56  while the 
x-ray drawings of Slow House that Woods comments on, expand the voyeuristic attitude of architectural 
representation by introducing the performance of inhabitation into drawing.57 Yet, it is important 
to point out that although the idea of drawing as a site of performance opens up an expansion of 
architectural ‘notation’ into a wider range of traditionally excluded media, it can and should be found 
at full function already between the line and the surface. 
54  “Translation is a mode. In order to grasp it as such, we have to go back to the 
original. For in it lies translation’s law, decreed as the original’s translatability”. 
Walter Benjamin, ‘The Task of the Translator’ (1928), trans. Steven Rendall, TTR: 
traduction, terminologie, reduction 10 (2) (1997), pp. 151-165; p. 152.
55  Peter Wood, ‘Eating in Bed’, in Tracey: Drawing and Visualisation Research 
Journal, p. 6. http://www.lboro.ac.uk/microsites/sota/tracey/journal/perf/wood.html 
[Accessed on 10 July 2015]
56  Elizabeth Diller and Ricardo Scofidio, ‘The withDrawing Room: Versions and 
Subversion, Artist’s Statement’ (1987), Capp Street Project Archive. http://libraries.
cca.edu/capp/elizabeth_diller_ricardo_scofidio.html [Accessed 14 December 2015]





[L4] Site I: extracts from the characters’ Photographic Sequences




[L5] Fishmonger: On site long-exposure photography
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[7] Rigadoon Dance Notation, Feuillet (1721)
[8] Labanotation, Arm and Leg Gestures 
[9] Labanotation, Rudolph von Laban 
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58  For a historical analysis of Feuillet’s notational system see Jean-Noel Laurenti, 
‘Feuillet’s Thinking’, in Laurence Louppe (ed.), Traces of Dance, trans. Brian Holmes 
(Paris: Editions Dis Voir, 1994), pp. 81-108.
59  Dance Notation Bureau, http://dancenotation.org/lnbasics/frame0.html [Accessed 
12 January 2016]
If photography offered the immediacy of figuration, its partiality made 
imperative the abstraction of a notational code, which would make 
it possible to introduce into the surface of drawing the element of 
duration, and to tie the distinct instances to the datum of a continuous 
spatial field. As Goodman has pointed out, the element of time figures 
prominently in music and dance notations. These forms of notation 
Goodman associates with architectural drawing as equally allographic 
forms of writing. Between the two, it is perhaps the choreographic score, 
which may seem more relevant to architectural drawing, by combining 
the figuration of geometric form with the abstraction of notation. In 
choreography, the inhabitation of space through the figure of the body 
maintains a visual prominence that constitutes the figural expression 
of form as imperative. Planar representations sufficed for the Baroque 
dances described by the Beauchamp-Feuillet notational system [fig. 
7],58 where variations were more limited and the formations of the 
dancers upon the floor were central elements of the choreography. 
Nevertheless, the most extensive kind of notation for the movement of 
the human body is perhaps the one originally devised by choreographer 
Rudolph Laban in the late 1930s. Labanotation is capable of providing 
through its notational schema information with regard to “the direction 
of the movement, the part of the body doing the movement, the level of 
the movement, [and] the length of time it takes to do the movement”.59 
This is possible due to the arrangement of the notational marks upon a 
staff – similarly to music notation [fig. 8-9]. 
In Weaving Lines/Looming Narratives, or rather in the materially two-
dimensional drawings that preceded it, the concept of the staff initially 
appeared as a kind of grid that would allow for the cross-reference of the 
perspectival views of stills with their position in time. The transcriptions 
of the photographic sequences were to be juxtaposed with parallel 
projective notations along two ‘boards’, one horizontal and one vertical, 
which would facilitate the reading of the characters’ paths through a 
combined-view representation, as is commonly done in architecture 
with the juxtaposition of plans and sections [L6]. Providing a datum of 
temporal and spatial ‘coordinates’, this combined-view drawing would 
act as a key for the multiplicity of itineraries that the characters wove 
in the site. In this sense, the drawing would be arresting, and fixing the 
multiplicity of the site, presenting the latter not as a continuous field but 





Returning to the basic architectural convention, of representing the 
‘swing’, the ‘path’ or the non-concrete by means of the dashed or dotted 
line, and the concrete by means of the solid line, I began to develop 
a kind of planar parallel projection of the site’s layers of action by 
coding the impressions illustrated on the photographs. This drawing 
developed in parallel to a detailed indexing of the photographs and their 
delineated frames through linear mappings of the distinct timescales 
of the individual characters (these were achieved with high accuracy 
due to the time stamps provided by the snapshots) [L7-L8-L9]. In 
essence, the main drawing remained adequately ‘faithful’ to the 
principle of a projective measured linearity of normative architectural 
representations, while expanding however, the scope of its content 
[L10-L11]. 
[L6] Characters’ Timelines
[from top to bottom]
Water Waste: Four minutes
Camera Shutter: One second
Fish: Twenty minutes
Flat Tenant: Twelve hours
Fishmonger: Eight hours 
Star Constellations: Twenty-four hours






























[L8] Site I: Extracts from the characters’ Tracing Sequences








[L10] Site I: Water Waste Planar Tracing
[L11] Site I: Fishmonger, Camera and Water Waste, Partial Plan 
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60  Daniel Libeskind, ‘Unoriginal Signs’, in Chamber Works: Architectural Meditations on 
Themes from Heraclitus. London: Architectural Association, 1983), pp. 4-5.
61  Werner Oechslin, ‘From Piranesi to Libeskind: Explaining by Drawing.’ In Daidalos 1 
(1981), pp.15-19.
62  Peter Eisenman, ‘Representation of the Limit: Writing a ‘not-architecture’’, in Chamber 
Works: Architectural Meditations on Themes from Heraclitus. London: AA Publications, 
1983), pp. 5-8.
63  Robin Evans writes of Chamber Works as a unique example of achieving a 
separation between the system of representation and a signified, latent, reality: “Without 
representing space, any of the Chamber Works can be fantasized into three dimensions, 
given sufficient volition in the observer, for the space is thought into them by him, not 
projected out of them by the draftsman. The uniform line of the architectural pen helps 
Libeskind to avoid constructing illusions of space in the drawings, but what is curious, and 
very impressive, is that even within the narrow confines of his chosen medium a dynamic 
potency emanates from somewhere… [the drawing] does not transfer real qualities of 
movement into lines (making them porters of their own origin) but invokes kinds of motion 
unconnected to actions previously performed”. Robin Evans, ‘In Front of Lines that Leave 
Nothing Behind’ (1984), in Neil Leach (ed.), Rethinking Architecture: A Reader in Cultural 
Theory. New York: Routledge, 1997), pp. 482-489.
64  “I accept the collapse of the convention of representation and its object, in this struggle 
in which ‘Culture’ battles ‘Post Culture’ for the domination of a new age”. Libeskind, 
Daniel, ‘Versus the Old-Established Language of Acrhitecture’, Daidalos 1 (1981), pp. 97-
102; p. 98.
65  Libeskind, ‘Unoriginal Signs’, p. 5.
What is entailed in the ‘performance of drawing’ is the active negotiation between the sensible and 
the intelligible that is inclusive of but not dependent upon convention. Touching upon the discussion 
of sign and the origin of meaning, Daniel Libeskind writes:
Architecture as a practice of control has projected over itself an immanent frame sufficient to reveal 
something without. What is at first an oppressive flash in this system yields in fact the things that 
belong together. […] It has been observed that one secretly reserves a tendency to disparage this dire 
state until one has undergone it. Architects too have suffered this ordeal by having followed Orders - 
the resulting disorder is yet to be appropriated even if it has been diagnosed and foreseen. 
The recourse to surrogates is only a habit which can be given up. One can refuse to substitute for 
the experience of Unoriginality, things that one has never experienced but which are known through 
originals. To substitute the ‘essence’ of Architecture for its actual nonexistence would be futile and 
dishonest.60
Libeskind’s position suggests a recourse to an architectural interiority, a reliance on the ‘Unoriginality’ 
and the disorder of architectural marks as self-sufficient signs. This expansion of architecture’s 
“responsibility” Oecshlin finds in both Libeskind and Piranesi’s work, where the expansion of the 
representational field occurs out of the engagement of the architect with a pure abstraction produced 
between the drawing hand and the line.61  Exemplary of this seeming ‘sabotage’ of architectural 
lineage are works such as Micromegas, but perhaps more prominently Chamber Works, where this 
loss of ‘meaning’, this “not-architecture”,62 creates the space for the full unravelling of the line as 
a sign of its very own performance; its very own architecture.63 For Libeskind, the departure from 
modernity has already marked the “collapse of convention”, which he describes as a kind of “obscure 
and illegible artifcialism”.64 Libeskind’s tactics to reveal architecture’s “unsettling”, unoriginal or, in 
Derrida’s terms, originless essence proceeds through an understanding of drawing where convention 
is not really abolished but grafted with the ‘will’ of the graphic and the architect. The line there 
becomes performative itself, able of moving in and out of, convention in a participatory performance 
of representation.
Like the outline of Diboutades’ lover, architecture’s marks remain linear and projective. They are 
variously projective upon delineating, projecting through and not necessarily in to drawing the “non-
existent reality”,65 of architecture: the desire for what is not there and may have never been. Although, 
projection is not identical to convention, they are both as unstable as the line and as versatile as 
architecture. As Robin Evans writes:
What connects thinking to imagination, imagination to drawing, drawing to building, and buildings to our 
eyes is projection in one guise or another, or processes that we have chosen to model on projection. All 
are zones of instability.66 
Not only the signs, not only the architect, but even convention performs within architectural projection, 
a performance that takes place in the mutual animation of a shared subjectivity. This grafting of the 
phenomenally ordering surrogate of origin that is convention on the one hand, and architecture’s 
own ‘unoriginal’, but still inherently disciplinary signs is motivated by the desire of the absent, what 
Ingraham exemplifies by means of the “lament”.67 Ingraham’s “lament for the object of architecture” 
draws out architecture and its representational operations as conditions of movement rather than 
stasis:
 […] it is not the movement of the material world, that moves architecture but the movement-in-stasis 
that architecture makes possible… Architecture persuades us of its stasis and territorial stake […] 
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70  Wolfreys, Julian, ‘Justifying the Unjustifieable: A Supplementary Introduction of Sorts’, in The Derrida 
Reader: Writing Performances (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press), pp. 1-49; p. 39.
71  See the relevant correspondence between the two men in Jacques Derrida and Peter Eisenman, Chora L 
Works.
72  Eisenman, Moving Arrows, Eros and Other Errors, p. 4.
73   Ibid., p. 5.
74  In his letter Derrida writes: “This discourse on absence or the presence of an absence perplexes me not 
only because it bypasses so many tricks, complications, traps that the philosopher, especially if he is a bit of a 
dialectician, knows only too well and fears to find you caught up in again...”. Quoted in Emily Apter, ‘En- Chôra’, 
Grey Room, 20 (Summer 2005), pp. 80-83.
75  Presented through a recording, in place of Derrida’s physical presence at a conference held at the 
University of California Derrida, ‘A Letter to Peter Eisenman’.
76  “I am not sure that you have detheologized and deontologized chora in as radical a way as I would have 
wished (chora is neither the void, as you suggest sometimes, nor absence, nor invisibility, nor certainly the 
contrary from which there are, and this is what interests me, a large number of consequences)”. Ibid., p. 8.
blinding us to the crucial moment of movement. The architectural edifice both moves and is static.  
Insofar as architecture is disciplined to stand still while we think our thoughts within it, we may now 
understand that this discipline, like other disciplines, secures only a momentary and provisional, only an 
apparent stasis.68
Ingraham’s paradigm of the lament regards a descriptive recounting of the loss. It is a grief for the 
lost movement, the lost origin, whose absence is marked by the outline, and at the same time for the 
impending loss-in-translation of architecture’s object, the phantasm of which haunts every act of 
representation. The lament is at once a desire for movement and fixity. Ironically, this latter fear is itself 
proof of the paradox of architecture’s lament. As both Ingraham’s notion of the movement-in-stasis, 
and Derrida’s mutability of meaning suggest, this loss is only phenomenal. It is a concealment that is 
equally susceptible to movement. Furthermore, it reveals the issue of the integrity, the unattainability, 
or more commonly in architecture, the illegibility of the mark as an issue of authority. The phenomenal 
fixing, the blinding to the movement, what remains outside the convention of propriety, is respectively 
excluded from the authority. At the same time however, this authority is challenged by the participatory 
performance of projection.
The binary structure of the universe on which this blinding relies, the division into the intelligible, the 
world of ideas, and the sensible, the material and changeable world, is discussed by Plato in the 
dialogue of Timaeus. On the account of mimesis, the sensible is presented as a world constructed 
by inferior copies of the intelligible. As a mediating term that describes the in-between the two, Plato 
introduces chora (from Greek χώρος, meaning space or site), a “receptacle of becoming,” where 
the intelligible becomes visualized. The chora, as a site of creation, is an “irreducible”, immaterial 
and temporal field.69 Neither sensible being, nor intelligible form, it resists absolute description and 
is therefore unrepresentable.70 In this sense, the Platonic chora suggests the inevitable partiality of 
the sensible in relation to the intelligible, of the representation in relation to presence. At the same 
time chora suggests a spatial manifestation that overcomes and therefore connects both the purely 
material and the strictly conceptual, the sensible and the intelligible. 
In the late 80s, chora became the point of controversy between Jacques Derrida and Peter Eisenman, 
and a crucial point for the turbulent liaison between architecture and deconstruction.71 In Moving 
Arrows, Eros and Other Errors, Peter Eisenman discusses the concepts of presence and origins  as 
relevant to architecture and its anthropocentric bias. He points out three states of space: presence, 
as a physical real form, void, which can be considered the lack of any physical form, and absence 
which he defines as the trace of a possible presence. Eisenman goes on to describe the site as “a 
palimpsest and a quarry, containing both memory and immanence”.72 Through this statement emerges 
the concept of the “non-static site” as containing traces of these “essential absences.”73 Traces hence, 
are described as containing potential rather than mere residues, through the notion of the absent 
presence, a concept that can be traced back to Jacques Derrida’s idea of différance.74 In his 
Letter to Peter Eisenman,75 Derrida expresses his objection to Eisenman’s interpretation of chora 
in relation to the idea of the site as a kinetic palimpsest of traces, pointing out that the chora is not to 
be mistaken for a void, absence or invisibility. According to Derrida the chora surpasses Eisenman’s 
analogy of the site as a palimpsest, where the traces of previous presences create a relief, thus altering 
the status of the chora as an originary field. More than a passive receptacle, it is a place and a 
displacement.76 Chora is the receptacle of an ‘interiority’ that remains illegible in the representation 
of the sensible. However, representation itself inevitably must contain the traces of the chora, 
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77  Jacques Derrida, ‘Khōra’, in Thomas Dutoit (ed.), On the Name, trans. David Wood 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 89-130. 
78  Carter, Dark Writing, p. 91.
not as residues but as seeds of différance.77 What Derrida’s “detheologizing” of the chora ultimately 
offers, is an understanding of the function of the trace not as layering or registration, but rather as 
a mutation, which is in turn open to mutation itself. The concept of origin is thus challenged again, 
revealing the chora as the place of creation, which is not a privileged nor a privileging originary field but 
a mutable place where the mark of the absent does not stand as a mimesis, but as the participatory re-
constituting of the field that the chora itself nurtures and enables.
The analogy of the palimpsest allows Eisenman to project the notion of chora upon the physicality of 
the architectural site, where traces can stand as both sensible and intelligible marks of ‘pre-existents’. 
The chora-traces schema presents for him notions of interiority and exteriority for architecture. Yet, 
the mutation at stake appears to be more crucial to the constitution of the field rather than an original 
absent presence; more crucial to the understanding of the integrity of an architectural field of meaning 
rather than the integrity of a mark as the sign of a presence. Considered this way, architecture’s 
geometric linearity does not constitute the architectural ‘chora’, attached to the genealogy of the line 
as established by Vitruvian drawing nor the intelligible equilibrium of the Albertian lineaments, but the 
means to the shifting of the architectural field of convention. The line does not simply bring things into 
architecture’s attention but rather traces architecture’s own writing, redefining thus its own field of 
action. This idea suggests an understanding of architectural representation through the Platonic idea 
of methexis, a kind of partaking that is not concerned with a repetition but rather a participation in a 
present meaning”:78 the participation of the trace within the field and of the field within the trace, of the 
static within the dynamic and of the dynamic within the static. Linearity thus maintains architecture’s 
integrity by means of a genealogy that is not one of methodological precedent, in other words of fixing 
convention, but of a spatiotemporal continuity that is maintained by the participation in the ‘shared’ 
performativity of projection. 
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79  The majority of the traces were represented in this scale, with the exception of the 
trails of the star constellations, due to their scale and distance.
Still, the two kinds of drawings, the planar tracings and the delineated 
sequences were at a distance, which was not similar to the complementary 
relationship between plan and section, but rather illustrated the one 
against the other: the instance against the field. Every line on the timeline 
was an instance of my observation and of a character’s range of actions. 
It was a delineation of the temporal figure of the site at this instance, 
while it maintained an indexical relation with the respective marks upon 
the plan. What then could be keeping these three elements apart, the 
sensible, the temporal and the spatial abstraction, once they were all 
constructed out of lines?  What could bring them to inhabit the same 
representational field other than the establishment of the field of their 
interrelation upon the surface of the drawing, other than the line that 
would represent this interrelation? Weaving Lines/Looming Naratives, in 
its final form, aimed to be that connecting line and at the same time 
the record of the making of that line, which is neither inclusive, nor 
representative of the ‘things’, but representative of the, relevant to the 
objects, motivation of the drawing and its conventions.
The idea of substituting the surface of tracing paper – which was up 
to then used for the handling of the drawings – with an actual room 
[L12-L13-L14] emerged after the completion of the survey, and of 
this first series of preliminary drawings. First, the linear frames where 
mapped upon a cumulative timeline that brought all characters together 
[L15-L16]. Then, these frames were to be mapped upon the field through 
the extension of the signs of the instances into the space of the plan. On 
one hand, the immense accumulation of detail raised questions about 
the legibility and the effectiveness of these drawings as representations 
in the graphic scales allowed by the sizes of paper available [L17]. More 
importantly however, the performative nature of the weaving involved 
in the bringing together of the two elements of the drawing, by now the 
Plan and the Timeline, was emerging as a kind of mobility relevant to 
the ones that were already mapped upon the drawing. 
The transition to the room finally allowed for a further ‘bending’ of the 
rules, as lines were then able to escape the two-dimensionality of the 
surface and layers of mapping could be lifted from the floor, representing 
a notion of height and depth in what was originally an act of ‘excavation’. 
In a scale that can be primarily anchored as 1:279 the actions of the 
characters were mapped on surfaces of printed tracing paper for the 
Timeline, and laser-cut plywood for the Plan. The weaving between 
time and space, figure and notation, was materialised in black thread, 
which revealed an alternative image of the site through the density of 
the shifts that occurred in its materiality upon its daily inhabitation as a 
real space, and its temporary inhabitation as drawing. The participation 
of the architect (and visitors) as reader(s), became manifest not only in 
the inhabitation of the original site – where the camera conditioned a 





drawing as a physical space, as well as a conceptual place of ‘discourse’ 
between the real (the referent), the graphic (notation) and the 
conceptual (interpretation). The space of the site and the space of the 
drawing coincided in a room in Newcastle, as a weave of traces that 












[L16] Weaving Lines/Loming Narratives: Timeline detail
[L16] Weaving Lines/Loming Narratives: Room Key
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80  Ingraham, The Burdens of Linearity, p. 13.
81  Ingraham refers to descriptive geometry, architectural drawing, the practice of 
traditional architectural history, the account of one’s passage through the buildings, 
the parts of buildings which are translated and transmitted from architect to builder 
by means of descriptive documents, the procedures and technologies of designing 
that entail naming and locating forms, parts, and programs and then putting them 
into relation with one other, and the “mystique” of architectural practice, which like 
all artistic practices, is habitually represented as something “impossible to describe”. 
Ibid., p. 115.
82  Paul Ricoeur, Memory, History, Forgetting (Chicago and London: The University of 
Chicago Press, 2004).p. 8.
83  Ibid., p. 13.
84  Ibid., p. 11.
85  Ibid., p. 5.
86  Ibid., p. 5.
87  Ibid., p. 6.
88  Roland Barthes, Camera Lucida: Reflections on Photography, trans. Richard 
Howard (London: Vintage Books, 2000). 
89  In Image Text Music, Barthes writes of the photographic image: “it is a message 
iii OUT-LINES
The lament is itself a projection, a linear formation. According to Ingraham a temporally linear 
recounting of the loss, 80 like Diboutades’s tracing it seeks to recall and hold the lost object by outlining 
its definite boundaries, an outline which acts as both the definitive line of the sign and the trajectory 
of the movement that its definition fixes. On one hand, it offers a ‘safeguard’ for its linearity, based 
on the exhaustive enumeration of the event of presence; on the other however, it is never neutral or 
absolute. By belonging, as Ingraham writes, to the realm of hermeneutics it does not simply recount, 
but “paraphrases”.81 A lament is descriptive, but as a wail for the loss it is also lyrical and romantic. 
Considered as a lament, architectural representation entails not only the paraphrase but also the 
performance of desire. More importantly however, considering the illusory nature of the loss, it appears 
that description seeks to graft itself into the object in order to conceal its futility.
This effacement constitutes the point where memory, perception and imagination become entangled in 
the pursuit of knowledge. In Plato’s Theatetus, Socrates begins to unfold Plato’s theory of representation 
by describing the memory as a block of wax within our souls.82 This block, a gift from Mnemosyne 
(in Greek Μνημοσύνη, meaning memory), as Paul Ricoeur reminds us the mother of all Muses,83 we 
use to create impressions (semeia) of the things we experience and wish to remember. The moment 
of the knowledge, or perception, is paralleled to the moment that the imprint is created. In this 
case error, which constitutes forgetting, is presented as either the complete effacement of marks 
(semeia) or the failure of the correct association between the present image and the imprint, while 
recollection constitutes the identification of the imprint. Through Socrates, Plato points out the 
difference between the original and the eidolon, the copy, through the paradigm of the mismatch 
between imprint and original. Beyond faithfulness and through perception, memory is drawn as a 
phenomenology of mistakes. In the Sophist, however, Plato moves from the eidolon to the theory 
of the eikon placing an emphasis on the ‘present absent’ as opposed to the ‘absent presence’. What 
makes this even more relevant to architectural drawing as the descriptive lament of architecture, is the 
fact that the concept of the eikon occurs from a metaphor directly related to graphic representation. 
Plato divides the graphic art of “copymaking” to the art of likeness-making (tekhne eikastike) which 
produces an eikon, a faithful resemblance, as opposed to the simulacrum or phantasma, which 
escapes proper likeness to the original.84 Through these metaphors, Paul Ricoeur initially articulates 
representation as a primary mechanism of recollection: memories appear as “images” themselves 
(eikon is the root for Greek εικόνα, meaning image) that represent a past event.85 Nevertheless, 
as he proceeds, this association is tweaked by the mediation of imagination, what he points out 
as “the least reliable of the modes of knowledge”. In order to subvert this implication, and while 
placing memories at “ the crossroads of semantics and pragmatics”,86 Ricoeur defines two types of 
imagination, that of the fantastic and the unreal, but also an imagination of memory that refers 
to prior reality.87 These two types of imagination reflect the twofold nature of the architectural 
‘lament’, as description (recollection) and desire (speculation): the trace of a prior existence, and the 
trace of a latent, possibility.
Dwelling upon a loss of his own, the death of his mother, Roland Barthes embarks upon questioning 
the affection of the photographic image as a means of knowledge and recollection in Camera Lucida.88 
Barthes becomes concerned not with the production but the reception of the photographic image. 
Belonging more commonly to the iconic, an image rather than a script, photography as a form of 
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without a code.” Roland Barthes, ‘The Photographic Message, in Image, Music, Text (London: Fontana Press, 1977), pp. 15-31; p. 
16-17.
90  Ibid., p. 6.
91  Batchen proposes a continuity between Barthes first and last published work, Writing Degree Zero and Camera Lucida 
respectively, one that he traces in Barthes’ response to the work of Jean-Paul Sartre. Geoffrey Batchen, Geoffrey, ‘Palinode: An 
Introduction to Photography.’ In Batchen Geoffrey (ed.), Photography Degree-Zero. Boston: MIT Press, 2009), p. 4-5. The notion of 
the zero degree of writing is also discussed in Instructions, Chapter IV. 
92  Roland Barthes, Writing Degree Zero, trans. Anette Lavers (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1977), p. 64.
93  Barthes, Camera Lucida, p. 81.
94  “Whether or not it is triggered…it is an addition: what I add to the photograph and what is nonetheless already there.” Ibid., p. 
55.
95  “Patented by William Wollaston in 1806 well before photography’s invention was announced in 1839. Consist of a three sided 
glass prism suspended before the eye of the draftsman, such that a subject and the piece of paper beneath the prism meld 
together onto the back of the draftsman’s retina. Thus the image produced by a camera lucida is seen only by the draftsman and 
by no one else, except in the form of a tracing.” Ibid., p. 11
96  Ibid., p. 20.
97  Barthes describes the stadium as “an unconcerned desire of various interest, of inconsequential taste”. Ibid., p. 27.
98  Ibid., p. 26.
99  Ibid., p. 51.
representation evades the notational characteristics of codification that are so prevalent in architectural 
drawing.89 Although photography evades the “mark” as a sign produced within the structure of a 
premeditated convention, it is still the effect of the marking of a surface – the chemical reaction upon 
the film. In this way it can be compared to the ‘incidental’ mark as opposed to the conventional sign. 
To quote Barthes:
Photography is unclassifiable because there is no reason to mark this or that of its occurances; it 
aspires perhaps to become as crude, as certain, as noble as a sign, which would afford it access to 
the dignity of a language: but for there to be a sign there must be a mark; deprived from a principle of 
marking, photographs are signs which don’t take, which turn, as milk does. Whatever it grants to vision 
and whatever its manner, a photograph is always invisible: it is not it that we see.90
Photography’s recollection proceeds through a clearly phenomenological and figurative sense that is 
not necessarily alien to architectural drawing’s iconic expressions. The lack of the mark as described by 
Barthes is the lack of the sign as symbol, and the lack of the ‘rule’ that verifies it. However its veracity 
is to Barthes undeniable. Deprived of any added formalism, any intermediate coding, photography 
stands as a “pure representation”, an “undeniable certificate of presence”. In this way, as photography 
historian Geoffrey Batchen suggests, it poses as a zero-degree description.91 In its exhausting veracity 
it allows for a direct exchange between the image and the receiver. 
Although when discussing the zero-degree of writing, Barthes points out that even this “colourless” writing 
still presents a noticeable style, “loaded with the most spectacular signs of fabrication”,92photography 
offers to him a ground for a phenomenological approach that engages with the field of the image as 
a diachronic artefact, conjuring “past, present and future” through the infinite mechanical repetition 
of the instance – what Barthes defines as the “noeme”, that which has occurred only once –  before 
the reader: “A sort of umbilical cord links the body of the photographed thing to my gaze”,  he writes. 
93 The artefact acts as a mediator between the original, the photographed, and the receiver, drawing a 
connective line of participation of the reader within the effect of the image. This participation, which 
regards an interpretative imaginary that emanates from the figurative as a conjunction of past and 
present, Barthes describes as an addition, a surplus of meaning that is created between the image 
and its reading.94 The camera lucida itself, a drawing device that merged the perception of a visual 
impression upon the drawing surface, marks the interiority of the photographic affect: the image 
projected through the lens is only visible to the one viewer.95 There is a lucid clarity of a contingent 
effect that takes place between the projected, the projection and the viewer. 
In this “vague, casual, even cynical” phenomenological approach, Barthes looks into his own bodily 
responses to the image.96 To account for his own reactions he introduces the concepts of the studium 
and the punctum. The former regards a kind of analysis, a ‘study’. Suggesting the effect of a pragmatic 
logical process it entails the recognition of the photographer’s intentions.97 It is denotative. The punctum 
on the other hand “rises from the scene, shoots out of it like an arrow, and pierces me”.98 It concerns 
the part of the image which evades analysis, and in its unsettling piercing nature sets on another line of 
investigation; it is “pensive” and connotative, but in its intensity it is also unrepresentable: “What I can 
name cannot prick me”.99 It is unnameable but, despite the lack of the “mark”, it is produced out of a 
writing, a process of representation. Considered in this sense, the photograph emerges as a “writerly” 
text without code.100 Although it maintains an analogical relation to its referent, it is according to 
Barthes not realist. Its effect does not emerge from the physicality of the artefact but rather emanates 
from its diachronic displacement.101 In this sense, posing for a sharing of subjectivity between the 
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reader and the image, the punctum presents a kind of “coding” itself, a self-made formalism that 
emerges from the performance of reading. In the photographic image then, the lucidity comprises of 
the uncovering of the punctum, as the not lost but obscured movement of representation. As Barthes 
writes “from a phenomenological viewpoint, in the Photo, the power of authentication exceeds the 
power of representation”.102 The purity of description, the purity of representation is what facilitates 
within photography the effect not of a copy but of a ‘superlative’ assertion of presence that ‘exceeds’ 
the validity of representation, in Libeskind’s words: a “non-existent reality”,103 that emanates from the 
sign itself.
To return to the architectural controversy between description and speculation, as it ‘translates’ to the 
challenge of the integrity of the architectural mark as an ‘intelligent’ coded sign of fixed meaning or a 
‘phenomenological’, contingent and unstable sign, we can consider Barthes’ idea of ‘pure’ representation 
through John Ruskin’s fascination with the daguerreotype. Looking at Ruskin’s engagement with this 
early form of photography, architectural historian Karen Burns focuses on the term documentary 
posing the contradiction of a mere transcription to an “active translation”.104 Although it was not 
possible to reproduce the daguerreotypes, Ruskin adapted a few into engravings for The Seven 
Lamps publication.105 In this particular act of transcription, of the tracing of the image, Burns 
identifies in the daguerreotype an opportunity for a “reassessment of representation”.106 As Ruskin 
himself indicated, the photographic image, this “lucid” artefact of transparent description, posed as a 
way of rereading the original and discovering new details. It is at this point that the daguerreotype, 
becomes as Burns writes, a system of representation of its own.107 More ‘real’ than the real experience, 
this early form of photography offered not an exact imitation but a new “model of information”.108 As 
Burns writes:
[…] the observer’s fallibility in the gathering of empirical evidence is exposed, but the observer is 
also presented with another way of seeing. It is the detail formed in the reproduction, rather than the 
original, that is prized.109 
Conveyed as a series of effects, information is structured by reproduction as a mode of representation 
rather than a transparent entity. Furthermore, to return to Carter’s idea of the track, the process of 
reading, or observing, becomes entangled with the process of representation. A kinetic process 
is implied that involves the “movement” of the observer. To paraphrase Walter Benjamin, here to read 
is to leave traces.110 The image as memento, in its superlative authenticity, hence becomes not only 
about remembering, but also about forgetting. Forgetting the loss through a visual compensation, and 
forgetting the movement away from origins. Is the lament of the architectural movement-in-stasis then 
really the recollection of a loss, or is it the repression of a memory, a denial? 
The ‘improper’ mark then, that which escapes the line of propriety and reveals the movement, the 
difference that is coiled within the representation, can perhaps be considered through the Platonic 
conception of the copy not as eikon, but as simulacrum. Defined in Plato’s Sophist as the counterpart of 
the eikon, the simulacrum escapes likeness to the original. It is a copy that does not carry the qualities 
that define the original, therefore lacking substance as a duplicate. In this sense the simulacrum 
takes on a negative tone, failing to fulfil its role as means of recollecting and therefore representing 
its origin.111 By challenging the primacy of the origin however, by differentiating, the simulacrum also 
separates itself and acquires a certain autonomy. The eikon-simulacrum division is found at the second 
level of Plato’s inquiry, following a first division between the original and the copy, the “thing” and the 
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image. Gilles Deleuze discusses the meaning of Friedrich Nietzsche’s proposition of the “overthrow 
of Platonism” as the abolishment of the division between essences and appearances.112 Deleuze 
argues that this idea removes and conceals the real motivation of Platonic theory, pointing out 
that the real aim of chorismos (division), is not the division of a genus into opposing species but the 
revelation of lines of succession,113 and therefore the distinction between the pure and the impure, 
the authentic and the inauthentic. In this sense, Platonic division seeks to define the authenticity of 
the idea rather than the copy, by defining a proper line, as opposed to a false line of succession. This 
forms, according to Deleuze, a dialectic of “rivalry”, in Plato amphisbetesis, which might also be 
translated as doubt.114 The copy and the simulacrum are still on either side of the division; however, 
the simulacrum is not simply a false copy. It retains the image but lacks resemblance, in this way 
calling into question, doubting the very notions of copy and the model:
We can thus better define the whole of the Platonic motive - it is a matter of choosing claimants, of 
distinguishing the good from the false copies, or even more, the always well-founded copies from the 
simulacra, ever corrupted by dissemblance. It is a question of insuring the triumph of the copies over 
the simulacra, of repressing the simulacra, of keeping them chained in the depths, of preventing them 
from rising to the surface and “insinuating” themselves everywhere.115
Plato grounds the domain of representation as filled by iconic copies defined not by an extrinsic 
relation to an object, but rather an intrinsic relation to the model or ground: a line of hereditary 
continuity. The criterion of resemblance established by the first division functions to validate the 
difference between the copy and the simulacrum. The copy, the eikon, is authenticated through 
the resemblance, which the simulacrum lacks.116 On the contrary, in the simulacrum emerges a 
resemblance that is an external effect.117 It is external to the model, but ‘internal’ to the simulacrum, 
and the difference upon which its repetition is grounded. The overthrow of Platonism, asserts then 
for Deleuze the raising up of the simulacrum, which as he writes is “not degraded copy, rather it 
contains a positive power which negates both original and copy, both model and reproduction”.118 
Already in Difference and Repetition, his earliest work of “doing” philosophy, Deleuze began by 
questioning the subordination of difference to identity and resemblance. As he wrote, since Plato 
philosophy traditionally subordinates difference to identity, considering it from the point of view of the 
subject, and consequently as resemblance and analogy.119 In a way the effect of difference is always 
externalized and concealed by being understood through a kind of mediation. In turn, repetition is also 
subordinated “to the identical, the similar, the equal or the opposed”: 
Henceforth, everything which causes repetition to vary seems to us to cover or hide it at the same time. 
Here again, we do not reach a concept of repetition. By contrast, might we not form such a concept 
once we realize that variation is not added to repetition in order to hide it, but is rather its condition or 
constitutive element, the interiority of repetition par excellence? Disguise no less than displacement 
forms part of repetition, and of difference: a common transport or diaphora. At the limit, might there not 
be a single power of difference or of repetition.120
The simulacrum subverts this subordination by claiming difference as its own resemblance by 
producing an effect of ‘signification’ through a process of disguise that includes both a  manifest 
and a latent content.121 Like the photograph, it is connotative and denotative at the same time. In the 
simulacrum, reality and representation are fused, overturning the subject as “privileged position” 
and hence overturning the primacy of origins.122 In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze makes the point 
that this process of disguise and concealment is inherent, and the true subject of repetition, which is 
in its essence symbolic.123 It does not re-present but signifies:  
112  Deleuze comments on Nietzsche’s definition of the task of his philosophy but also 
tracing similar objections to Kant and Hegel. Deleuze. Gilles Deleuze, ‘Plato and the 
Simulacrum’, October 27 (Winter 1983), pp. 45-56; p. 45.
113  As it appears in the allegory of ‘The Statesman’, in Ibid., p. 46
114  Ibid., p. 46.
115  Ibid., p. 48.
116  Ibid. p. 48.
117  Ibid., p. 49
118  Ibid., p. 53
119  Ibid., p. xv.
120  Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1994) p. xv-xvi.
121  Ibid., p. 54
122  Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 5
123  Ibid., p. 17.
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I do not repeat because I repress. I repress because I repeat, I forget because I repeat. I repress, 
because I can live certain things or certain experiences only in the mode of repetition. I am determined 
to repress whatever would prevent me from living them thus: in particular, the representation which 
mediates the lived by relating it to the form of a similar or identical object.124 
To return this to Ingraham’s lines of architectural propriety, the criterion of ‘resemblance’ emerges 
in architecture not through appearances but through the maintaining of convention, through the 
maintaining of the orthogonal/orthographic and the geometric. In the same way that Platonism seeks to 
conceal the differential point of view, the difference within the repetition, architecture seeks to disguise 
its own operative movement of disguise: the domestication of the ground through a constitutive act 
of transmutation. Considered through the simulative repetition, architecture and hence architectural 
drawing do not constitute a lament but a repressive repetition. The difference of drawing, in Barthes’ 
words its punctum, emanates and flourishes out of this repetition, the again and again that is imposed 
by the obsessive anxiety for the assertion of the repression, for the disguise of that very difference 
as a means to an integrity of meaning. This repetition, which is at the same time the movement and 
the repression of the memory of the intrinsic movement of architectural representation, differs from 
representation as defined by Deleuze not in that it does not represent, but in that it denies and at times 
even seeks to subvert its operative performativity. Considering this, the ‘stutterings’ and ‘stammerings’ 
invoked upon the drawing of architecture’s line may seem to disrupt and lose the continuity from the 
origin, but rather what they do is uncover the mutability of the origin as architecture itself. Although 
these marks appear to be external to the code of convention, they are architectural in that they are 
able to domesticate and inhabit the convention that they themselves introduce, rather than escape it. 
The sole prerequisite is that this ‘different’ code need only be attached to the line.
124  Ibid., p. 18.
Although the representation of the multifariously temporal multiplicity 
of the site was fixed upon the surface(s) of the drawing, the traces of the 
real came to ‘domesticate’ the convention by displacing its boundaries. 
At the same time however, upon entering this drawing, these marks 
were in turn domesticated by the cunning movement of architecture 
by being inscribed within another field of action that set them in new 
motions and trajectories, through the reading of the architect and 
the interpretations that were conferred upon them in the milieu of 
drawing. Even though these marks did not constitute an instruction 
for the reproduction of the characters’ actions, they constituted an 
instantiation of their original site as an intertextual field of action, 
where the characters described were joined by other ‘characters’ that 
came to depict, materialise and conceive of its original state (operators 
of reading and writing them into the room, ranging from conventions, 
materials, fabricating machinery and people). The density of the marks 
may have indeed rendered detail illegible, even in the larger scale of the 
room. However, within the mutable ground of architectural drawing, 
it was this density, rather than the individual markings, that in the end 
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THE ANIMATE GAZE: Reimagi(ni)ng the City
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1  The association of the legibility of the city to criteria of visibility we have already 
encountered in De Certeau’s ‘Walking in the City’, as discussed in Instructions, 
Chapter IV. See Michel De Certeau, ‘Walking in the City’, in The Practice of 
Everyday Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988), pp. 91-110.
2  Quoted in Juhani Pallasmaa, ‘Part I’, in The Eyes of the Skin: Architecture and 
the Senses (London: Wiley, 1996), pp. 15-37; p.15.
3  “But the change goes beyond mere visual dominance; instead of being a 
situational bodily encounter architecture has become an art of the print image fixed 
by the hurried eye of the camera. In our culture of pictures, the gaze itself flattens 
into a picture and loses its plasticity. Instead of experiencing our being in the world, 
we behold it from outside as spectators of imaqes projected on the surface of the 
retina”. Ibid., p.30.
4  Within this architecture, vision too becomes according to Pallasmaa nihilistic 
leading to a crisis of representation: “instead of reinforcing one’s body-centred and 
integrated experience of the world, nihilistic architecture disengages and isolates 
the body, and instead of attempting to reconstruct cultural order it makes a reading 
of collective signification impossible”. Ibid., p. 22.
5  “It has not facilitated human rootedness in the world”. Ibid., p. 19.
The encounter with the city is often considered as an ‘affair’ of the eye. The city’s presence is 
conventionally described and comprehended in architectural representation through ocularcentric 
processes of figuration.1 Yet, the means through which this visualisation proceeds are not strictly 
sensible, and at the same time neither universal nor static. The image of the city takes shape at the 
intersection of a multiplicity of visual regimes, collective and individual, conventional and impulsive, 
the agency of which does not rely on the primacy of a ‘hegemonic’ universal vision but rather on the 
‘malleability’ of visual perception as a process of knowledge through acts of representation. Ultimately, 
the encounter takes place not ‘in’ the eyes but in the movement between the eyes and their object – 
or rather between the eyes of alternating subjects. Dealt with suspicion for the ways they, somewhat 
cunningly, construct the world, seemingly in absence of the other senses, eyes ‘reorder’ in order to 
cognitively conquer but are also ‘ordered’ by the gaze and the exchanges it entails. The city thus 
emerges as the terrain of innumerable gazes: equally approachable and ungraspable, it unfolds by 
means of a composite imaginative cartography, which is piece by piece conquered at the conjunction of 
a sensory experience and the narration of experiences past, as recollected in a variety of expressions: 
maps, stories, photos. And so the encounter ends with ‘eyes’, when all that becomes of it, persists as 
no more than image(s). 
Within this field of congested visualities, architectural drawing presents itself as a device of looking, 
a kind of ‘optical’ device that is capable of offering, in lieu of a universal vision, a unified field of an 
intertextual visibility. Despite the distinct conventions that have from time to time structured and 
predetermined the ‘field of view’ of architectural representation, drawing can be considered as a kind of 
visual ‘prosthesis’ (an extension) that brings things into visibility by proposing alternate spatialisations, 
which overcome the limitations of our visual perception. In the end, I would like to argue that drawing 
is always destined to succumb to one final ‘scopic regime’. The gaze of the architect/reader, as the 
final inhabitant of the drawing, which seeks to ‘fix’ by inevitably animating, a composite and contingent 
visual territory.
i RULES OF VISUAL ENGAGEMENT
The idea of the ‘primacy’ of vision can be traced as far back as the fourth century BC, when Aristotle 
would announce it as the ‘noblest’ of the senses, explaining: “it approximates the intellect most closely 
by virtue of the relative immateriality of its knowing”.2 Vision is thus according to Aristotle closer to the 
immaterial abstraction of the mind, yet knowing the reality of matter. Juhani Pallasmaa has followed 
this operative participation of vision within the process of knowledge and the verification of reality 
–  pointing out the ocularcentrism that has been maintained throughout Renaissance and Cartesian 
thought – to the rationalist planning of modernity and, lastly, to the alienated spectacle through which 
the city is ‘lived’ and consumed in the postmodern era.3 In these last five decades, Pallasmaa argues, 
not only has architecture become increasingly “retinal”, that is, relying on the teasing of vision through 
the production of striking imagery, but this ocularcentrism is simultaneously shifting the locus of 
inhabitation as encounter, from the bodily situation to the flatness of the image.4 It is suggested hence 
that there is a saturation of visuality which, embraced as it has been by recent architectural practice 
and digital modes of visualisation, has led not only to the production of an architecture that is through 
this proliferation of imagery highly self-referential, but also, due to the disengagement of the body 
from space, to a sensory decline of vision itself.5 
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6  This is argued in Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration of Vision in Twentieth-
Century French Thought (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 3.
7  Despite commenting on the enhancement of other senses through the emergence of 
new technologies, Pallasmaa’s conclusive projection relies on the emergence of what 
David Michael Levin defines as the ‘aletheic gaze’, a hermeneutic and pluralistic mode 
of vision. See David Michael Levin, The Opening of Vision: Nihilism and the Postmodern 
Situation (New York: Routlege, 1988), p. 440.
8  As illustrated in the title of the book. See Martin Jay, Downcast Eyes: The Denigration 
of Vision in Twentieth-Century French Thought.
9  In his response to his critics in particular Jay describes the idea of oculracentrism 
as merely an example of repressive liberal tolerance. Jay Martin, ‘Disciplinary Prisms: 
Responding to my Critics’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 38 (2) (April 
1996), pp. 388-394; p. 393.
10  This term is borrowed by Jay from Christian Metz, ‘The Passion of Perceiving’, in The 
Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and Cinema, trans. Celia Britton et al. (Bloomington: 
Indiana University Press, 1982), pp. 58-68; p. 61.
11  Jay, Downcast Eyes, p. 7.
12  Martin Jay, ‘The Scopic Regimes of Modernity’, in Hal Foster (ed.), Vision and Visuality 
(Seattle: Bay Press, 1988), pp. 3-23. The term ‘The Art of Describing,’ Jay borrows from 
Svetlana Alpen’s The Art of Describing: Dutch Art in the Seventeenth Century (1983).
13  The term is introduced in Christian Metz, ‘The Passion of Perceiving’, in The 
Imaginary Signifier: Psychoanalysis and Cinema, trans. Celia Britton et al. (Bloomington: 
Pallasmaa’s propositions reflect a common cautiousness towards the effects of vision upon not only 
the physical parameters of the perceptive experience, but also on the ideologies that emerge in relation 
to particular visual cultures. This approach is based on the presupposition that such a privileging 
of vision is reversible and thus culturally constructed.6 The fact that Pallasmaa concludes that the 
opportunity for a ‘re-sensualisation’ of architecture relies yet again on the introduction of a new visual 
paradigm,7 asserts that what is at stake is not so much the domination of vision, but the ways in which 
the  domination over vision occurs. 
The validity of ocularcentrism as hegemony of vision is widely examined by Martin Jay, who proposes 
instead a status of denigration rather than domination.8 Shedding light on the contradictions of 
ocularcentric theories in his book Downcast Eyes, Jay reveals the misunderstanding of visual primacy 
by placing emphasis not on specific images, nor on visual practices but on the “scopic regimes” that 
condition vision.9 The concept of the scopic regime, which Jay borrows from Christian Metz,10 regards 
not so much the possible configurations of the physiological aspect of seeing (such as for instance the 
possibility of expanding or altering it through technological appendages), but the ideological dimensions 
that permeate the understanding of its translation from the physiological to the psychological, that is 
to say, the structuring of the exchanges of meaning that take place between visual perception and 
knowledge.11 
Although certain regimes have been construed in more explicit ways, and as a consequence may 
have been more directly associated with certain epochs, there is never a universal and dominant 
vision, but a number of scopic regimes, which, as Jay notes, coexist and often compete with each 
other. From his earlier work on modernity, Jay had already distinguished three concurrently dominant 
regimes: Cartesian Perspectivalism, the ‘Art of Describing’, and Baroque,12 all of them stemming from 
earlier historic periods and their pertaining ideologies. This condition of overlapping, and particularly 
competing, regimes becomes more prominent throughout modernity and its succeeding visual cultures. 
The 19th century, was a century of rapid developments in the field of optics. A series of optical devices 
that imitated or expanded the capabilities of the eye were invented, such as Sir Charles Wheatstone’s 
stereoscope (1838),14 and Joseph Plateau’s phenakistoscope (1829). At the same time, previously 
established technologies such as the camera obscura evolved, leading to the invention of photography 
and consequently the cinematograph. The increasing mobility of everyday life that the advent of 
modernity marked, through the mechanization of production and locomotion, combined with the new 
kinds of visual experience –a mechanization of seeing– to which the new optical technologies gave rise, 
gradually contributed to the cultivation of a visual culture, which was radically informed by these physical 
‘exosomatic’ reconfigurations of seeing,15 yet was still laden with strongly prevailing remnants of pre-
existing regimes. Of course, as Jonathan Crary points out in the book The Techniques of the Observer,16 
these shifts in the modalities of observation, just as the inventions that inspired them, did not occur in 
isolation, but in continuity with the preceding and concurrent social and ideological transformations. 
Furthermore, they coincided with the development of theories on the interrelation between space and 
time as they evolved in the conjunction of the work of physicists Henri Poincaré, Hermann Minkowski, 
and Albert Einstein,17 but also in the writings of philosophers such as Henri Bergson which, challenging 
the Renaissance model of three-dimensional space, introduced the notion of a fourth dimension.18 As 
the rising awareness of motion had a significant impact on the representation of objects and space, 
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Indiana University Press, 1982), pp. 58-68; p. 61.
14  Walter, Wheatstone, ‘Contributions to the Physiology of Vision Part the First. On Some Remarkable, and Hitherto Unobserved, 
Phenomena of Binocular Vision’.  In Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society of London, Vol. 128 (1838). pp. 371-394. pp. 
371-394. The concept of the stereoscope was later developed by Sir David Brewster who presented the lenticular stereoscope – 
the first portable 3D viewing device- at the Great Exhibition in 1851.
15  The notion of the “exosomatic organ” is elaborated by Robert E. Innis. Innis considers the body, in the process of cognition and 
perception (“meaning-making and sense-giving”), as a kind of cyborg formation emerging at the intertwining of an ‘artificial body’ 
and the human’s own ‘natural equipment’. Beyond the physicality of the objects and techniques, “exosomatic organs” expand to 
the creation of collective biases that emerge from the practices involved in their use. Robert E. Innis, Pragmatism and the Forms of 
Sense: Language, Perception, Technics, p. 131-132.
16  Crary, Jonathan, Techniques of the Observer: On vision and modernity in the nineteenth century (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 
1992), p. 9.
17  Minkowski, Herman, Space and Time: Minkowski’s Papers on Relativity, trans. Fritz Lewertoff and Vesselin Petkov (Montréal: 
Minkowski Institute Press, 2012). http://www/minkowskiinstitute.org/mip/ [Accessed: 25.04.13]
18  Bergson, Henri, Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness (1889), trans. F.L. Pogson (New York: 
Dover Publications, 2001). 
19  Moholy-Nagy, László, Vision in motion (Chicago: Paul Theobald and Company, 1947).
20  “Although vision suggests sight as a physical operation, and visuality sight as a social fact, the two are not opposed as nature to 
culture”. Hal Foster, Vision and Visuality (Seattle: Bay Press, 1988), p. ix.
21  Ibid., p. ix.
Weaving Lines/Looming Narratives (WL/LN) proposed an expansion 
of architectural drawing, by expanding its subject-matter, its ‘field 
of view’, from the enduring materiality of the built to the transitive 
manifestations of action. Considering the ways in which visual relations 
and modes of perception come to play in the process of reading (and 
consequently writing) both the city and the drawing, the second part of 
the project – which involved the transition from the experimental field 
of the small scale site to the city – became concerned with the processes 
of visual perception, interpretation, and even conception, which are 
involved in urban representation. Already in WL/LN, the implications 
of the physical limitations of visual perception became prominent in 
the consideration of material presence and the ways in which this could 
be transcribed into a visual code of representation. In architectural 
drawing, however – and perhaps even architectural spaces as well, 
representational regimes and their semiotic function become tangled 
with what Christian Metz defines as “scopic regimes”,13 the impact of 
which expands beyond the practicalities of a transcription of the city 
on the basis of physical presence (as the interpretation of matter in WL/
LN suggested). Eventually, ideological effects of power, knowledge, as 
well as desire, which can be conscious and unconscious, collective and 
personal, universal and site-specific, affect the ways in which what is 
considered as ‘present’ in the object of representation, is made present 
within architectural drawing. 
Shifting focus to the scale of the city, Kaleidoscopic City also pursues a 
reconsideration of urban representation by pushing architecture’s own 
codified modes to include what is still currently excluded by convention. 
This is attempted by putting pressure on the historical constitution of 
the codes, by addressing the extensions and transformations that the 
modalities of our visual perception have undergone under the influence 
of modernity, as well as a reinterpretation of their effect upon the image 
of the city. The installation was presented at the Inspace Gallery in 
Edinburgh, in the frame of the Plenitude & Emptiness Symposium on 
Architectural Research by Design, at ESALA, Edinburgh College of Art 
in October 2013, along with a short first draft of this essay.
the new vision of ‘the world in 
motion’ – as we have seen in 
Instructions, Chapter II – became 
one of the main preoccupations of 
modernist artists such as László 
Moholy-Nagy, who sought to 
bring to visibility the implications 
and possibilities of the emerging 
space paradigm.19 The shift that 
was taking place in the mental 
image of looking was leading to 
a shift in the physical image of 
representation.
As opposed to ocularcentrism 
which alludes to the workings of 
the eye, the concept of the scopic 
regime regards visuality, that is, 
as defined by Hal Foster, “sight 
as a social fact”.20 This distinction 
between vision and visuality does 
not point to an opposition between 
the nature and culture of vision, 
but to a distinction between the 
eye (and sight) as subject and as 
object. The scopic regime then, 
concerned with uniting vision and 
visuality into an “essential vision”21 
involves equally the modalities of 
looking as well as representing. 
Defined as a ‘regime’, a set of 
rules, the term suggests indeed 
a hegemonic intention in relation 
to vision and its related practices. 
It is these scopic regimes then, 
rather than vision itself, that are 
capable of regulating and perhaps 
even dominating, raising thus issues of ideology and intentionality with regards to the politics of 
observation and representation. As Tom Conley writes, “A person on foot in a modem city is no less 
indoctrinated than anyone writing a dissertation following the laws of usage that chart the frame of 
common sense”.22 The play between vision, as an individual practice of inhabitation, and visuality, as a 
socially informed (or guided) ideology, becomes central in the understanding of the city, as entity and 
as object of representation, in which institutional, political, or even capital driven models of perception 
are often revealed. As Tom Conley remarks, the two become so embedded in one another that the 
distinction between the dominant and the dominated party becomes blurred.23 Eye and city are staged 
towards one another in a dialectic between conditions of observation and representation.
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[11] Amsterdam, Daniel Stalpaert (ca. 1670)
[10] Map of Paris, Jacques Gomboust (1652)
GAZE
63
The often antagonistic coexistence of multiple scopic regimes has been made manifest in the 
representation of cities, where the shadow of the Ptolemaic distinction between geography and 
chorography, between mathematical abstraction and qualitative resemblance, has historically 
marked the understanding of the city through varying instrumentalisations of vision. Multiple view 
representations, their expression ranging from the hybrid technique of Daniel Stalpaert’s engraving 
of Amsterdam (ca. 1670) to Jacques Gomboust’s collective map of Paris (1652) [fig. 10-11], have 
often proposed a mediation in the opposition between pictorial resemblance and the conceptual 
abstraction that has traditionally defined the pursuit of totality within representational regimes of 
urban cartography, reflecting the oscillation of the understanding of vision as concrete knowledge or 
illusion. The positioning of the ‘looking eye’ has defined the development of representational regimes 
through scopic attitudes that define not only the observation of their subject, namely the city, but also 
the reception of the image presented. The instrumentalisation of the view was manifest in the use 
of vantage points for the conceptual construction, but primarily for the associative validation of, and 
immersion in urban representations, as seen in Giorgio Vasari’s The View with a Chain of Florence 
(ca. 1485), or Gomboust’s map of Paris (1652), where the depiction of the artist at work in the former, 
or of an envisioning citizenry in  the latter – a citizenry which was at once presented as subject and 
as object to king Louis XIV receiving the map – established a ‘reality’ of the image by embedding the 
body of the receiving viewer into representation.24 This attachment to the land as a kind of natural 
‘prosthesis’ to the observing body, was primarily present in oblique and multiple view representations, 
serving as the connecting point between an institutional, meaning-laden visuality and an individual 
experience of situated perception.25 The transition from the empiric figuration of the bird’s eye view 
to the speculation of the orthogonal plan, which was established as the dominant mode of urban 
representation from the 19th century onwards, not only illustrates a changing ideology but perhaps 
also suggests the ‘education’ of the eye. The dissemination of a certain visuality that was previously 
exclusive to specialists and intellectuals – artillery and fortification engineers, architects and planners 
– is indicative of the reciprocal exchanges between the experience of the city and the ‘experience’ of 
its representation.26 As the city became more ‘alien’, due to its expanding scale and changing form, its 
representation became more popular, as well as popularised.
22  Tom Conley, ‘Foreword: The King’s Effects,’ in Louis Marin, The Portrait of the 
King (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), p. vi.
23  Ibid., p. ix.
24  Marin writes on the representation of the figures in Gomboust’s map: “In the 
places where they appear, these five figures (two nobles, a bourgeoise, and two of 
the people) designate and draw attention to the knot of the chiasmus of the real and 
representation: the real city in its moment of history, Paris in 1652. […] this city here 
returns, more than three centuries later, faithful, exact, and rigorous, toward our eye 
today through our attentive gaze. Figures in their place […] just like that we, now, 
are their figures in the real that we only perceive, in 1981”. Louis Marin, ‘The King 
and his Geometer’ (1981), in The Portrait of the King (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1988), pp. 168-179; p. 178-179.
25  In the essay ‘Perspective as Symbolic Form’ Erwin Panofsky illustrates the 
effects of the symbolic connotations of the perspectival regime. Panofsky, Erwin, 
Perspective as Symbolic Form (New York: Zone Books, 1991).
26  These modes of visuality originated from the practice of fortification engineers, 
and later architects and surveyors.
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[4] National Museum of Scotland
[5] Arthur’s Seat
[6] Royal Observatory
[G2] Tiles of the gallery floor are being replaced 
in order to emphasize the transversal ‘section’ of the installation 
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Kaleidoscopic City returned to the concept of the transversal survey of 
movements that was introduced in WL/LN, this time at a larger site 
spanning over the Old City of Edinburgh. ‘Zooming out’ from the grid 
structure that had defined the previous site, and seeking to anchor the 
shift of scale to normative architectural graphic scales, the boundaries 
of the site delineated an area that was 100:1 larger than the first site 
(1,500x1,500 metres). 
The idea of sampling the complexity of the site by means of six characters 
was also maintained from WL/LN, and the criteria of selection were the 
same as before with regard to scale, material expression and temporality. 
Nevertheless, on seeking to critically address the ways in which the city 
has been historically represented and the visual negotiations between 
the city and the drawing that these reflect, this representation proposed 
a mapping of the city that would engage with the previously established 
‘images’ already pertaining to the site. The site was in this case large 
enough to relate to the visually charged image of the city as a predefined 
entity. Although this thesis is not concerned with the specifics of 
the particular city as such, it is in the case of the Kaleidoscopic City 
concerned with the ways in which notions of specificity may expand 
form the idea of a physical context (as in site-specificity) into notions of 
‘visual specificity’. It is these specificities that emerged from the past and 
present of Edinburgh that were anticipated in this project, not as unique 
conditions but as instantiations of a different kind of ‘mobility’ entailed 
in architectural, and in particular in urban representation.
The Geological Map: Edinburgh’s historic centre spans along the Royal 
Mile, the main street connecting the old centres of power: the Castle 
Rock on the West and the Holyrood Palace on the East, almost on the 
foot of Arthur’s Seat. The ground upon which the main axis of the Old 
Town is situated constitutes largely of the volcanic rock erupted from 
Arthur’s Seat, now extinct, volcano. The city’s ground is included in the 
surveyed characters of this representation, not as a static territory but 
as a shifting field.
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[12] Plan of Rome detail, Giambattista Nolli (1748)
[13] Ordnance Survey Map of Edinburgh detail (1948)
[14] Ordnance Survey Map of Edinburgh detail (2016)
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27  Giacomo de Barbari’s Portrait of Venice can be considered as consolidating 
this modality of urban representation. The elevation of the viewpoint from the 
hilltop views of the oblique to an ideal, imagined aerial viewpoint, may suggest an 
‘outgrowth’ of the gaze from the hilltop view to the panopticity of the plan. See Hilary 
Ballon, Hilary and David Friedman, ‘Portraying the City in Early Modern Europe: 
Measurement, Representation and Planning’, in Woodward, David (ed.), History 
of Cartography Vol. 3: Cartography in the European Renaissance (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 2007), pp. 680-703;  p. 687.
28  John A. Pinto, ‘Origins and Development of the Ichnographic City Plan’, Journal 
of the Society of Architectural Historians 35 (1) (1976), p. 35.
29  László Moholy-Nagy, The Vision in Motion (Chicago: Paul Theobald and 
Company, 1947), p. 245.
30  De Certeau, ‘Walking in the City’, p.92.
The Aerial View: The ichnographic plan presented the abstraction of a 
panoptic view, long before the distanced totalizing gaze of the view from 
above was physically possible. Today such views are more accessible 
than ever through air travel, software such as Google Earth, or even high 
rise buildings – let’s not forget how Michel De Certeau compares the 
view from the summit New York’s World Trade Centre to the abstracted 
aerial views of architectural representation.30 The airplanes that arrive 
and depart from Edinburgh airport often get to travel around the city’s 
periphery offering similar aerial views to their passengers. The planes 
figure as one of the characters in Kaleidoscopic City, associating the 
aerial view with experience rather than the conventional abstraction.
ii THROUGH THE LOOKING MAP
Despite this apparent ideological coincidence, the impact of the new perception of space as a 
kinetic condition that emerged in the experience of the modern metropolis as well as the perceptive 
explorations of pictorial artists of modernity, did not find a direct counterpart in the representational 
expressions of architecture. The panoptic, simultaneous gaze of the ichnographic plan, foreshadowed 
in the divine elevated viewpoints of the bird’s eye view,27 overcame some of the limitations and spatial 
distortions that the single point of view perspective created while offering a ‘scientific’ exactitude that 
was in agreement with the rationalist attitudes of a functionalist architecture. However, the image of 
the city that it created, relying on conventions established as early as the 15th century, was evidently 
in opposition to the shifting experience of the modern city.28 From early city plans such as Leonardo 
da Vinci’s plan of Imola (ca. 1503) to the Nolli plan of Rome (1748) and contemporary Ordnance 
Survey maps [fig. 12-13-14], the quantitative likeness to the subject is consistently conveyed through 
the rigid alternation of solid versus void of the figure-ground drawing. The totalising view of the plan 
matched the newly conquered view of aerial mobility and, in its abstraction, liberated the impression 
of the static observer of the bird’s eye view, conferring upon the observer/reader a free movement 
across the spaces of the city that are there revealed with equal accuracy. But the city itself is rendered 
as absolutely static. The plan presents the viewer with a selective image, avoiding embracing the 
complex interactions of movement that the modern experience of the city revealed. Laszlo Moholy-
Nagy’s observation indicates the discrepancy between the fixity of the image and the mobility of the 
city, as it emerges in the technologically ‘charged’ perception of modernity:
In our age of airplanes, architecture is viewed not only frontally and from sides, but also from above – 
vision in motion. The bird’s-eye-view, and its opposites, the worm’s and fish-eye views, have become 
a daily experience. Architecture appears no longer static, but if we think of it in terms of airplanes 
and motor cars, architecture is linked with movement. The helicopter, for example, may change the 
entire aspect of town and regional planning so that a formal and structural congruence with the new 
elements, time and speed, will manifest itself.29
Moholy-Nagy’s description is representative of the spatial explorations that concerned the majority 
of art movements of the first half of the twentieth century, such as the Futurists, the Cubists and the 
Constructivists, among others. Although still maintaining focus on the visual impressions of spatial 
experience, the latent concern sketched out in the enumeration of what are visual connections to 
the city, is not strictly scopic. As we have seen in Instructions, Chapter II, Moholy-Nagy’s writings in 
particular advocate the position that this visually interfaced fluidity of perception is biologically tied to 
a wider experience of dwelling as a process of change and becoming for both the individual and the 
place.
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31  De Certeau, ‘Walking in the City’, p.93.
32  Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York: Henry Holt, 1911), 
p. 4. The awkwardness of visual perception towards movement the effects of which on 
theories of presence and perception have been evident since Ancient Greek Thought, is 
also pointed out by Jay. See Martin, Downcast Eyes, p. 24-25.
33  For a discussion of the effects of constancy on vision see James Gibson, ‘On 
Constancy and Invariance in Perception’, in Gyorgy Kepes (ed.), The Nature and Art of 
Motion (New York: G. Braziller, 1965), pp. 60-70. 
34  Jay, ‘Scopic Regimes’, p. 19.
35  Ibid., p. 16.
36  Christine Buci-Giucksmann, quoted in Hal Foster, Vision and Visuality, p. 19.
37  Ibid., p. 16-17.
38  Ibid., p 12.
39  Quoted by Jay in Ibid., p. 19.
40  Quoted in Mark Dorrian, ‘On Google Earth’, In Mark Dorrian and Federic Pousin 
(eds.), Seeing from Above: The Aerial View in Visual Culture (London and New York: I.B. 
Tauris, 2013), pp. 290-307; p. 291.
Is this discrepancy then, between the static representation and the kinetic perception, a representational, 
or a ‘scopic’ issue? In other words, is this, in De Certeau’s words,31 “misunderstanding” owing to a 
limitation of representational techniques, such as the difficulties faced by early Renaissance surveyors 
on measuring the shape of streets and buildings, or is there perhaps a need to redefine the very subject 
matter of representation? The question that arises is therefore not only how an expansion of the 
capabilities of an architectural representation could take place, but furthermore, under the influence of 
the dominant scopic regimes, what do we in fact consider as physically present in order to re-present? 
The choice of what is made visible in architectural representation has been diachronically established 
according to a material criterion for the visual. On one hand, that which is tangible, quantifiable or, 
visually constant is regarded as legible and is therefore possible of being transcoded into the linear 
realm of the drawing. On the other hand, that which is not confined within the conscious capabilities 
of vision is rendered redundant. As Henri Begrson has put it “we look away”, from movement as a 
manifestation of change and temporality.32 The criteria of representation in architectural drawing are 
thus submitted to the criteria of materiality as expressed through a duration masked by constancy 
in the process of visual perception.33 And indeed, the representational is inevitably visual due to its 
involving an act of reading, but does the represented need to be respectively ‘scopic’?
Although rejecting hierarchies, Jay suggests that the scopic regime most ‘in place’ within modernity 
and its postmodern aftermath would be that of the Baroque.34 Originating in seventeenth century art, 
Baroque emerged as a distinct reaction to Cartesian perspectivalism, opposing the linear, rationalist 
clarity of classicism with a plurality of forms and images that provoked the movement of the eyes 
and invited the agency of vision as a producer of meaning. Associated with the Portuguese barocco, 
from the Spanish baruecco, meaning “irregular pearl”,35 baroque proposed a rhetoric where images 
functioned as signs, and concepts were inextricably charged with visuality. This “madness of vision” as 
described by French philosopher Christine Buci-Giucksmann36 promoted a space of visual multiplicity 
as opposed to an absolute space of universal vision.37 Thus, it was equally not concerned with the notion 
of legibility as clarity of matter in the same way that the ‘Art of Describing’, emerging from the detailed 
veracity of Dutch painting was.38 Standing for the odd or the peculiar, as opposed to the ideal, baroque 
seems to contradict the canonicity of form for the sake of the peculiar, that which was previously not 
simply excluded, but upon whose exclusion the validity of truth and beauty was previously dependent. 
The hermeneutic proliferation of meaning, the linguistic (post)structuralism of the image as expressed 
in twentieth century art from the Surrealists onwards appear to comply with the visual ideology of 
Baroque as the “palimpsest of the unseeable”, in the words of Buci-Giucksmann.39 
Where then does architectural representation stand with respect to its ‘scopic’ modalities? If the 
cartographic/geographic dualism – as discussed in Instructions, Chapter III – is considered as 
delineating the current paradigm of architectural representation, what could the representational 
regime pertaining to the current architectural discourse entail, as the plan remains the ubiquitous and 
eternal bearer of the image of the city? In an unprecedented dissemination of ‘cartographic’ imagery, 
the dweller of the world, rather than the city, is now no longer merely familiar and ‘literate’ with regards 
to reading the orthographic projection of the plan. Google Earth presents its users with the entirety 
of the globe on their screen, and with it the ability to zoom in from a deep space view to an elevation 
of a few meters above its surface. Officially aspiring to “organise the world’s information and make it 
universally accessible and useful”,40 Google Earth has contributed to what Mark Dorrian describes as 
a “collective planetary unconscious”.41 Does it get closer –and at the same time farther- from ‘holding’, 
from being aware of the earth than this? It seemingly does, as Google Earth, has is gradually substituted 
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41  Ibid., p. 291.
42  The odometer, or hodometer, was a device known since antiquity, used for the 
measuring distances in relation to the number of full rotations of a wheel. In his 
treatise On Architecture, Vitruvius dedicates a distinct chapter to its presentation. 
Vitruvius, On Architecture (ca. 30 BC), trans. Richard Schofield (London: Penguin 
Books, 2009); pp. 300-302. This ancient devise is assumed to have been also used 
by Alberti in is measurements for the Descriptio de Urbis Romanae. See Pinto, ‘The 
Ichnographic City Plan’, p. 35.
43  Jean Starobinski quoted in Jay, Downcast Eyes, p. 19.
44  The term visuality was originally coined by Thomas Carlyle with reference to his 
‘pictorial writing’ where history was ‘visualised’ through the narration of heroes as 
‘agents of visibility.’ See Nicholas Mirzoeff, ‘On Visuality’, Journal of Visual Culture 
5(1) (2006), pp. 53–79.
45  Dorrian, ‘On Google Earth’, p. 291.
The Sky map: The star constellations remain a character in the mapping 
of  Kaleidoscopic City, acting as a counterpart of the ‘earthly’ attachments 
that architectural representations maintain.
by the more popularised version of 
Google Maps. Available directly 
on the browser of desktop, laptop 
computers as well as mobile 
phones and wearable smart-
watches, Google Maps is the 
number one go-to navigation tool for probably billions of users daily. 
As Google Earth is giving way to more available Google maps, we move back from the simulation to 
the map. From the photograph to the linear orthogonal map combined with a ‘photographic’ oblique, 
as opposed to the original catoptric view, when one zooms in in “Earth View”, meaning an aerial view 
similar to that of Google Earth – that being said, the “earth” part of this mode is more likely to refer 
to Google Earth rather than the Earth itself. But what is really new is the immersive effect of the 
Street View function, where the Google Street View car, posing as a contemporary descendant of the 
medieval odometer allows one not only to navigate as if ‘da vivo’ [fig. 15],42 but also to navigate upon the 
‘footsteps’ of the respective ‘Google cartographer’ as if driving down the photographed streets. Google 
Maps, taking the lead and data from the revolutionary Google Earth proposes an accumulation of 
varied visual modalities, an immersive multiple-view representation, where the ‘institutional’ recording 
systems are actively supplemented by the contributions of ordinary users themselves, embellishing 
the map with their own photos (following from Google Earth’s Panoramio), as well as a variety of data 
from business reviews and advertisements to 3D models of buildings. The contemporary city dweller 
no more ‘looks’ with the eyes of the pedestrian ‘flâneur’, but with the camera of the Google Car. The 
popular notion of the map is thus reconsidered while acquiring again a widely used navigational role, 
closer to the original purpose of cartography as opposed to exhibitionist intentions of early urban 
representations, which were intended to declare the status of the rule and the majesty of the city.  Yet, 
this map, collectively produced between the users and the corporation, is highly prescriptive, and most 
of the time remains panoptic for its own sake, in its rationally selected routes proposed to the user 
according to distance, traffic load and bus times. 
Google Maps, making use of the vast amount of information and the connectivity afforded by the World 
Wide Web, represents the visual multiplicity of what the image of the urban has come to mean today 
through fairly conventional modes of representation, such as the orthographic plan, still photography 
and a virtual photographic reality whose effect can be considered as akin to a localised panorama. 
Bringing the user/reader of this ‘mapping’ in an oscillating relationship of distance and proximity to 
its object of representation, it still eliminates the intimacy necessary for the ‘living eye’.43 In the digital 
age, visuality shifts focus from the viewpoint of the ‘hero’, of the ‘ideal one’ as represented in Scottish 
philosopher and historian Thomas Carlyle’s original coining of the term visuality,44 to the viewpoint of 
the ordinary individual. Only the individual is now mediated by, and attached to a scopic regime that 
has become so closely embedded to their visual interface with the world, that it becomes hard to 
make out. This omnipresence of a system of representation that becomes so ubiquitous that it begins 
to approximate virtuality, allows a freedom for collective participation yet one that can only happen 
within specific guidelines. In this way, it substitutes totalism with a holism, which Dorrian describes 
as a “benign encompassing of difference rather than the negation of difference”.45 The abundance of 
participation, does not make up for the lack of plurality, as the result of strategic homogenisation. 
Beyond the publicity and accessibility of Google, oligoptic representations – to borrow a term proposed 
70
[15] Google Street View, Looking towards the project’s initial site in 
Marchmont, Edinburgh.
[16] Rome’s Invisible City, ‘The temple of the Divine Claudius and its 
Underground Quarry ‘, ScanLAB (2015)
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46  Bruno Latour and Emilie Hermant use this to refer to places that maintain views of the city’s infrastructural ‘internal’ functions 
such as water services and traffic. Bruno Latour and Emilie Hermant, Paris: Invisible City (Paris: La Découverte-Les Empêcheurs 
de penser en rond 2006). http://www.bruno-latour.fr/sites/default/files/downloads/ [Accessed 7 December 2011]
47  “During two months, 75 volunteers were tracked by GPS in their everyday movements and routines around the city. These 
traces were then drawn as white lines over a black background. The resulting, animated map has a distinct look and feel of 
psychogeographic experience: it is not precise or rational, but expresses the intuitive and personal aspects of geography. It shows 
a city that does not consist of buildings, roads and water, but of the movement of its inhabitants. […] Viewers of the map get 
involved in a mixture of aesthetic experience, identification and participation – but also a bit of voyeurism. In the installation and on 
the Amsterdam RealTime website, visitors can choose to browse and explore individual participants’ maps or to see the combined 
map as a whole”. Esther Polak, Jeroen Kee and Waag Society, ‘Amsterdam RealTime’ [installation], in Maps of Amsterdam 1866-
2000 (2001).  http://www.li-ma.nl/site/catalogue/art/17300# [Accessed 20 November 2015]
48  Founded in 2010 ScanLAB is a creative studio, pioneering in the area of large scale scanning. ScanLAB Projects, http://
scanlabprojects.co.uk/ [Accessed on 10 December 2015]
49  “With its own rhetoric and representations, each scopic regime seeks to close out these differences: to make of its many social 
visualities one essential vision, or to order them in a natural hierarchy of sight”. Foster, Vision and Visuality, p. ix.
50  This is not limited to services such as Google Earth, or in respect Google Maps, but it is also cultivated by the vast control 
over information that the corporation handles offering a sort of “augmentation of the brain” and, consequently the ‘self.’ See Mark 
Dorrian. ‘On Google Earth’, p. 291-293.
51  Jonathan Beller, ‘KINO-I, KINO-WORLD: Notes on the Cinematic Mode of Production’, in Nicholas Mirzoeff (ed.), The Visual 
Culture Reader: Second revised edition (New York and London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 60-85. 
52  The term first appears in the subheading ‘The Scopic Regime of the Cinema’. Although Metz does not limit the idea of the 
scopic regime to cinema, it is in his discussion on the “signifier of cinema” that he first makes use of the term. Metz, ‘The Passion 
of Perceiving’, p. 61.  
The postcard: Edinburgh is a popular tourist destination. Known as ‘The 
Athens of the North’ for its neoclassical heritage,55 as a UNESCO World 
Heritage site, as Auld Reekie for its dark and (supposedly) ‘haunted’ 
medieval past, and as a festival city for the variety of events that it hosts 
over the Summer, it is a place where multiple identities converge that 
millions of tourists visit each year. The tourist becomes a character in 
Kaleidoscopic City, as a temporary inhabitant who often performs a 
detached ‘overview’ of the city within a short period of time, and one 
that is commonly either conditioned by ready-made impressions – such 
as the postcard or the predetermined views of walking and bus tours – 
or mediated by means of recording such as the photographic camera.  In 
this way, s/he reflects on the image of the city as a collective commodity, 
informed by ready-made images and modes of urban experience.
by Bruno Latour and Emilie Hermant –46 such as the pioneering Amsterdam Real-Time (2001),47 make 
use of information technology like GPS to present real-time data, bringing change into mapping, while 
the form of the city can by now be properly captured in three dimensions, by services such as Scan 
LAB’s large scale 3D scanning “capturing precisely measured, beautifully coloured digital replicas of 
buildings, landscapes, objects” as well as “events” [fig. 16].48 So what remains to be discovered by 
architectural drawing in this age, when everything that can be seen can systematically become ‘visual’ 
and measurable, at the intersection of such multiple visual orders? Or rather, what more is there to 
be included? How do these modalities of looking at the world take effect within architectural drawing 
itself?  How are the symbolic and semiotic actions of the drawing as looking at and as being looked 
at, informed by the collective voyeurism that regulates the image of the city? A voyeurism that begins 
to cultivate corresponding attitudes of exhibitionism, such as the addressing of the “extra-terrestrial” 
online viewer or the Instagram gentrification, of an aestheticized micro-urbanism. Is there any room 
left in the city’s utopia for the secondary scopic regimes emerging from a ‘visual-specificity’, or is this 
multiplicity of spaces limited by the laws of the market?
iii MATERIALITY OF THE VISUAL
If as Hal Foster posits, the purpose of the scopic regime is to fuse vision and visuality to the degree 
that they form a universal vision,49 never before has this succeeded to the degree that is in effect 
now. This homogenisation is akin to the holistic definition of the world and the individual produced by 
corporations such as Google,50 but it is also symptomatic of the embeddedness of the visual as virtual; 
as a visuality mediating between perception and reality, within a constructed unconscious that becomes 
not collective but mass, by substituting subjectivity for homogeneity. Thus, it is the proliferation of 
the visual, carried out in the postmodern through conditions such as Jonathan Beller’s ‘Cinematic 
Mode of Production’,51 including both the ideology of cinema and its succeeding televised and digitised 
‘relative’ media, that suggests not a hegemony of vision but an exquisite embedment of visuality and a 
consequent homogenisation of consciousness, which is carried out through the ‘techniques’ of vision. 
Compared to Jay’s proposed scopic regimes, and in particular the relevance of the Baroque to modern 
visual culture, the ‘cinematic’ appears to surpass the effects of the ‘scopic’ - even though Metz’s 
term was originally coined to describe the scopic effects particular to cinema.52 In Vision and Visuality 
Foster proposes an ‘antidote’ to the homogenisation of vision as its “socialisation” – a reconquering 
of the agency of subjectivity. This 
suggests then the understanding 
of vision as an intersubjectivity 
that reveals the gaze as a dialectic 
rather than a regime.53 The 
cinematic however, does not rely on 
looking as a discursive act, rather 
directly reaches consciousness by 
simulating it.54
In both its daily experience and 
in its representation the city 
is, as Louis Marin also notes, 
both seen and read.58 With the 
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53  Foster, Vision and Visuality, p. ix.
54  Similar effects can be considered also with regard to photography, through Walter 
Benjamin’s concept of the “optical unconscious”. Benjamin, Walter, ‘Little History of 
Photography’, in Michael W. Jennings, Howard Eiland, and Gary Smith (eds.), Walter 
Benjamin: Selected Writings Vol. 2 1927-1934, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London and 
Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 507-530; p. 511-512.
55  Cliff Hague and Paul Jenkins, ‘The changing image and identity of the city in the 21st 
century: “Athens of the North” or “North of Athens”’, in Brian Edwards and Paul Jenkins 
(eds.), Edinburgh: The Making of a Capital City Brian Edwards. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh 
University Press, 2005), pp. 217-230; p. 218.
56  In the patent granted to him in 1787, Barker describes the spatial arrangement of the 
exhibition as an intrinsic part of the Panorama’ “entirely new contrivance or apparatus”: 
“my invention, called La Nature à Coup d’ Œil, is intended, by drawing and painting, and a 
proper disposition of the whole, to perfect an entire view of any country or situation, as it 
appears to an observer turning quite round; to produce which effect, the painter or drawer 
must fix his station, and delineate correctly and connectedly every object which presents 
itself to his view as he turns round […].There must be a circular building or framing 
erected, on which this drawing or painting may be performed; or the fame may be done 
on canvas, or other materials, and fixed or suspended on the fame building or framing, to 
answer the purpose complete. It must be lighted entirely from the top, either by a glazed 
dome or otherwise, as the artist may think proper”. The Panorama, http://www.edvec.
ed.ac.uk/html/projects/panorama/barker.html [Accessed 15 January 2016].
57  Angela Miller remarks the extent of its popularity reflected on an estimated number of 
three hundred giant productions, and an audience of hundreds of millions, in the years 
between 1870 and the appearance of cinema. Angela Miller, ‘The Panorama, the Cinema 
popularisation of the city map, the supposed scopic and representational regimes that come to ‘collide’ 
in representation are not only institutional but also individual, and in that sense not only totalising but 
also singular, albeit, within the cinematic the singular is often overtaken by the holistic. As the city is 
read, as it is enunciated in its utopic interspatiality, architectural design is not defined, but certainly 
conditioned by the scopic regimes that infiltrate architectural representation. This infiltration occurs 
from within architecture and the popular culture, the representational sophistication of which has 
been accelerated by the dissemination of technologies that are entailed in the cinematic. Conventional 
modes of architectural representation evoked an issue of translatability between the drawing and the 
building. Yet, considering the abundance of representations through which the city is – particularly 
within the cinematic/digital culture – experienced and consumed, what kind of ‘transaction’ emerges 
between the drawing and the cit, as a space of not only building but also dwelling? If the map 
represents the production of the ‘discourse’ of the city, which is produced intersubjectively across 
the physiological and the psychological, and at the intersection of the universal and the singular, how 
does this performance of sight, as discursive enunciation of the urban, register into another visual 
performance, that of drawing?
The characteristic that has identified vision so extensively with human perception on the one hand, 
and constituted it so operational to the production of ideology on the other, is exactly this discursive 
function, which is expressed not only with regard to the ways in which sight engages with the world, 
but also with regard to its ability to project the mental back to the material. As Robert Rivlin and Karen 
Gravelle note:
The ability to visualize something internally is closely linked with the ability to describe it verbally. 
Verbal and written descriptions create highly specific mental images [...]. The link between vision, visual 
memory, and verbalization can be quite startling.59 
It is this association between the visual and the linguistic, as a concrete articulation of the internal 
workings of the mind that raises the stakes of vision – along with hearing– among the other senses. 
In the essay the ‘City in its Map and Portrait’,60 Louis Marin underlines the dual character of the 
cartographic image through the paradigm of the city portrait. The notion of the portrait in urban 
representation is most commonly associated with the ’perspective plan’, later known as bird’s eye 
view, the earliest example of which is considered Jacobo de Barbari’s ‘View of Venice’ (1500) [fig. 17]. 
Although there has been no evidence that such representations were based on measured surveys 
rather than mere impressions,61 the perspective plan marks the move of urban representations from a 
symbolic depiction of the city as ideal, to the function of map as a record concerned with the specificity 
of the city’s geographical and manmade characteristics,62 as well as the combination of a totalising ‘all-
encompassing’ resemblance with an abstraction that brings urban representation from chorography 
closer to the function of cartography.63 According to Marin, the concept of the portrait primarily 
suggests this abstraction –the selective representation of traits, which is however founded on the 
truth value of individuality: the city is portrayed as an individual and the map is both a presentation of 
the ‘pro-trait’ but also a pro-ject. The city portrait is therefore, according to Marin, characterized by a 
double meaning of intentionality and recollection:
A portrait, a city map, is thus at once the trace of a residual past and the structure for a future to be 
produced.64
The expression of this twofold nature of the city portrait proceeds, according to Marin, through the two 
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and the Emergence of the Spectacular’, Wide Angle 18 (2) (1996), pp. 34-69; p. 36. http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/
wide_angle/v018/18.2miller.html [Accessed 15 January 2016].
58  Louis Marin, ‘The City’s Portrait in its Utopics’, in Utopics: Spatial Play (New Jersey: Humanities Press 1984), pp. 
201-232; p. 203.
59  Rivlin, Robert and Karen Gravelle (1984). Deciphering the Senses: The Expanding World of Human Perception. 
60  Louis Marin, ‘The City in its Map and Portrait’, in On Representation (Stanford University Press, 2001), pp. 202-218.
61  Ballon et al, ‘Portraying the City’, p. 690.
62  As Juergen Schulz points out, that maps earlier than 1500 were mostly concerned with “the representation of 
religious mysteries and history, rather than the recording of precise geographical facts”. Juergen Schulz, ‘Jacobo de 
Barbari’s View of Venice: Map Making, City Views, and Moralizing Geography before the year 1500’, The Art Bulletin 60 
(3) (1978), pp. 425-475; p.446.  
63  The concept of chorography and the ambiguities surrounding its description by Ptolemy against the lack of any 
concrete paradigms in his Atlas, triggered the controversy around chorography as a ‘true likeness’ based on a sensual 
subjectivity, being inferior to the intellectual and mathematical value of geography, and hence suggesting a distancing 
between chorography as the representation of ‘localities’ to cartography, and particularly cartography as understood 
today, functioning between the symbolic and the figural, and as it emerges in contemporary cartographic strategies in 
architecture. On a discussion around chorography in the Renaissance, see Lucia Nuti, ‘Mapping Places: Chorography 
and Vision in the Renaissance’, in Dennis Cosgrove (ed.), Mappings (London: Reaktion Books, 1999), pp. 90-108; p. 
91.
64  Marin, ‘The City in its Map and Protrait’, p. 205.
65  Plato, Cratylus (ca. 360 BC), trans. David Sedley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
The Panorama: Edinburgh is the birthplace of the Panorama, which 
was patented in 1796 by Irish painter Jonathan Barker, based on his 
360 degrees painting of the view from the top of Calton Hill [fig. 18]. 
Presenting the viewer with immersive panoramic views of landscapes, 
cityscapes and historical events, which were exhibited in specifically 
designed circular buildings,56 the Panorama became a popular form of 
mass entertainment in the nineteenth century [fig. 19].57 In its specific 
staging of the viewer within rather than without the view, the Panorama 
offered for the first time the experience of a mass mediated virtuality, 
where the subject was displaced in space and time from its surroundings 
into a hyperrealistic illusion, where the pursuit of a realistic image was 
fulfilled through a constructed virtuality. The image of the real was 
there conditioned through what Otto describes as “an observation of 
observation”, where subjectivity was dispersed between the viewer and 
the spatial arrangement of the visual perception as a kind of theatrical 
event, as well as the ‘first-order’ observation of the artist. 
As Miller states, the Panorama foreshadowed the mass mediated, 
spatiotemporal illusion of cinema and the modernist alienation from 
the real that it suggests. The Panorama thus stands in the Kaleidoscopic 
City for the composite immersive mediated view, which can be today 
found not only in cinema but also in digital environments such as 
Google Earth’s Street View. As both these latter instances rely on the 
recomposition of stills (cinema in a sequential/temporal and Street 
View in a kinetic/spatial manner) my camera becomes the character 
that refers to the panorama in Kaleidoscopic City. The distinct spatial 
arrangement of the Panorama as “the observation of observation”, is 
transposed into the suturing of the stills.
essential modes of enunciation, 
description and narration, which 
reflect respectively the iconic 
and the symbolic functions of 
signification. Signification occurs 
in this case in the experience of the 
map as a visually received object. 
As Marin states, both modes of 
expression involve a practice of 
observation. Description refers to 
an external, ‘synoptic’ gaze, that 
reflects a “stable order of places”, 
while narration regards a moving 
gaze, working through space and 
itineraries”. The ‘pro-trait’ in the 
map is that which is being put 
forward, ‘pro-duced’, extracted 
or abstracted by representation, 
from the individual portrayed. 
The map then presents both the 
city and its projection of the city, 
which is experienced again from 
within the drawing through a 
sequence of interrelated gazes. 
This movement between what is 
present and what is represented 
is therefore partly voluntary –an 
instrumental abstraction, and 
partly an omission, which is 
the result of the consecutive filtering of the original through not only a double ‘vision’ (towards the 
city, and towards the representation of the city), but also through the regimes that regulate both 
the understanding of presence within the referent and within the representation. There is therefore 
involved, in this consecutive ‘looking’ a cinematic jolt, a seeing interval between what appear as discrete 
conditions, which seems to occur as visual perception mediates between experience (immediate 
and remembered), and the image of graphic representation. Hence, although it is a re-presentation 
rather than a reconstruction that the drawing pursues, what becomes defining of the degree of the 
discrepancy, from the intentionality of abstraction to the inconsistency of misrepresentation, seems to 
be the intermediate ‘movement’ of its visual perception.
In Plato’s dialogue Cratylus, Socrates appears to propose the etymology of anthropos (άνθρωπος), 
the Greek word for human, as “anathrôn ha opôpe”: he who reflects on what he has seen.65 Although 
this etymological analysis is commonly challenged, Socrates’ interpretation points out exactly to the 
close relation between sight and intelligence. In Matter and Memory, Henri Bergson, examines this 
transition from the physicality of matter to the mental image of perception, pointing out the degree of 
consciousness – or rather unconsciousness – of human perception as the driving force of a perpetual 
becoming:
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[17] View of Venice, Jacopo de Barbari (1500)
[18] Panorama of Edinburgh from Calton Hill (extract, 
Jonathan Barker (1789-1790)
[19] Robert Barker’s Leicester Square Panorama, London (1793)
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66  Herni Bergson, Matter and Memory (1896), trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. 
Scott Palmer (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1911), p. 1.
67  Ibid., p. xvii.
68  “When a ray of light passes from one medium into another, it usually traverses 
it with a change of direction. But the respective densities of the two media may be 
such that, for a given angle of incidence, refraction is no longer possible. Then we 
have total reflexion [...]. Perception is just a phenomenon of the same kind [...] there 
is for images merely a difference of degree, and not of kind, between being and 
being consciously perceived. Ibid. p. 12.
69  “[…] my body. This image occupies the centre; by it all the others are 
conditioned; at each of its movements everything changes, as though by a turn of a 
kaleidoscope”. Ibid., p. 12. 
70  Ibid. p. 236.
The bird’s eye view: In the oblique aerial vista of the bird’s eye view, the 
constitutional human meets the unpredictability of the animal. If there 
is a bird looking at Edinburgh, it must be a seagull. The birds, flying in 
from the Firth of Forth on Edinburgh’s North, can be found all over the 
city, yet often rest on high vantage points, from street lamps and heads 
of statues, to the cliffs of Edinburgh Castle Rock.
[...] it is a mistake to reduce matter to the perception which we have of it, a mistake also to make 
of it [matter] a thing able to produce in us perceptions, but in itself of another nature than they [our 
perceptions]. 66
Bergson distinguishes the actuality of matter, from the virtual image of perception. However, he does 
not propose a clear opposition between the physical and the mental –a dualism that could be perhaps 
transposed to the visual and the intellectual. By reassessing the “common sense” meaning of the 
image, an image that he places half way between the idealist representation and the realist thing, 
between pure idea and strict geometry, Bergson defines matter as an aggregate of such images.67 
In Bergson’s interest the concern about the material and the mental is transposed to the relation 
between body and mind. Perception and material reality are bound together through the body as a 
centre of action, establishing a materiality of perception. In turn, perception as a kind of action itself, 
is hence understood as continuous with images of matter. 
Bergson here explains the transition from matter to perception not as a change of kind but of degree.68 
Space is then understood as oscillating between the physical and the mental by means of the image, 
and the concept of materiality expands, capable of including all the elusive, illegible, intermediate 
states of thought and matter, that is, those states of perception which cannot be explicitly categorised 
neither as one nor as the other: the so-considered process of ‘translation’ from the real to the 
representation and, conversely, from the representation to the real. All facets of space are therefore 
considered material as all facets of matter are, according to Bergson, considered as images. In this 
continuity of matter and perception, the human body is thus itself a kind of privileged image that 
deals with two types of movement: an internal movement that refers to the mental, and the external 
bodily movement that refers to the relationship with its surroundings and the interaction with other 
images. Consequently the animate constitutes a form of ‘living matter’, as through its movements it 
conditions and affects the image of the space around it, in Bergson words, “as though by a turn of a 
kaleidoscope”.69 
By discussing perception and matter through the concept of the image, Bergson’s approach may 
appear to suggest a primacy of the visual. However, it is clear that he does not limit the image to 
the visual, nor the imaginary. Instead of a visual manifestation of matter, what Bergson asserts is 
the participation of the human body in matter, what he regards as pure perception, and at the same 
time, the multiplicity of conscious perception which he identifies with memory. Consciousness is then 
regarded as the degree of difference between matter and memory, between perception as description 
and perception as narrative. What the concept of the image as such offers, is the idea of multiplicity, 
of both the actual and the virtual as an accumulation of images, the montage of which is always the 
result of a movement: a transference that represents a duration.
[…] in pure perception, the perceived object is a present object […] Its image then is actually given […] 
But with memory it is otherwise, for a remembrance is the representation of an absent object.70 
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It appears then, that the transference of the ‘original’ to representation is also concluded in a dual 
movement: an externalized physical interaction and the internalized mobility of the mental image, 
which through the concept of the image as explained by Bergson, remains both visual and speculative. 
To return thus to the image of the city as a construct of architectural representation, a movement 
from matter to memory, is to return to an image of knowledge of the city as a recollection, which is 
enriched by both the conscious and the unconscious. This process of suturing the two that is entailed 
in human perception, is what Bergson has paralleled to an internal ‘cinematograph’: a mechanism 
that does not translate, but projects the heterogeneous continuity of duration to discrete spatialized 
instances, only in order to mentally produce out of them a new continuity. “Such is the contrivance 
of the cinematograph. And such is also that of our knowledge”,71 writes Bergson. But this, as he 
remarks, is an abstraction that seeks to rationalise our understanding of the multiplicity of presence, 
by rendering the kinetic process visible as a static object. 
In the same way, in a ‘cinematic mode of visuality’, narration is provided by a constructed ‘cinematography’ 
that simulates and thus produces consciousness. Although then this ‘newly’ conquered comprehension 
of a vision and space in motion of modernity that Bergson’s theory of duration foreshadowed, has 
since continued to expand in parallel to practices of spatial representation such as digital modes 
of visualization, what remains critical is the importance of architectural representation as a visual 
language free of presuppositions and thus able to both look and speculate, rather than simply simulate. 
If the cinematic in urban representation compromises the agency of perception by being too akin to 
the mechanisms of human perception, what then could the paradigm for a representation of the urban 
be? Normative architectural representations, have traditionally proposed a ‘material’ criterion for the 
visual, and in return a visual criterion for the material, advocating to the establishment of presence 
within, and consequently without representation –as the representation has been seen to propose 
a validation for reality. Yet, what is excluded is not merely the unseen as the not constant, but also 
the unseen as the intersubjective gaze that will constitute representation as a collective terrain of 
consciousness rather than a ready-made virtuality. This constitutes a kind of ‘visual-specificity’, which 
may not be ‘material’, yet is visually materialized through representation. Instances of this ‘visual-
specificity’ can perhaps be traced in the cartographic practices as discussed by Mark Dorrian,72 where 
representational ‘pre-existents’ pose as new sites, new contexts, or new origins of presence, enriching 
the referent of the representation with the multiplicity of scopic orders that ‘obscurely’ condition its 
understanding. 
71  Bergson, Henri, Creative Evolution, trans. Arthur Mitchell (New York: Henry Holt, 
1911), p. 306. 
72  Mark Dorrian, ‘Architecture’s Cartographic Turn’, in Frederic Pousin (ed.), Figures 
de la Ville et Construction des Savoirs (Paris : CNRS Editions, 2005), pp. 61-72. See 
also Instructions, Chapter III.
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73 A similar approach, expanding the attention of urban representation from the 
mere observation of the ground, can be found in the drawing ‘Composite City’, 
compiled by students of the 2012-2014 M.Arch. course Lisbon-Tagus: Building 
in the City of Unsure Ground, led by Suzanne Ewing at the Edinburgh School 
of Architecture and Landscape Architecture. This composite mapping included 
aqueous and airborne conditions on representing Lisbon. ‘Composite City’. See 
Suzanne Ewing (curator), Saltcities: Drawing the City of the Unsure Ground, 
Shrinking Cities/Expanding Landscapes, https://expandinglandscapes.wordpress.
com/exhibitions/saltcities/. [Accessed 10 September 2016].
74 Stellarium, http://www.stellarium.org/en_GB/ [Accessed 15 January 2015], Flight 
Radar, https://www.flightradar24.com/55.63,-1.15/6 [Accessed 10 January 2016] 
and British Geological Survey, Geology of Britain Viewer, http://www.bgs.ac.uk/
discoveringGeology/geologyOfBritain/viewer.html [Accessed 10 January 2016].
The six characters selected were anchored to interpretations of the 
modalities of observation involved in a range of representational 
modes. In congruence with the revision of the scope and codes of 
representation that had been established in WL/LN, these modes 
of representation were, with regard to their scope, not limited to the 
strictly ‘architectural’ but expanding attention from ground to air, 
ranging from the subterranean to the stellar, and from the individual 
to the animal and the institutional.73 The geological map, aerial view, 
the sky map, the postcard, the panorama and the bird’s eye view, posed 
as means to interrogate the city as a place of congested visualities and, 
as a consequence, subjectivities. The [1] the terrain of the city, [2] the 
aeroplanes, [3] the star constellations, [4] the tourist, [5] the seagull, 
and [6] my camera stood as operators/actors of these visual orders in 
the drawing.
The distinct modes of representation were thus introduced through the 
specific modes of action of the respective characters, into the continuous 
space of the drawing. This was done following the practices developed 
in WL/LN, through planar mappings of sequences of instances, 
which were acquired either through personal observation by means 
of the camera (in the case of the tourist, the seagul and the camera) 
or through oligoptic mappings and software (such as Stellarium in the 
case of the stars, Flight Radar for the planes, and Geology of Britain 
Viewer for the terrain).74 Each character thus, became much more than 
themselves. In experiencing the scale of the city, they were charged 
with the respective visual and material culture that was related to the 
modalities of experiencing and, more specifically, of looking at the city, 
implied in the corresponding modes of representation. The mappings 
of the characters were laser-engraved and allocated in groups upon six 
layers of clear acrylic, which similarly to the arrangement of WL/LN 
added a third dimension of relevant depth to the installation. Seemingly 
separated between different heights, but in reality brought together 
through the transparency and reflection of this series of acrylics, acting 
as ‘lenses’, these lines remained almost immaterial, hovering in the air 
rather than being confined to the two dimensions of a sheet of paper. 
The specificities of a number of distinct scopic regimes that acted 
upon the city, thus informed the codes of the collective representation. 
Nevertheless, as each one of these visual orders was equally considered 
in the ‘writing’ of the drawing’ it became relevant that each one could be 













[G5] Site II: Tourist at the Hutton Roof, National Museum of Scotland
[G6] Site II: Tourist in Bus, Transcribed Frame
[G7] Site II: Tourist on Bus, Sequence




Scopic regimes and the respective modes of representations emerged 
then not only as modes of sight, but also as ‘sites’ that interacted with 
the representation of the city as the actual site. Six sites that acted as 
viewing devices towards the city were recognised in [1] the mass of 
Arthur’s Seat Hill, [2] the Camera Obscura Observation Tower, [3] The 
Royal Observatory, [4] the National Museum of Scotland, [5] the Calton 
Hill Observation Tower, and [6] Edinburgh Castle, as representatives 
of the forms of representation of the city interrogated. If then each 
representational regime, and its corresponding scopic modes towards 
the observation of the city were transposed to the process of drawing 
through the surveying of their corresponding character, their scopic 
attitudes were also transposed into the observation of the drawing, 
in an exchange of sites and sights between the drawing and the city. 
Associating characters, and representations in pairs, six new optical 
devices (respectively [1] The Mirror and [2] The Observatory, [4] The 
Cabinet and [5] The Telescope, and [2/5] The Terrain, connecting 
the Castle to Arthur’s Seat), offered a range of  readings, which were 
intended to complement each other towards a collective reading of 
the whole. These prostheses, mediating between body and drawing, in 
effect pushed the representation from the two-dimensional physicality 
of the drawing surface towards the three-dimensionality of installation. 
However, this was not to point out a limitation of the surface nature 
of normative architectural representations, rather an opportunity of 
‘modelling’, and in a sense ‘drawing in space’, the immersive effects 
emanating from the drawing and its kaleidoscopic function. 
[G8] Kaleidoscopic City: The Telescope  and Cabinet




[G11] Kaleidoscopic City: Looking at the Mirror from the Observatory




[G13] Kaleidoscopic City: The Kaleidoscope looking at the Tourist’s frames, 
embedded upon the City plate
[G14] Kaleidoscopic City: The Terrain extending to the East of the site
[G15] Tourist Frames detail with fragments of the Terrain
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75  Hence the neologism deriving from Greek words kalos (κάλος), meaning beauty, 
eidos (είδος) - form and skopeo (σκοπέω-ώ), meaning to see. David Brewster, The 
Kaleidoscope: Its history, theory and construction (London: John Murray, 1858), p. 1.
76 Ibid., p. 134-136.
77  Charles Baudelaire, ‘The Painter of Modern Life’ (1863), in Jonathan Mayne (ed.), 
The Painter of Modern Life and Other Essays (London: Phaidon Press, 1995), pp 
1-41; p. 9.
78  Bergson, Creative Evolution, p. 305.
79  Ibid., p. 304.
80  Catherine Ingraham, Architecture and the Burdens of Linearity (New Haven 
and London: Yale University Press, 1998), pp. 114-147. Ingraham’s idea of the 
architectural lament is also discussed in Speculum, ‘To Draw a Line’.
81  Vitruvius’ On Architecture [De Architectura, ca. 30 BC], is the first architectural rule 
book known today, which distinctively suggested the symmetry and proportions of the 
human body as a paradigm for the achievement of venustas (beauty) in architectural 
design, compiling an essential triad of qualities completed by firmitas (solidity) and 
utilitas (usefulness). Vitruvius, On Architecture (ca. 30 BC), trans. Richard Schofield 
(London: Penguin Books, 2009), p. 19.
82  On the discussion of origin and geometric precedent as a factor of integrity to 
architecture’s modes of design and representation see the Speculum, ‘To Draw a 
Line’. 
iv TOWARDS AN IMAGE [OF THE 'GOOD' KIND]
One of the optical devices that emerged from the experimentations with vision of the 19th century was 
the kaleidoscope. In 1814, Scottish scientist Sir David Brewster, was performing an experiment on 
the polarization of light. While placing a series of reflecting plates in a parallel array he noticed the 
phenomenon of the multiplication of an image around a centre. This accidental observation led him to 
the development of the optical device, which de would consequently describe as “an optical instrument 
for creating and exhibiting beautiful forms to look at”.75 Used as an object of what Brewster defined 
as ‘rational amusement’, the kaleidoscope was intended as a mechanical means of artistic production:
It will create in an hour, what a thousand artists could not invent in the course of a year; and while it 
works with such unexampled rapidity, it works also with a corresponding beauty and precision.76 
According to Brewster, the success of the kaleidoscope lay in two principles:  the perpetual variety 
of images offered by the mobilisation of the instrument, and the undeniable symmetry of the images 
produced. On the one hand, due to its mobility, the kaleidoscope offered an inexhaustible supply of new 
images as even a minute movement of the device sufficed for the substantial change of the whole of 
the image. On the other hand, this abundance of possibilities was according to Brewster only rendered 
‘beautiful’, due to the order imposed by symmetry. In reality, what the kaleidoscope effectively did was 
to create new images through the multiple reflection of pre-existing objects: disparate, seemingly 
useless fragments of matter such as pieces of glass, cloth, etc. The kaleidoscope was therefore, 
according to Brewster’s descriptions, a device that produced order out of the phenomenally disorderly 
image of the objects it contained. An order that, derived from the optical structure of its mirrors, 
provided an ‘agreeable’ image. It was therefore essentially meant to be a beautifying optical filter. 
In contrast to Brewster’s fascination with the visual order afforded by the symmetry of the structure, 
in the ‘Painter of Modern Life,’ the kaleidoscope serves his contemporary Charles Baudelaire as a 
paradigm for the multiplicity afforded by its mobility, in order to celebrate the dynamic experience of 
the modern city as emerging from the conscious interaction of humans with their urban surroundings: 
[…] the lover of universal life enters into the crowd as though it were an immense reservoir of electrical 
energy. Or we might liken him to a mirror as vast as the crowd itself; or to a kaleidoscope gifted with 
consciousness, responding to each one of its movements and reproducing the multiplicity of life and the 
flickering grace of all the elements of life.77 
Baudelaire’s visual metaphor for the flâneur’s engagement with the city, on one hand, seems to point 
out a certain primacy of the visual. On the other, it also excludes from the kaleidoscope, by pointing out 
the necessity of its addition, the element of consciousness. Baudelaire’s notion of the kaleidoscope is 
in that sense very similar to that of Bergson’s:
[…] the mechanism of our ordinary knowledge is of a cinematographical kind.
Of the altogether practical character of this operation there is no possible doubt. Each of our acts 
aims at a certain insertion of our will into the reality. There is, between our body and other bodies, an 
arrangement like that of the pieces of glass that compose a kaleidoscopic picture. Our activity goes 
from an arrangement to a re-arrangement, each time no doubt giving the kaleidoscope a new shake, but 
not interesting [sic] itself in the shake, and seeing only the new picture. […] we may say, if we are not 
abusing this kind of illustration, that the cinematographical character of our knowledge of things is due 
to the kaleidoscopic character of our adaptation to them.78 
The kaleidoscope models human perception as agent of a wilful multiplicity, where the body stands 
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83  Giacomo Barozzi da Vignola’s Canon of the Five Orders of Architecture (1562), 
an architectural treatise comprising of thirty-two engravings as well as some brief 
accompanying texts, summarizes the forms and figures of the five architectural 
canons in a highly practical manner that allowed for the wider dissemination of the 
orders as a set of exemplary rules for architectural production. Vignola’s work was 
influenced by the work of Vitruvius on compiling De Architectura. Giacomo Barozzi 
da Vignola, Canon of the Five Orders of Architecture (1562), trans. John Leeke 
(New York: Dover Publications, 2011). The idea of the imposition of a geometric 
order upon nature, in relation to architecture and its representational regimes, can 
be also found in Ingraham’s discussion on the understanding of the delineation of 
the landscape as “civilization”. See Catherine Ingraham, The Burdens of Linearity, p. 
7-8.
84  John Macarthur writes on Captain Gordon H. G. Holt’s techniques of aerial 
photography as a tool for ‘the architectural understanding of cities’. Macarthur points 
out Holt’s description of ‘what needs to be understood’ through his photography 
as ‘ordonnance’, the etymology of which he traces not only to Holt’s previous 
engagement with warfare -as an RAF pilot- but also to Claude Perrault’s definition 
as the “systematic arrangement of the parts of architecture”.   John Macarthur, ‘The 
Figure from Above: On the obliqueness of the Plan in Urbanism and Architecture’, 
in Mark Dorrian and Federic Pousin (eds.), Seeing from Above: The Aerial View in 
Visual Culture (London and New York: I.B. Tauris, 2013), pp. 188-209; p. 190.
85  Kevin Lynch, The Image of the City (Cambridge, Mass. And London: MIT Press, 
1960), p. 4.
in place of the ‘disorderly’ debris of the kaleidoscope. This multiplicity is however revealed only in 
the resulting ‘image’ rather than the energy of the shake, through a cinematographic concealment 
of becoming into distinct states – that is, distinct images. But if ‘will’ is involved in the shake, 
what remains unconscious, as Baudelaire’s metaphor shows, is the ways in which the reordering, 
‘the re-arrangement of the arrangement’ occurs. That is, the visual isolation of the image from its 
producing action. This philosophical toy, illustrates then, that as much as this effect of reordering is 
a construction, it is equally an often unconscious necessity for our inherent difficulty in grasping the 
fluidity of becoming. As Bergson notes, this “trick” through which perception functions, which is a kind 
of fixing, is the same trick of language.79 The denial, the concealment of this trick, puts us then in a 
constant state of what Catherine Ingraham describes as lament;80 we are constantly unaware of the 
abstraction involved in the ‘image’ of our very own perception.
In the kaleidoscope, the understanding of a geometric order as a criterion of rightness and beauty 
reflects Brewster’s influence by a classicist notion of symmetry. Yet, this indeed ocularcentric notion 
of geometry as a rationalism of form is hardly strange to architecture. Visually it is of course related to 
Cartesian thought and the rationalising of form and perception through perspective, yet that is not its 
beginning. From the outset, architectural historiography has been laden with rules and orders trying 
to codify the principles of a spatial order for both the city and its architecture, at least since Vitruvius’ 
proposition of venustas (beauty) as the product of symmetry and the proportions of the human body 
(ca. 30 BC).81 Architecture has always sought its ‘proper’ origin and found its scientific integrity, as we 
have seen in ‘To Draw a Line’ through Werner Oechslin and Catherine Ingraham, within the reason of 
geometry, both on the level of the sensible (material) and the intelligible (mental).82 Vignola’s Canon 
of the Five Orders of Architecture, as a Renaissance continuation of Vitruvius’ work, is also a great 
example of how a set of mathematical and geometrical rules of harmony was carried through to an 
architectural aesthetics that effectively defined the image of cities up until the advent of modernity.83 
Architecture has consistently served as the means of introducing a rational order upon erratic nature, 
not strictly, but very often on visual terms. Thus, in the reading of the city, it is reasonably the ordered 
constant of architecture that is favoured as a means to comprehension. The figure-ground paradigm 
exalts the primacy of the figure of the built form against the ground, which derives as its negative, 
while even the term ‘ordnance survey’, the official surveying authority of our environments, reminds 
the concept of an existing order. This order is not only related to an understanding of architecture as 
ordonnance,84  but is also largely based on the role of drawing as itself a viewing device, traced to the 
origins of architectural survey as military operation, defining and bringing into visibility fortifications 
and topographical elements related to the arrangement of warfare. 
In contemporary urbanism, aside from the strict geometric form of planning propositions such as Le 
Corbusier’s conceptual Ville Radieuse (1924), or the real metropolis of Manhattan, the concept of a 
visual order as a criterion of a ‘desired’, legible, image emerges in Kevin Lynch’s writings on the Image 
of the City. Lynch’s research sought in 1960 to put critical pressure on the effects of modernity on 
American cities. Lynch proposes the idea of a ‘clear image’ as crucial to navigating and wayfinding in 
the city, but most importantly he deems that it “may serve as a broad frame of reference, an organizer 
of activity or belief or knowledge”, which he considers capable of constituting the city “a useful basis 
for individual growth”.85 This clear ‘experiential’ image is of course relying on a geometric clarity of 
form for the city itself, that is, on the form of the city as defined by its planning and architecture. Lynch 
is referring here to an order that although artificially invoked, manmade, is meant to be inherent in 
the structure of the urban environment rather than an order that is secondarily attributed by a kind 
90
86  Ibid., p. 2.
87  Ibid., p. 12-13.
88  Ibid, p. 13.
89  Georges Didi-Huberman, ‘Connaissance par le Kaléidoscope: Morale du joujou 
et dialectique de l’image selon Walter Benjamin’, Etudes Photographiques 7 (2000). 
https://etudesphotographiques.revues.org/204?lang=en [Accessed 10 October 
2013].
of visual distortion. He is therefore underlining the importance of a clear structure with regard to 
the legibility of the ‘image’, which appears here to surpass the concept of a perceptive experience 
by manifesting upon the physicality of form. Nevertheless, Lynch does not neglect to point out the 
temporal aspect of the city in relation to individual perception:
We are not simply observers of this spectacle, but are ourselves a part of it, on the stage with the other 
participants. Most often, our perception of the city is not sustained, but rather partial, fragmentary, 
mixed with other concerns. Nearly every sense is in operation, and the image is the composite of them 
all... While it may be stable in general outlines for some time, it is ever changing in detail.86 
What Lynch appears to suggest here, is the importance of the multiplicity and fluidity of the image 
of the city that derives from the subjectivity of the viewer in conjunction with a collective memory 
and, moreover, similarly to Bergson, from the participation of humans in shifting the actual form of 
the urban space by means of their actions. Not only design but also an adaptation of our perception 
–a cinematographic one if we rely on Bergson–  are then implied as some form of control over 
the incoherence of this arbitrariness, a means of achieving the necessary clarity of ‘legibility’87. It 
is interesting that Lynch concludes this chapter with philosopher Suzanne Langer’s definition of 
architecture as ‘’the total environment made visible’’.88 Langer’s definition points out not only the 
ocularcentric character of architecture but more importantly, its understanding as a system through 
which the city is visually comprehended. So if in the kaleidoscope, order is optically achieved by the 
symmetrical reflections of the casual material array of the objects contained, as produced by the 
fixed structure of the lenses, in the city, it is architecture that through the conditioning of the built as 
encompassing the physical form of the city, most obviously imposes an order upon the arbitrariness 
of visual experience. There is then an insistence on our receiving of the visual in an ordered manner, 
which is enabled by architectural design and, in turn, by the ways in which the latter conditions the 
form of the city through the ‘scopic’ operations of architectural representation.
The mechanism of the kaleidoscope becomes a central point of reference to the thinking of both 
Bergson and Baudelaire in relation to a spatialized experience of perception. Although  Brewster 
places the emphasis of the ‘rightness’ of his images on the achievement of a kind of order (the beauty 
of precision), it is the principle of mobility that seems to be operative in the analogies of both Bergson 
and Baudelaire. However, the kaleidoscope does not pose here as mechanical paradigm for the city’s 
structure, nor the forms of its representation. Instead it is possible to understand it as an analogy for 
the complexity of the process of visual perception as taking place through the synergetic interaction 
between two elements: multiplicity and order. The virtue of this analogy is that through the mechanism 
of the kaleidoscope it suggests the codependency between presence and perception: the interplay 
between the randomness of the event and the addition of a structural order, either universal or singular, 
which is external to the object as much as it is intrinsic in the unfolding of what is effectively a process 
of becoming through a representation. Considered as an act of observation where representational and 
scopic regimes become fused, architectural drawing constitutes itself a ‘shake’, and a ‘looking through’ 
from one space to another, from the space of the city to the space of architectural representation as 
a kind of optical device. 
The subject of patent controversy, between Brewster in Scotland and Alphonse Giroux in France, the 
kaleidoscope was described by Giroux as a transfigurator (le transfigurateur).89 What this definition 
brings to the fore is not the concept of a reordering pertaining to the application of a geometric 
architectural narrative of visual constancy. Rather, the notion of the transfigurator illuminates a 
process of decomposition and re-composition of a view or image. 
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92   Didi-Huberman, ‘Connaissance par le Kaléidoscope’.
93  We know that for a child repetition is the soul of the play, that nothing gives him 
greater pleasure than to “Do it again!” the obscure urge to repeat things is scarcely 
less powerful in play, scarcely less cunning in its workings, than the sexual impulse 
in love…”. Walter Benjamin, ‘Toys and Play’, in Selected Writings: 1927-34 trans. 
Rodney Livingstone (London and Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 
1999), p. 120.
In the essay ‘Connaissance par le Kaléidoscope’ (Knowledge through the Kaleidoscope) Georges Didi-
Huberman recalls through Walter Benjamin, Baudelaire’s fascination with the kaleidoscope as a kind of 
‘scientific toy’.90 Drawing from Baudelaire’s ‘Philosophy of the Toys’, Didi-Huberman proposes the toy 
as a ‘theory of knowledge’ that progresses through the operations of disconnection and composition. 
There is a constant negotiation between the deconstruction and the re-composition of an image, the 
smashing and the reassembling of the toy, which is carried out through the performance of play, as a 
process of acquiring and ordering knowledge. The kaleidoscope arises as a ‘rational’ toy, a “rational 
amusement”, which results in the production of a ‘proper’ image: an image of valid knowledge. The 
disconnection of matter, the removal from the context, provides for the composition of a new image, in 
effect a deterritorialisation that signifies the (re)definition and thus the conquering of the toy. 
In Central Park, an accumulation of notes on Baudelaire, Benjamin writes with respect to knowledge 
and the kaleidoscope:
The course of history as represented in the concept of catastrophe has no more claim on the attention 
of the thinking mind than the kaleidoscope in the hand of a child which, with each turn, collapses 
everything ordered into new order. The justness of this image is well-founded. The concept of the rulers 
has always been the mirror by means of whose image an ‘order’ was established. This kaleidoscope 
must be smashed.91 
As Didi-Huberman states, Baudelaire’s account of the toy asserts the origin not as an archetypical 
image but as a “vortex of becoming”:92 an operative mediator between past and present, between the 
once present and the re-presentation. Accordingly, Walter Benjamin parallels the kaleidoscope to a 
process of history as knowledge that progresses with the decomposition and re-composition of the 
origin through knowledge as representation. Benjamin’s notion of a ‘mirrored order’ then suggests 
the dominant scopic regimes, as regimes of representation and knowledge. Benjamin’s kaleidoscope 
of history can then perhaps be situated between Brewster’s idea of order, and Giroux’s concept of 
transfiguration. 
The kaleidoscope ultimately represents both the instability of matter considered as physical presence 
and the instability of memory, as the process of ‘conquering’ matter through processes of representation. 
Through the ‘device’ of representation both images of matter and memory are deterritorialised and 
thus capable of opening up to the possibility of the production of new meaning. As in a child’s play, the 
operative trait of representation is found in the impossibility and hence fecundity of the repetition:93 
the produced image can never be the same, yet its visual ‘propriety’ is inherent not in its geometric 
order but in the very difference produced and called for, by the erratic multiplicity of its material 
traces. From matter, to perception, and back to representation, the image of the city is therefore not 
reduced, but constantly reconstructed, transfigured through the nested gazes of instructed visualities 
and spontaneous processes of sensory comprehension.
In urban representation, it can be said that the image of the city has been constructed ‘kaleidoscopically’: 
seeking to acquire a connaissance, of the city, to produce an image ‘proper’ with regard to the occasional 
scientific or ideological expediency of the representation, yet denying to look at and acknowledge the 
multiplicity of its object. Among the various ‘orders’ and ‘regimes’ that work upon constructing the 
image(s) of the city, drawing emerges as a viewing device, an optical toy of reason ‘making the world 
visible’ through its own selective ‘mirrors’. With regard to history, Benjamin proposes the smashing of 
those mirrors, as producing biased reconstructions of history. Yet in the kaleidoscopic understanding of 
the city, what will remain of the image of the city without any bias, without any subject? What ‘eyes’ will 
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[G16] Kaleidoscopic City: General view from the West
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The main aim of this piece was to interrogate the distances across the 
various representational regimes that act upon the city as their common 
object. As in the process of representation these regimes implied 
specific attitudes of observation, the conventions established by each 
mode of representation were introduced into the drawing with regard 
to both its writing and its reading. Thus, this representation sought to 
compose a new image on the basis that these distinct visual approaches 
are essential contributors to a representation capable of embracing the 
multiple facets of the urban. If the city can be considered as a weave of 
complex interactions between the various agencies that inhabit it, then 
its representation can also be considered exactly as such. Weaving the 
parallel universe of an image, the agency of the observing subject, be it 
the dipole of the human eye and mind, the Google Street View car or the 
odometer along a Renaissance surveyor’s map,95 is always offering only 
one specific piece of the image of the city. Preconceived images such as 
Robert Barker’s Calton Hill panorama, or the image of Edinburgh as the 
Athens of the North, are, among others, themselves pieces of the city. 
They are precisely manifestations of the congested visualities of the city 
and as such they constitute part of its cumulative entity.
In the kaleidoscope it is only through disorder that ‘order’ is produced, 
only through the re-presentation of the seemingly useless that a ‘right’ 
image is produced. Respectively, in the kaleidoscopic city, through the 
uncovering of the secondary subjectivities the drawing is revealed as a 
new space for action. In the consequent processes of signification that 
marked the transition from the physical image(s) of the city to the image 
of its representation, as the visual negotiations that they involve were 
inherited in the space of the drawing, hierarchies between the ‘ordering’ 
and the ‘ordered’ became interchangeable, and the primacy of vision 
over matter was challenged through the materialization of both into the 
drawing. The elusive matter-image of the city was indeed ‘transfigured’ 
by acquiring a new form and materiality. In the provisional array of 
its marks upon the transparent acrylic plates, Kaleidoscopic City is 
ultimately presented as nothing more than a drawing, moments before 
the coming together of its elements through its final animation by the 
gaze of the ‘wilful observer’. 
the disciplinary architectural drawing gaze through without any convention? Representation emerges 
in the kaleidoscope as a constitutive act, which in the intertextually formulated, unstable image of the 
city, takes on multiple forms and is conditioned by multiple operators. What is perhaps limiting in the 
representation of the city in architecture is perhaps not the application of the ‘regime’ of convention, 
but its acceptance as singular, In this context, the regimes involved can be considered as distinct 
situations, as staging both city and drawing in specific situations of observation that are reflected 
back to the collective and individual understanding of the city. Particularly in the current conditions of 
the cinematic ubiquity and plurality of the image, the architect/draughtsman appears not as a flâneur, 
but rather as a reluctant chiffonnier, who inevitably ‘collects’ what seems to be an erratic debris 
of images that come to destabilize 
the integrity of his/her established 
scopic patterns.94 In this abundance 
of visual ‘orders’, of constructed 
visualities, the hierarchy between 
the institutional and the individual 
can be challenged, to include in 
architectural representation their 
collective intersubjectivity as a kind 
of ‘visual specificity’. The architect 
then may attempt to act instead 
as a wilful observer, who through 
their own gaze will animate and 
set in motion the representation, 





[G17] Kaleidoscopic City: ’Cutting Through: City Level’ 
[still from animation]
[G18] Kaleidoscopic City: Views through the acrylic plates reposition the 




[G19] Kaleidoscopic City at the Plenitude and Emptiness Symposium 
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[G20] Kaleidoscopic City: General View from the Southwest





DEEP SURFACE: On the Situation of Drawing
SURFACE
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1  The Roman tabula (Latin) was a wax writing surface that could be melted and thus reinstated to its blank state for reuse. The 
term tabula rasa has come to describe a blank slate thus implying a neutrality that awaits enrichment.
2  In geography situation refers to the relative location of a settlement in relation to its surroundings, as opposed to site that refers 
to the physical characteristics of the location. As such situation is a term that describes relationships and associations and it is 
used here to describe drawing as a dynamic action of placement.
3  Frascari discusses the role of paper as an “ingredient of architectural conceiving”, yet later refers to it as a “passive instrument”. 
See Marco Frascari, ‘A Reflection on Paper and its virtues within the Material and Invisible Factures of Architecture,’ in M. Frascari 
with J. Hale and B. Starkey (eds) From Models to Drawings  (London: Routledge, 2007) pp. 23-33; p. 23.
4  On the concept of the allographic sign see Instructions to Wayfarers, Chapter III. See also Stan Allen, ‘Notations + Diagrams: 
Mapping the Intangible’, in Practice: Architecture, Technique and Representation (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 40-69, p.45.
5  Ibid, p. 41-42.
6  Central to the explorations of this thesis has been Robin Evans’ essay: Robin Evans, ‘Translations from Drawing to Building’, in 
Translations from Drawing to Building and Other Essays (London: Architectural Association, 1997), pp. 153-193.
7  Flusser recalls the Greek verb graphein (γράφειν). Originally meaning to scratch or carve as well as write, the verb has come 
to be predominantly used in Modern Greek with the meaning to write. See Vilém Flusser, ‘The Gesture of Writing’ (1991), p. 1. 
Available at FlusserStudies.net, http://www.flusserstudies.net/sites/www.flusserstudies.net/files/media/attachments/the-gesture-of-
writing.pdf [Accessed 27.03.2015].
8   Ibid., p. 1
9   Ibid., p. 1.  
10  Ibid., p. 3.
It is often at the pureness of white where it all begins. The page that anticipates the beginning of the 
physical instantiation of drawing, is commonly dominated by white, or rather the absence of colour as 
a signifier of the absence of everything: it is blank. The drawing surface – just like the writing surface 
- is wishfully considered a ‘tabula rasa’, a Euclidean plane with no past and no memory, which will 
allow for the blossoming of the script: a surface.1 But it is only as part of this surface that the script 
is. It is only upon this situation that drawing comes to be, by assuming the material spatiality of an 
only seemingly passive and neutral territory.2, 3 Offering its substance to the effects of the script, this 
surface is at least as intrinsic to the expression of drawing as any of its other constituents, which range 
from lines and symbols to the syntactic rules that organise them spatially. In this light the role of the 
surface in drawing, and consequently design, as a kind of passive infrastructure is challenged.
In architecture, a discipline that has been described as “allographic”,4 drawing is often regarded as a 
disposable artefact: the ephemeral expression of the projection of a remote reality, a mere signifier of 
the real subject matter.5 The syntactic apparatus of parallel projection – conditioning how the spatiality 
of the ‘real’ is arranged in the drawing by means of notation – the transition to architecture, that which 
is physically absent, have been the subject of numerous texts.6 But what about that which already 
is and, moreover, that which is made present through the physicality of the drawing surface which, 
at once haptic and visual, constitutes the site of performance for both architect and ‘reader’? The 
emergence of drawing takes place there, at the intersection of two spaces: the tangible spatiality of 
the drawing and another that is absent, either pre-existing (survey) or speculative (design). More than 
a receptacle, the surface becomes drawing upon becoming the site of an intricate coincidence.
i A Matter of Drawing
In his essay ‘The Gesture of Writing’, Vilém Flusser begins by describing writing (graphein),7 as a 
physical action. He points out that the physical expression of writing had originally been a process of 
scraping, therefore of “de-structing” a surface,8 rather than a creative process of constructing, that 
is of composing something new. This material aspect of writing Flusser illustrates by recalling early 
forms of writing:
Some place some time in Mesopotamia people began to scratch soft clay bricks with sticks, and then 
burned them to harden the scratched surface. And although we no longer do such a thing very often, 
it is this half-forgotten gesture of scratching which is the essence, (“eidos”), of writing. It has nothing 
to do with constructing. It is, on the contrary, a taking away, a de-structing. It is both structurally and 
historically, closer to sculpture than architecture […] a penetrating gesture. To write is to in-scribe, 
to penetrate a surface, and a written text is an inscription […] the gesture of writing is a penetrating 
gesture that informs a surface.9 
Writing is thus primarily presented by Flusser as an act of repositioning matter. This material 
understanding of writing does not shift focus from the semiotic value of the process, albeit it brings 
forth the physical spatiality of the script as the reconfiguration of a surface. 
This interpretation of writing also alludes to another expression of writing: that of drawing as a form 
of surface script. Although – placing his focus on literary writing – Flusser clearly distinguishes the 
two (“drawing […] a gesture of putting shapes on a surface”), 10 his account of writing’s necessary 
constituents finds a direct equivalence in drawing: it inhabits a surface, it maintains a system of 
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11  Ibid., p. 2.
12  Ibid., p. 9.
13  In ‘The Gesture of Writing’, Flusser describes the consecutive translations of 
his own original texts as a way of arriving to the complete unravelling of the text’s 
own possibilities. Referring to the third translation of text, from Portuguese back to 
German, he specifically writes “[…] in the second text all the other languages at my 
disposal are somehow present, and thus confer it a depth which is lacking in the first 
text”. Ibid., p. 11.
14  The myth of Diboutades as the origin of drawing is accounted by Pliny the Elder. 
See Evans, ‘Translations’, pp. 163-165, and Stan Allen, ‘Hunting the Shadow’ in 
Practice: Architecture, Technique and Representation (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 
3-8; p. 4.
notation and a set of conventions which gives meaning to it (rules of “orthography”), it presupposes 
the use of tools for this “rearranging of matter”, and it regards the expression of ideas.11 In fact, there 
is only one element that distinguishes writing from drawing in terms of Flusser’s definition: the lack of 
“a language” to be signified through the convention. 
In both cases of inscription however, what seems to become important to Flusser through this analysis 
is that writing appears to regard not the creation of something anew but the intervention upon and 
reconfiguration of a reality that is already there. 
To express is of course a relative term […] It implies to press to somewhere else. To impress upon a 
sheet of paper in the case of writing…”Essentially” everything I write upon becomes a Mesopotamian 
brick by my very gesture. And this is true not only if I restrict my observation of my gesture to its 
surface. It is also true with regard to the many invisible layers my gesture has to penetrate before it 
reaches the visible surface of the sheet of paper… The thought as it appears on the paper surface is 
a result of a series of dialectical processes between my subjective invention and the objective “brick 
structures” I go through.12 
The effect of these consecutive re-writings, either literal or mental, is more clearly articulated through 
Flusser’s experience of translation. As a multilingual thinker and writer (operating between German, 
Portuguese, English and French) he systematically employed consecutive re-translations as a way of 
distilling meaning or, as he writes, of “conferring depth” to his own texts.13  Flusser’s writing method 
reveals a process that is fulfilled by the allocation of the script upon the surface: writing always 
returns to the impression, an act that constitutes a spatial recalibration. This process suggests a 
gesture of projection – of assigning a pre-existing object into a new condition. Projection already 
presupposes the existence of this new condition or territory,  which in the myth of the origin of painting 
as found in Pliny the Elder’s account of the story of Diboutades tracing the shadow of her departing 
lover – previously  discussed in ‘To Draw a Line’, emerges as the surface upon which the shadow is 
captured by drawing.14 Nevertheless, what Flusser’s analysis further suggests is that this projection 
is hardly ever singular, as it is formed at the intersection of the structure of the method (i.e. the 
linguistic convention of syntax and meaning) and the elements of “subjective invention” that interact 
with this structure. This dialectic effect is reflected and purposefully intensified in Flusser’s method 
of consecutive tranlations. In Flusser’s account each one of the languages he employs, constitutes 
a territory to be inscribed, to situate his thoughts upon. The implication of this analogy between 
language and surface is double. On one hand, it implies that within the gesture of writing there is an 
intervention of equal weight on a material level (the surface) and a conceptual (the semiotic). On the 
other hand it suggests an understanding of both conditions (the material and the conceptual) through 
the gesture of situation that his primal account of writing describes, a situation that is at the same 
time informing and informed by the script. Although then Flusser’s writings exceed the physicality of 
their final expression, it is this same gesture of writing, this same spatial configuration that describes a 
clearly mental process of synthesis. Not only does the mental inform the material but also the material 
appears to inform the mental.
Both concepts of projection (from the Latin proicere: to throw forth) and translation (in Latin, also, 
translatio from the verb transferre or translat- : to transfer, to carry across) suggest a movement 
across space; a change of place. Flusser’s analysis clearly denotes this change of place in the situation 
of matter entailed in the gesture, but also, in the consecutive re-sitings of the inscription that become 
operative in its taking the form of writing, an action that he clearly distinguishes from mere typing. 
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15  “The subject-matter (the building or space) will exist after the drawing, not before 
it”. Ibid., p. 165.
16  Ibid., p. 160.
17  Ibid., p. 181.
18  Ibid., p. 185-186.
19  “[…] we can never be certain, before the event, how things will travel and what 
will happen to them on the way”.  Ibid., p. 182.
So if we consider that architectural drawing, as a form of re-siting that is concluded through the 
negotiation of a pre-existing surface and, as such, shares the same constituents as writing, is itself a 
process of (dis)placement and therefore a form of translation, the question raised is once again, what 
is ‘translated’ in the architectural drawing? From where to where is it displaced? And consequently, 
how does this transference occur? In the essay ‘Translations from Drawing to Building’, Robin Evans 
discusses the role of drawing in architecture through the relationship between the drawing and what 
he defines as the subject-matter of architecture: “the building or space”.15 By proposing translation, 
the title of the article already points out the gap between the two: drawing is understood as a limited 
and partial medium towards the architect’s real work. To the predicament of this discrepancy, however, 
Evans contraposes the further exploitation of this mediation.16 It is exactly in this transitive nature 
of the drawing, oscillating between the language-like conceptual (verbal) and the phenomenological 
sensible, and the suspension that is produced through the phenomenal mismatch between 
representation and its subject, that Evans locates the operative and generative virtues of drawing. 
Through the mechanism of projection drawing becomes what Evans calls “a translator’s dream”: a way 
of achieving the homogeneity that will allow the transference to take place without the alteration of 
meaning through the assignment of both the verbal and the visual to the spatial.17 
It is therefore space that is conveyed through drawing but it is also in space that this conveyance 
occurs. Always partial and always an abstraction, a drawing is highly visual but hardly ever visually 
conclusive of the concrete architectural reality it represents. Nevertheless, within the drawing always 
lurks the possibility of a ‘deeper’ space and, as Flusser shows us, it is through spatial recalibrations 
that the transcription from the referent into drawing is able to take place. The semantic coherence 
between architecture and drawing can hence be attributed not necessarily to architectural conventions 
per se but to the spatial nature of drawing. On concluding his essay Evans writes:
It would be possible, l think, to write a history of Western architecture that would have little to do with 
either style or signification, concentrating instead on the manner of working […]. In it the drawing 
would be considered not so much a work of art or a truck for pushing ideas from place to place, but 
as the locale of subterfuges and evasions that one way or another get round the enormous weight of 
convention that has always been architecture’s greatest security and at the same time its greatest 
liability.18
Drawing can thus be understood as the place that enables these shifts: itself a change of place. 
But at the same time this movement is only fulfilled through the drawing’s physical alteration: the 
change of a place. As both Flusser and Evans point out, this movement is not a one-off process: the 
destinations are multiple but so are the ‘origins’.19 Other writings, and hence re-sitings, precede it, 
while other writings may be borne by it. Beyond spatial and topographical facts, all kinds of influences 
and inspirations, carried across a series of spaces, from real spaces such as sites and buildings, to 
‘Mesopotamian bricks’, sheets of paper or techniques of representation, come to meet one another on 
the surface of drawing. Considering this, drawing constitutes neither an end, nor an origin but a space 
in between. It rather emerges as an actual translatum: the ‘locale’, or the space of translation. 
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Draw of a Drawing, is not a direct representation, but the transcription 
of a representation of the city of Edinburgh. Drawing from – or rather 
simply ‘redrawing’ – Kaleidoscopic City, Draw of a Drawing marked the 
moment that the elements of the preceding drawing were finally projected 
upon a single surface. Acting as a transcription and a miniaturization of 
its predecessor [S1], this installation oscillated between the seemingly 
distinct spaces that emerged from representation as a transitory state 
between a tangible materiality (figure) and another materiality that, 
although not currently physical, was still present (signification). On 
drawing Kaleidoscopic City, this third representation involved not only 
the indirect survey of the part of the city that was initially represented, 
but also of the peripheral devices that facilitated its reading. 
Out of the three installations Draw of a Drawing was perhaps the one 
that ‘resembled’ a drawing the most. However, it was in fact the one that 
is most concerned with an act of installation, of situating something 
in a new place. The operations of Kaleidoscopic City were not reduced, 
neither terminally fixed in their new material state, but re-located and 
thus informed by their new situation. In effect, Draw of a Drawing was 
a portable re-installation of the Kaleidoscopic City upon the interior 
surfaces of a wooden box [S2]. The dual expression of the object as the 
enclosed space of a box, on the one hand, and as an extended continuous 
surface on the other, was exemplified through the relationship between 
the spatial and the ‘superficial’ elements of the installation, while the 
robust materiality of wood – texture, colour and thickness – created 
an opportunity to illustrate the negotiations that take place between 
sign and surface by materially reassigning signification to the effect 
of inscription. The reconfiguration of the box offered a variety of 
transitions that required direct physical – both tactile and visual – 
engagement: unfolding from an enclosure to a flat surface, collapsing 
from installation to superficial inscription or reversely developing the 
space that is implied from the surface, Draw of a Drawing sought not 
only to re-present but to also enact the gesture of representation, taking 
into account architectural signification as a process of (re)configuring a 
space that is not necessarily ‘other’, but continuous to, the locality of its 
physical instantiation [S3-S4-S5]. 
[S1] Draw of a Drawing: Initial sketch
[S2]Opening Sequence




[S4] Draw of a Drawing: Views across the miniaturized plates into the 
folded space of  the box 
[S5] Draw of a Drawing: Axonometric View illustrating the the three-
dimensional miniaturization of Kaleidoscopic City.
 The timeline and weave of the Kaleidoscopic City characters is visible 
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[20] The Hopetoun Chest in the Library at Newhailes House 
[21] Hopetoun House, Elevation, Claude Comiers (1680)
[22] Hopetoun Chest, Drawer Detail 
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20  I am grateful to Mark Dorrian for pointing out to me this magnificent object.
21  Joe Rock, ‘The Hopetoun Chest at Newhailes House’, The Burlington Magazine, 
Vol. 129, No. 1013 (1987), pp. 516-518. 
22  The Hopetoun Chest is presented in further detail by Joe Rock on his personal 
website. His writing ranges from discussion on the intricate wave-turned mahogany 
of the chest to remarkably detailed speculations on the possibilities of ownership, 
erections and demolitions in a small area of the Cowgate, all based largely on his 
reading of the chest.  Joe Rock, ‘John Hope’s House in Edinburgh, 1680’, Joe 
Rock’s Research Pages. https://sites.google.com/site/joerocksresearchpages/home/
john-hope-s-house-in-edinburgh-1680 [Accessed 19 March 2015].
ii A Place of Drawing
While Evans’ approach to drawing points out the instrumentality of techniques, which are both 
structural and semiological, Flusser’s description of writing and its gestural extensions bring out the 
dispersal of this effect on the material manifestation of drawing. This understanding of drawing as an 
artefact and a process consequently reveals an understanding of architectural representation as a 
series of relocations. In its simplest form, elements of a site of origin are negotiated through a system 
of notation and finally relocated upon a new surface. Carrying the memory of a site, either as survey or 
as intervention, architectural drawings can hence be considered as inevitably carrying an attachment 
to site (or specific situations). But does the displacement that emerges from representation create an 
additional latter attachment to the new situation of the surface? Is the locality of the drawing surface 
‘specific’ enough to constitute a place out of its space?  
The Hopetoun Chest is a piece of furniture found at Newhailes House outside Edinburgh.20 It is a large 
late seventeenth century chest of drawers of Flemish origin, its figure dominated by an intricate wave-
turned ebony veneer [fig. 20]. The most remarkable feature of this chest, however, is the interior lining 
of its drawers which are covered by the only remaining copies of a series of architectural drawings. 
The engravings – a series of plans, sections and elevations spread across a number of fifteen drawers 
– describe French philosopher Claude Comier’s 1680 proposal for a grand house for the Hope family in 
the Cowgate area of Edinburgh [fig. 21].21 The placement of these never-realized drawings on the walls 
of the chest does not necessarily suggest a diminution of the drawings’ value. Although its purpose of 
use is not certain, the possibility of it being used as a ‘cabinet of curiosities’ suggests not only a unique 
way of exhibiting the drawings but perhaps even a certain primacy of the drawings as a system of 
curating the objects on display. In any case however, the cabinet itself became a way of re-organizing 
the drawing [fig. 22].22
At the same time the house, although never built, acquired a new spatial arrangement within the 
spaces of the chest. The space of representation takes on here not only a distinct physical spatiality 
of its own – other to the referent – but one that is also enriched by the specific conditions of its 
localization. The isolation of the enclosure, the possibilities of its contents, the choreography of the 
cabinet (the gradual re-composition of the drawings through a mental unfolding and the opening 
and closing of the drawers) offer this set of drawings a second life through a reading that surpasses 
their original purpose. Not only does the drawing thus acquire a clear spatial expression through its 
contextualization, but the space that it inhabits becomes itself infused by the drawing. In a sense, the 
entire chest becomes a drawing.
The concepts of context and, consequently, site are of great importance to architecture and 
architectural design. While looking at the Hopetoun Chest drawings, we are faced with a case of re-
siting a pre-existing representation, a case of coinciding, yet distinct, situations that can be paralleled 
to Flusser’s rewritings. On one hand, this is a representation that refers to a specific origin; an urban 
site in Edinburgh’s Cowgate. On the other hand it is now so closely attached to its site of presentation 
at Newhailes House that it has come to be known by the name of a chest of drawers rather than of the 
elaborate estate it describes. 
The importance of site, however, is not only prominent in architecture among creative practices, but 
also art. The notion of site is particularly examined in the work of art historian and curator Miwon 
Kwon. Originally trained as an architect, Kwon performs an enquiry of art over the latter half of the 
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twentieth century through a classification of artistic practice in terms of site-specificity. In doing 
so she engages with defining and eventually redefining the concept of site.23 Kwon’s classification 
looks further from physical experience offering an expansion of the definition of site beyond that 
of geographical location. Site-specific art can, according to Kwon, be sited within or without a site, 
hence siting exceeds the concept of localized accommodation. Specificity suggests then a relation 
that expands beyond physical placement.  Furthermore, Kwon’s most radical – and most controversial 
– contribution to the understanding of site-specificity in art, appears to be the classification of sites 
that she proposes.24 In Kwon’s understanding, the expression of a site can range between a physical 
space, an institutional grid, a discursive network or a community formation, respectively establishing 
a phenomenological, institutional or discursive form of site-specificity.25 
Originating from a reaction to the self-referential nature of modernist art, site-specific art as a model 
of practice suggests a performative, inclusive engagement with its surroundings that often goes as far 
as challenging the unique authority of the artist. As Kwon writes:
Furthermore, unlike previous models, this site is not defined as a precondition [sic]. Rather, it is 
generated by the work (often as “content”), and then verified by its convergence with an existing 
discursive formation.26 
Site is here defined neither as a neutral infrastructure, nor as a given territory. Siting is described as 
a process of reciprocal territorializations where site and installation are both operative in defining one 
another. The site that emerges from this definition is upon installation infused with agency while it is in 
turn defined and redefined by the condition of this encounter. More importantly, however, what Kwon’s 
theorization of site-specificity offers is the extension of site to the intangible through the concept of 
discursive site-specificity, therefore reflecting the multiple manifestations of Flusser’s “Mesopotamian 
bricks”,27 as the material instantiation of the writing surface and as the conceptual frame of language.
Not only does this expansion of the understanding of site therefore support the localized connotations 
of the notion but instead, it succeeds in associating the discursive with the spatial and consequently 
– to return to Evans’ preoccupations – the verbal with the visual, in a reciprocal interaction: discourse 
is spatialized while space constitutes a form of discourse in the work of art, through the contingent 
overlapping of distinct manifestations of site-specificity. The situation of the work of art thus emerges 
through Kwon’s perspective not as one but as the interweaving of a multiplicity of sites. 
The question that arises then is what is the effect of these ‘places’, or rather what is the effect of these 
placements, on the work of art? As site potentially constitutes content and agency is attributed to the 
material, it becomes apparent that the relationship between site and work is not one between object 
and subject, but that both carry the potency of agency upon one another. As a consequence of this 
the relation to site does not necessarily suggest a relationship of origins, rather it is now drawn out as 
a relationship that can emerge from an equally dynamic situation. In any case the specific situation 
appears to become ultimately intrinsic to the work to the degree that it becomes definitive of its 
identity. That is a moment not of installation, but of proper reterritorialization. Considering the multiple 
forms of site as introduced by Kwon and the emergent reciprocity between site and installation, 
the question that could then be raised is what constitutes in turn the site, or perhaps the sites, of 
architectural drawing? As the locus of the drawing shifts across different types of geographical sites, 
sites of fabrication, systems of signification and sites of materialization, do these re-sitings either 
undermine, or establish the drawing’s capacity as a space in its own right?
23  Miwon Kwon, ‘One place after another: Notes on Site Specificity’. October 80 
(Spring 1997), pp. 85-110.
24  Responding to Kwon’s definition, Jason Geiger strongly dismisses it by arguing 
that “her use of the term ‘site’ to describe a discourse or field of knowledge extends 
–‘the ‘amorphous- notion of discourse’- the term beyond its legitimate usage 
and threatens to undermines the ‘locational anchor’ of the term”. Jason Gaiger, 
‘Dismantling the Frame: Site-Specific Art and Aesthetic Autonomy’, British Journal of 
Aesthetics 49 (1) (2009), pp. 43-58; p. 51.
25 Kwon, ‘One Place’, p 95.
26 Ibid., p.92.
27  Flusser, ‘The Gesture of Writing’, p. 9.
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As the lines of the projection were applied on the surface by means of 
a laser engraving, the material effect of the burning beam on the wood 
was instant. The negotiation of the surface was already at issue as the 
box had to be dismantled and strategically relocated in the machine, 
to which the drawing was digitally fed in portions. This fragmentation 
of the drawing was initially dictated by the machine as the complexity 
of the drawing suggested both a large size of data to be transferred 
and a long time of execution that raised the risk of glitches. However, 
as each part was applied on the surface – admittedly hesitantly due 
to the irreversibility of the engraving – the interaction with surface 
gradually became more complex. The explicit materiality of the box, 
the thickness of its surface as well as the folds that its original shape 
created, were so materially compelling that they began to have a 
direct effect upon the marks inscribed. While the drawing of lines was 
relatively straight forward (line-weights were assigned by tweaking the 
power, speed and distance of the laser head) the highlighting of areas 
– what in conventional drawing would possibly be illustrated by means 
of hatching, or colour – in the box could become far more intrusive, 
opening up the possibility of new materials that could intervene with 
the box’s actual structure. For instance, when it came to mapping the 
Inspace gallery floor upon which certain tiles had been replaced in 




original and the custom tiles was manifest with the actual replacement 
of parts of the wood with pieces of Chinese red plywood [S6]. Gold 
leaf was used to mark the surfaces of the metal devices (such as the 
Telescope, the support of the Terrain and the Observatory), which, 
faced with the effect of the surface were not simply projected but in 
the end developed in the new script [S7]. These operations required 
that the object had to be removed and repositioned in the laser cutter 
multiple times. These consecutive relocations informed the drawing 
not only with their final anticipated effects but also with a series of 
marks that were derived from the consecutive ‘re-acquaintance’ of the 
box with the machine [S8]. The folding of the box, respectively, almost 
dictated multiple projections, on top of the direct planar transference 
of the marks, with the devices duplicated – where needed - in opposing 
surfaces, eventually even piercing the enclosure, and reclaiming their 
original function of enabling observation upon the box [S9-S10]. 
[S8] Marks created as guides for the reposition of the re-alignment of the 
box with the laser
[S6] Pieces of Chinese red plywood replaced the parts tha responded to the 
custom tiles of the gallery
These also served to create a sliding component that would allow for the 
storing of the plates in the recess defined by the ‘original site’
[S7] Gold leaf signifies the metal structures of the Kaleidoscopic City 
devices while dry pastel dust ‘sculpts’ the volume of Arthur’s Seat
Although impossible to accomodate in a collapsible structure, the ‘weave’ 
of the Kaledisocopic City characters manifests its shadow on the wood by 
means of laser engraving
[S9] Custom-made brass pins pierce the bottom of the box in order to hold 
in place the plates, when in full array
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[S10] Views into the enclosure of the box through the perforation 
derived from the transcription of the Observatory
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28  Peter Eisenman, Moving Arrows, Eros and Other Errors: An Architecture of 
Absence (London: Architectural Association, 1986).
29  Eisenman mentions site, program and “representation (the aesthetic object)”. 
The use of drawing instead of representation is used here to contrast drawing 
as condition, or perhaps situation, to representation as an operation or rather, in 
Eisenman’s words, as a “destabilising agent”. The clarification “the aesthetic object” 
suggests an expansion of drawing from the artefact to a structural framework, 
however one that appears to be more intrinsic to drawing as a practice rather than 
to architecture as a way of thinking. Ibid., p. 4.
30 Ibid., p. 5-6.
iii In Place of a Site
In geography, site is a term that is strictly used to describe the physical characteristics of a place. 
Similarly, in architecture it is primarily used to refer to the characteristics of a location intended for a 
potential intervention. As such, site defines the final place of action of architecture. It constitutes thus 
the most immediate context of the space that will be produced out of the architect’s drawings – what 
we have previously seen being defined as the ‘real’ subject-matter of architecture – but it is also often 
one of the very first material conditions that the architect gets to work with (program, function, or even 
geometry may also pose as beginnings but rarely reflect as concrete spatial instantiations). For the 
architectural subject, the consideration of this context suggests not only a situation in space but also 
a situation in relation to time. It describes a concrete reality that situates the imagined proposal upon 
the space and time of earth. This concrete reality constitutes a present that will become the past of the 
imagined proposal. Site, overall, may be considered as defining an origin for the architectural proposal: 
the initial state of a condition that is to be altered. 
The concepts of presence and origin become prominent in Peter Eisenman’s project Moving Arrows, 
Eros and Other Errors.28 In this project, which engages with the city of Verona by superposing the 
fictional romance of Romeo and Juliet upon the physical reality of the city, Eisenman recognizes 
architecture’s insistence on origin and presence as evidence of an anthropocentric attitude on behalf 
of architecture. Moreover, Eisenman’s objection to this premise is the insistence on physicality, as he 
points out that this anthropocentricism has consistently been manifested in the form of an attachment 
to the scale of the human body. To overcome this partiality, Eisenman seeks to challenge the position the 
concepts of presence and origin hold in architectural thinking and making, by introducing the process 
of a “scaling” that is not dependent on the human body but belongs to – as it is only applied through 
– representation. According to Eisenman, this scaling proceeds through three “destabilizing agents” 
(discontinuity, recursivity and self-similarity) which respectively address the issues of presence, origin 
and consequently representation. Although Eisenman appears to insist on this tripartite schema by in 
turn associating it with site, programme and drawing, the prominence of site seems to be evident.29 Of 
the site Eisenman writes: 
The first aspect which is confronted is the idea that site is a reality containing only presence. To 
privilege ‘the site’ as the context is to repress other possible context, is to become fixated on the 
presences of ‘the site’, is to believe that ‘the site’ exists as a permanent, knowable whole. Such a belief, 
as has been discussed, is untenable today. By treating ‘the site’ not simply as presence but as both a 
palimpsest and a quarry containing traces of both memory and immanence, ‘the site’ can be thought of 
as non-static […] a moving arrow […] it contains where it has been and where it is going, i.e., it has a 
memory and an immanence that are not present to the observer of the photograph; they are essential 
absences. Theories of ‘the site’ as present origin presume that the moving arrow and the still arrow are 
the same; they ignore the subtle but profound conditions of the presence of these absences.30 
Presence represents the physical “real” form while absence stands for the latent – preceding or future; 
essentially that which currently belongs to the virtual and hence the verbal or the discursive. This 
introduction of a time of the site through memory and potential is what brings out a concept of the site 
that appears to be as dynamic, or perhaps as kinetic, as the conception of drawing as we have seen it 
through the prism of translation. If we consider the site as a dynamic condition that contains a past, a 
present and a future, it is possible then to consider it as involving internal re-sitings of its own. Both 
presence and absence are considered only in relation to site, they are thus situated in a milieu that is 
not fixed but susceptible to change.  
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[24] York Minster Tracings Drawing, John Harvey (1968)
[23] Floor Tracings on Plaster Floor at the York Minster  (ca. 1360-1500)
[25] The Origin of Painting, Karl F. Schinkel (1830)
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31  Both terms épure (from French) and tracing floor are used to describe such an 
inscription. The original French meaning of épure refers to an accumulative detailed 
description of an object in space by means of drawing, specifically, a description 
that involves projections that describe all three dimensions of the object.
32  This painting of the fable is one of the two visualizations of the fable mentioned 
by Robin Evans in ‘Translations’, p. 163-165.
33  Ibid., p. 165.
34  A discussion of the origins and ‘disciplining’ of architecture can be found in 
‘To Draw a Line’.  See also Catherine Ingraham, Architecture and the Burdens of 
Linearity (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1998), p. 51.
Representation is hence drawn into reconsideration as a record of the site where, for the translation 
from drawing to building to occur, another re-siting, from site to drawing, has to take place, albeit 
the site stands as a record of not only past, present and future, but also – if we consider it in relation 
to Kwon’s definition – of physical, discursive and representational ‘situations’ that come to act upon 
one another through the agency of drawing. In Eisenman’s project the “potential” appears to emerge 
exactly from this presentation of the site, where the site cannot be stabilised as Verona, or as the 
fictitious love of Romeo and Juliet. Both site and architecture arise at the conjunction of the two which 
come to interact through a process of scaling that is no more anchored to the human body but to the 
intrinsic modalities of the ‘gesture of drawing’, an action that, in Flusser’s terms, is fulfilled on both a 
material and a conceptual level. The site becomes the drawing and the drawing becomes site.  
This close connection between site and drawing can be traced back to a time when the surface of the 
drawing and the site coincided not only semiologically but also physically. The inscription of scaled or 
even 1:1 elements upon the site of construction was a common practice since ancient times and until 
the dissemination of paper and its dominance as the primary printing medium from the 14th century 
onwards. Examples of tracings are found in ancient temples such as the temple of Apollo at Didyma, 
however they are far more common in medieval structures such as Gothic temples and cathedrals. 
In the medieval times it was by means of the mason’s tracings, of the épures, which were inscribed 
on floors such as stonework or, most commonly, on a thin layer of plaster [fig. 23-24].31 The various 
elements of the building would be hence conceived and later carved out of stone in situ. 
To this day, building always begins with a form of tracing as the site is being marked with the positions 
of the structures to be erected: the first act of building is therefore a form of drawing – although to be 
exact, the very first act of tracing can be found in the scanning of the field upon surveying. In the case 
of these tracing floors, the site of origin became the site of conception, signification, presentation and 
finally fabrication while gradually transforming into architecture, by means of the bodily movement of 
the mason/draughtsman across space. This ‘moving across’, this carrying across through one’s own 
body was more than a translation. It was the literal drawing out of an architectural space from the 
surface of the site. The drawing was there and then projected outwards into relations and formations 
of materials but also from the material and structural processes of craftsmanship, the movement of 
the draughtsman/mason, the abstractions of representation as well as other external or internal points 
of reference such as religious tradition or even personal aspiration.  Architectural creation was being 
built up directly from the ground (or was it the drawing?) of its conception. 
This projection, so closely attached to the materiality of the site and more specifically to the horizontality 
of the ground brings to mind again the archetypal projection of the departing lover, and particularly its 
depiction in architect Karl F. Schinkel’s Origin of Painting (1830) [fig. 25].32 Diboutades there instructs 
the tracing of the shadow of her lover as it is projected by the sun on a rock. This specific choice of the 
surface of projection suggests, as do the early delineations of the tracing floors, the attachment to the 
ground as an anchor of both material and meaning. As the transference from the site of presence and 
origin to the site of projection and representation takes place a separation occurs. As Evans writes, 
there is entailed in the instruction a chronological hierarchy between drawing and architecture, across 
the practical and intellectual knowledge that signifies not simply the origin of drawing but also the 
disciplining of architecture.33, 34 
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35  Eisenman, Moving Arrows, p. 5.
36  Frascari, ‘A Reflection on Paper’, p. 23.
37  Jacques Derrida, ‘The Pit and the Pyramid’ (1971), in Margins of Philosophy, 
trans. Alan Bass (London and New York: Harvester Press, 1982), pp. 69-109; p. 81-
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From the medieval floor tracings, drawing gradually developed through material surfaces that could 
retain the tracing of the structure to be reused. The wide use of paper, along with the development of a 
notational schema to represent the structure, allowed for the scaling down of drawing and the further 
manipulation of the design away from the physicality of the site. The physical detachment, as well as 
the miniaturisation, moved the process of design further from the structural limitations of the building 
site, yet deeper into the agency of the conditions that comprise drawing physically, discursively and 
conventionally. 
Eisenman is very apt in pointing out that all three agents of discontinuity, recursivity and self-similarity 
operate upon representation, as a relationship of repetition and signification is drawn out between the 
two ends of the translation.35 Although the material manifestation of the drawing surface is, as has 
been previously discussed, fundamental to the process of drawing, the deferral that occurs exceeds 
the physical separation between site and drawing.
The separation between origin and (re)presentation (in Eisenman’s terms a discontinuity), Marco 
Frascari points out as one of the most instrumental virtues of paper as a medium, and, in turn, of 
drawing as a distinct intermediate “facture” acting between the referent and the representation.36  By 
establishing this disjunction architectural representation has led to the emergence of the drawing as 
an artefact that is a way of remembering (carrying across) but also of forgetting. Although the reasons 
for this material separation were obviously practical, namely the portability of the medium and the 
further visual manageability of space offered by scaling, the move from site to drawing of course 
contributed to a further liberation of drawing from the site of construction which was also paralleled in 
the overall shift in the establishment of architecture as a discipline and practice – from the anonymous 
stonemasons to the ‘homo universalis’ architect/artist of the Renaissance.  
Nevertheless, even in the case of on-site designation of the medieval floor tracings, there has always 
been a gesture of inscription, at once tactile, visual and discursive; bodily and mental. Far from 
mediated, involving the entire body, these drawings suggested the in-situ recalibration of the site 
through a form of inhabitation. The translation does not merely entail a repositioning of the site but 
a repositioning of the architect as well. In both architectures – that of the medieval stone mason and 
that of the Renaissance architect – the instrumentality of the (re)siting is located in its ability to also 
produce a re-sighting, a change of perspective and therefore a new meaning. As we have seen through 
Flusser’s interpretation of writing, drawing is inevitably involved with the assignment to the materiality 
of the surface. As Jacques Derrida remarks in his analysis of Hegelian semiology, the materialisation of 
the signifier into a “sensory perception” causes resistances against the unity of the signified concept 
and its material instantiation.37 The surface is on one hand ‘animated’ by the inscription, but it is never 
completely effaced by nor absolutely welded with the effect of the script. In this way is never singular: 
it is both projected and projective and hence attached to, but not concluded in its material experience.
A series of re-sitings therefore takes places within the very process of figuration of the drawing; re-
sitings that are involved in its formulation as well as re-sitings that may occur through its ‘inhabitation’ 
by the architect not only as draughtsman but also as reader and interpreter: as designer. This projection 
may involve but is not limited to the known-to-the-architect forms of orthographic or perspectival 
projections. In effect, the gesture of drawing exceeds the conventions of architectural drawing not 
only in terms of inclusion but also in terms of signification, and that is exactly what is at stake in the 
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38  The concept of architecture and its linear convention as disciplinary and 
domesticating actors, is also discussed in this thesis in the essay ‘To Draw a Line’, 
through the writing of Catherine Ingraham. 
39  Peter Eisenman, Chora L Works: Jacques Derrida and Peter Eisenman (New 
York: Monacelli Press, 1997).
recognition of drawing as a form of space in its own right. It is this act of reterritorialization into and 
within the drawing that gives meaning and in effect grounds the architectural creation back to its 
site of not only origin but also destination. An anchoring to reality and at the same time a conquest 
of this same reality, the situation into drawing re-enacts this original act of drawing by posing as 
a miniaturization of the earth’s ground and a site of signification for architecture. Architectural 
drawing performs there, for the sake of architecture, the ‘domestication’ of both the imaginary and the 
conventional – that is, the appropriation of elements that belong to both – through the intersection of 
the codes of representation and the locality of the surface.38
Even in the physical distancing from site to paper, this process of consecutive re-sitings, remains highly 
introspective, in this way suggesting a recursive relationship between the representation and its object. 
Every site (or to return to Flusser, every “brick”) constitutes another origin. Material instantiations, 
techniques of fabrication, conventions of signification and acts of interpretation ‘contaminate’ one 
another, as well as the writing and reading of the drawing in an infinite exchange. Furthermore, every 
presence is re-presented (is made present in the representation) through the registration of its absence 
(separation). The drawing hence becomes a place where, as Peter Eiseneman writes, ‘absence and 
presence operate equally’; where past and present situations come to meet in the materialisation of 
the notation.39 By becoming either materially or merely semiologically detached from the site, this 
‘intermediate facture’ acquires its own time and its own space, while maintaining its specificity to 
site. Morphing into a space that encompasses both the drawing’s physical and semiotic presence 
and agency, drawing does mediate between site and building but not between site and architecture. 
Drawing is ultimately as intrinsic to architecture as an act, as this projected spatiality is intrinsic to 
drawing.
Draw of a Drawing was a transcription of the installation Kaleidoscopic 
City, which was in turn a transcription of part of the city of Edinburgh. 
Lastly, in the end it was also itself a record of the transactions occurring 
within these transcriptions. As seen through Flusser’s analysis, an act of 
transcription entails the effect of a script as a scraping that is a material 
recalibration of a surface, while the prefix trans- confers upon this action 
the effect of movement, or more specifically of carrying across. Indeed, 
what has come to develop into Draw of a Drawing has been carried across 
a variety of localities or sites. From the city to the gallery, and finally 
to the interior of a wooden box, these re-sitings can be understood as 
a series of reterritorialisations, where the object of representation was 
not merely displaced but constantly recalibrated by the agency of new 
space(s). These transcriptions were always concluded upon surfaces: the 
volcanic earth carries the city, the pristine floor of the gallery is disrupted 
by the installation, while the box is cut, engraved and reassembled. 
But even the immaterial ‘situations’ that emerged were always enabled by 
the surface. Indexical, verbal and figural marks, were not simply situated 
in the drawing but also placed the drawing itself within the frame of 
distinct ‘languages’, while both the material expression of the box and 
the techniques of fabrication involved (such as the wood workshop, 
the laser-cutter and even the digital environment of the drawing 
software) were equally formative of the final result. At the same time the 
topographical facts and other forms of spatial information about the city 





[S11] Draw of a Drawing: Developed Plan
[S12] Draw of a Drawing: Side view
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40  Drawing and photograph are here considered as images as both being visually 
experienced representations of originals that are grounded in the physically real 
world. See Eduardo Cadava, ‘“Lapsus Imaginis”: The Image in Ruins’, October 96 
(Spring 2001), pp. 35-60.
41  Ibid., p. 36.
42  “[…] the image is always at the same time an image of ruin, an image about the 
ruin of the image, about the ruin of the image’s capacity to show, to represent, to 
address and evoke the persons, events, things, truths, histories, lives and deaths to 
which it would refer”. Ibid., p. 36.
This is why, we might say, the entire logic of the world can be read here, and it can 
be read as the logic of the image. Like the world, the image allows itself to be 
experienced only as what withdraws from experience.” Ibid., p. 36.
43  This clash, which rather effects a ‘coming together’, is very aptly concluded in 
Walter Benjamin’s understanding of the image as “dialectics on a standstill” which 
Cadava refers to through a quotation from The Arcade’s Project text. See Ibid., 
p. 38, or Walter Benjamin, The Arcades Project, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin 
McLaughlin (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 462-
63.
iv The Space of Drawing
It is the reduction to the surface that assigns spatiality to the sign – every line, every little mark 
acquires a spatial meaning the very moment that it becomes as part of the surface. Diverse and 
previously disparate information find there a place of association, a place of meaning; the surface is 
where the sign enters space and consequently the realm of architecture. Nevertheless this spatiality is 
not superficial. Its two-dimensionality is physical but not necessarily affirmed on the experiential level. 
The dual nature of drawing is not manifested on the surface as a coincidence between two spaces, but 
as one continuous space that, although partly manifested in, ultimately exceeds its current material 
state. How then can we begin to understand this space which is rooted in both the mental and the 
physical, which is both superficial and deep beyond its two dimensions? And furthermore, how can we 
begin to make sense of the ways in which this space, almost part real, part imaginary, intervenes in the 
production of new realities, such as architectural designs? 
In the essay ‘Lapsus Imaginis: The Image in Ruins’ Eduardo Cadava poses a similar question with 
regard to another image – another form of representation – the photograph.40
What does it mean to assume responsibility for an image or a history – for an image of history, or for the 
history sealed within an image? How can we respond, for example, to the image and history inscribed 
within this strange photograph especially when, before our eyes, it ruins the distinctions it proposes? It 
bequeaths to us a space – the space of the photograph as well as the photographed space in which we 
can no longer know what space is. It offers us a time-the time of the photograph and the photographed 
time – in which we no longer know what time is. We know neither what remains inside or outside the 
violated space, inside or outside the interrupted time, nor what space and time can be when they are 
ruined in this way.41
In this extract, Cadava points out the paradoxical nature of the photographic image which serves 
as a testimony of a past, and at the same time as an abolition of this event as past, as other to 
the image which stands to testify it. The photograph becomes an “image of ruin” thus expressing a 
clash between these two spaces and times: the space-time of the event and the space-time of the 
experience of the photograph. It proceeds by means of connection (recollection) and separation (ruin) 
at the same time.42 In fact connection is only achieved through this separation, which Cadava very 
graphically describes as the “implosion of the image”. Cadava’s ruin regards a clash which is the result 
of an end. The constitution of representation, and of the space-time of representation, is a sign of the 
end of the moment that it captures. The space-time of the event is fleeting while the time of the space-
time of the photograph, the space and time that the photograph stands to signify, is eternal, or at least 
continuous with the existence of the photograph as an artefact. It is a space-time that borrows from 
the event while expanding into the experience of the object. Always partial in its account of reality, 
the space of representation creates space for affects and interpretations that exceed the facts of its 
origin.43 The image represents through its incapacity to re-present a totality, by constituting a space 
of its own which is other to the space to which it refers. This space that according to Cadava belongs 
to representation is thus rooted in reality yet becomes distinct, and in that sense acquires a certain 
degree of autonomy; as presence as well as representation. The surface of representation stands thus 
not as an interface, between the space of reality and imagination, but as the tangible expression of 
this other space of representation. 
This concept of otherness we could perhaps trace back to Jacques Lacan’s theory of psychoanalysis 
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which constitute a sort of counter arrangement, of effectively realized utopia, […]: a sort of place that lies outside 
all places and yet is actually localizable”. Michel Foucault, ‘Of Other Spaces: Utopias and Heterotopias’, in Neil 
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49  Ibid., p. 76.
50  Ibid., p 76.
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and to Michel Foucault’s philosophical concept of the heterotopia.44 It is interesting that in both 
theories emerges the paradigm of another surface of representation, the mirror. Of the mirror Michel 
Foucault writes: 
[…] that sort of mixed experience which partakes of the qualities of both types of location [utopia and 
heterotopia], the mirror. It is, after all, a utopia, in that it is a place without a place. In it, I see myself 
where I am not, in an unreal space that opens up potentially beyond its surface; there I am down there 
where I am not, a sort of shadow that makes my appearance visible to myself, allowing me to look at 
myself where I do not exist: utopia of the mirror. At the same time, we are dealing with a heterotopia. 
The mirror really exists and has a kind of comeback effect on the place that I occupy: starting from it, in 
fact, I find myself absent from the place where I am, in that I see myself in there. 
Starting from that gaze […] I turn back on myself, beginning to turn my eyes on myself and reconstitute 
myself where I am in reality. Hence the mirror functions as a heterotopia  since it makes the place that I 
occupy […] both absolutely real […] and absolutely unreal […].45 
Foucault’s gazing at the mirror is clearly influenced by Lacan’s description of the Mirror Stage as a 
process of identification. In both cases, the surface of the mirror becomes a means of introspection 
and identification, a reconsideration of the real by means of the panoptic, externalized vision of the 
mirror image. What Foucault’s description offers is the return to the spatial through the recognition of 
the surface as a locality and as a third space, as an intermediary between the real and its reflection. 
This space, which for Foucault is both utopic and heterotopic, undermines the stability of the real (of 
the referent) by challenging the very integrity of the latter through the displacement, the otherness of 
the reflection. But is this disjunction to suggest a clear separation of representation from the realms 
of the real and the imaginary? On the contrary, the thirdness of the surface can perhaps be found in its 
capacity to convey what Roland Barthes defines as the third meaning of the image: one that emerges 
in the intersection of the material and the intellectual and fuses “disguise” with “expression”.46 It 
does not constitute a boundary but a place of synergistic coexistence between the two. The mirror 
image thus establishes a paradoxical continuity between the real and the imaginary, through effects 
of discontinuity.
In the Lacanian paradigm of the ‘mirror stage’, the infant is subject to an imaginary identification with 
the coherent image provided by the panoptic view of the reflection, as opposed to the fragmented 
perception of the body that the infant perceives directly.47 This coherent image is according to Lacan a 
misrecognition (méconnaissance), a false knowledge of an ideal imaginary.48 Yet, even though illusory 
and alienated, it is external but not independent from the referent. The mirror image is still formative 
of a process of knowledge through identification,49 as it is impregnated with the preconceived effects 
of the subject’s desires.50 The surface of projection then stands as a place of a fantasmic identification 
that is carried out through the representation: it is the place of entrance into the imaginary (the 
ideal) through the mediation of the symbolic (the reflection). Always partial and always other, the 
mirror image presents us with a locality whose comeback effect binds the real and the imagined in a 
relation of mutual projection. Both the real and the imaginary exceed the physicality of the surface, 
yet it is there that they come to engage in a mutually dependent process of transformation.51 And 
although Lacan’s mirror stage exchange takes place in the pre-verbal stages of the unconscious, we 
can consider through Barthes’ assigning of the image to the linguistic concept of the signifier,52 how 
this mediating, ‘third’ place emerges in the encounter of the referent and its notational, symbolic 
instantiation upon the drawing surface. 
Like the mirror, the drawing proceeds through projection functioning between the imaginary and the 
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for the design opening project of the M.Arch, Year 2007-2009 at the School of 
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studio as a site of architectural production. The concept of forensics as a process of 
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real. Elements of both are assigned in the drawing a meaning which expands beyond, but also from 
within its superficial physicality and the analogical signification of architectural convention. In this 
process of signification the inscription may act either denotatively as a figure or connotatively as a 
symbol, yet always as a material expression of a deeper not yet realized materiality that it represents. 
The drawing is formed as the accumulation of places (sites) and things where the effect of the whole 
exceeds the sum of the parts. The surface of drawing thus does not pose as the effect of a deep 
structure; it is rather the very surface that poses as a system that produces meaning, through its 
capacity to enact the space of representation in the experience of its material expression. Rooted in 
but detached from its origins, the surface of drawing poses at once as the signifier and the signified. 
Although detached from all origins, it can never be detached from the deep space beyond it. Between 
the site of origin and the site of architecture (the construction) the surface of drawing stands not as a 
tool of imitation and separation but as a tool of projection as speculation, where meaning is not simply 
produced but excavated out of the real through a recursive process of re-sitings and consequent re-
sightings. The space of drawing constitutes a site of constant speculation within which a rigorous 
process of, in Mark Dorrian’s terms, “architectural forensics” (a close, ‘architectural reading’ of the 
sites of architectural production) redefines (a) reality.53 Ultimately, it is the place through which the 
relationship between the real and the imagined is also made real through a recursive process of self-
reference, for that which cannot be found on the surface cannot be in architectural design: the drawing 
is sited within the city just as much as the city is sited within the drawing. 
We may then conclude that to define the space of drawing merely as a site among others in the act of 
representation as a series of displacements, is to diminish its importance as a system of signification 
and its speculative role in assembling the various sites that contribute to its formation. Despite the 
dispersal of agency that the multiple ‘site-specificities’ that emerge in the process imply, the drawing 
maintains, or rather through its establishment asserts, a ‘semiotic authority’ upon the various sites 
that are involved in its formation.54 The drawing is open to external agency but it is the situating within 
the drawing that enables this agency to act upon this common ground of signification which is, before 
anything, a material condition. If we consider that the site-specific is that which is intrinsically defined 
by its association to a site, the situation upon the drawing surface appears to surpass all previous sites 
and re-sitings. 
How are we then to understand this situation of drawing with regard to the real, the speculative, 
the material and the discursive sites that affect its figuration? Where are we to locate this space 
of representation in relation to these other spaces? We have paralleled the gesture of drawing to 
a displacement, a trans-lation that would probably locate this space as a destination at the end of 
the gesture. But neither the origins nor the destinations are singular or fixed. In truth, a drawing is 
not without any, but with multiple origins and open to an equal number of interpretations. As such, a 
space that is formed through situations, through relations to other spaces, drawing can perhaps be 
best defined by the prefix inter-: the writing of drawing an intertextuality.55 But, although pointing out 
the drawing’s cumulative and recursive character, inter- overlooks its unique status as the expression 
of all those spaces that define it and which it also defines, and that can only interrelate through the 
drawing’s own spatiality. Inter- can thus be considered as the effect of drawing while the situation, the 
drawing’s relational locality, should be concluded in the hyper-, as it emerges in Jean Beaudrillard’s 
notion of hyperreality: drawing as a kind of hyper-site. 56 In myth and literature, the mirror often poses 
as an authenticator of reality, where for a creature, the lack of reflection, the incapacity of casting 
a shadow, or the inability to be captured in a photograph signifies the lack of a soul as proof of the 
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having a reflection. The adjective inanimate refers to the not living, the ones who do 
not possess a soul (in Latin anima). The term however can be projected further to 
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unreal and the inanimate.57 The projection on the drawing surface is however, not a reflection but a 
shadow that can be traced back to the departure of Diboutades’ lover. It belongs neither strictly to the 
real nor to the imaginary.58 Yet it is there that the elusive real is conquered through ‘transformation’ 
(considering Lacan’s idea of identification as transformation of the subject). The drawing poses as the 
shadow that, detached from its origin, animates the surface while acquiring a “soul” of its own. 
Enabling a systematic re-organization of the traces of a reality that 
marked the presence and absence of an original site, this drawing 
was also a “drawer” of curiosities. Re-sitings became re-sightings, and 
even looking was performed as a surface effect. Performed through 
bodily interaction, this re-organizing was extended to the viewer as re-
sightings, which facilitated new ‘readings’ that revealed new spatialities 
– in-situ recalibrations of the site that emerge through the experience 
of the object. In the end, the ‘translation’ did not merely entail a 
repositioning of the site but also a ‘repositioning’ of the architect. With 
regard to the immaterial ‘sites’ of the drawings, we can add to Kwon’s 
theorization of the institutional frames of conventions, the conceptual 
(re)sitings that emerge through sensory processes of ‘inhabitation’.
In Draw of a Drawing, the physical attachment to the site of presentation 
implied by installation as a form of practice facilitated the enactment 
of this performativity. Installation can therefore be considered as a 
form of drawing in space: of drawing out from the surface the space of 
representation. The scaling of the transcription within the box allows 
for the expansion of the field, but what it primarily achieves is to assign 
representation to the scale of the body. Draw of a Drawing is then 
experienced by the viewer through the “drawing out” of its elements in 
a choreography of manipulation.
The drawing therefore emerges as something more than a site in this 
transitive act of representation. If we consider that the site-specific 
is defined by an intrinsic association to a site, the situation upon the 
drawing surface appears to surpass all previous sites and re-sitings. 
Weaved out of the intertextual assemblage of all previous conditions, 
the drawing surface is constituted as an accumulation of a number of 
sites. Moreover, this non-hierarchical relationship between these sites 
as intermediate states of representation undermines the origin of the 
drawing. At once projected and projecting, the drawing surface reveals 
a ‘reality’ that is not yet: rooted in but detached from sites of origin and 
fabrication, it constitutes a hyperreality. Ultimately, the surface that is 
the drawing is the place through which the relationship between the 
real, the absent and the imagined is materialised through a recursive 
process of self-reference. For that which cannot be found on the surface, 
cannot be in architectural design: the drawing is sited within the city 
just as much as the city is sited within the drawing.
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59 On hyperreality see Baudrillard, ‘Simulacra’, pp. 1-42.
60  “The subject-matter (the building or space) will exist after the drawing, not before 
it”. Evans, ‘Translations’, p. 165. 
61  Gaiger, ‘Dismantling the Frame’, p. 46. Drawing from Kant’s Critique of the Power 
of Judgement (1790), Gaiger later defines aesthetic autonomy as “the claim that 
art is intrinsically valuable and hence not fully subsumable under any other end or 
purpose”, p. 52.
62  Frascari traces the term in textual biblical exegesis where, introduced as anagogia 
by Augustine de Dacia, it was used to describe one of the “four senses” of the text 
(literal, allegorical, moral and anagogic), a composite word from the Greek words ana 
(above, high) and agein (to lead). These four senses can be considered to describe 
degrees of interpretation, or rather ‘comprehension’ of the text. In this sequence, 
anagogy represents the highest sense of the text and thus as Frascari writes, its 
telos. Frascari, ‘Reflections on Paper’, p. 28.
63  On the concept of espacement as a space of contingency and anticipation 
of meaning, see Ella, Chmielewska, ‘Writing with the Photograph: Espacement, 
Description and Architectural Text in Action’, in Anna Dahlgren, Nina Lager Vestberg, 
and Dag Patersson (eds ), Representational Machines: Photography and the 
Production of Space (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2013), p. 83-105. 
v Drawing in Space
The drawing thus emerges as something more than a site in this transitive act of representation. Weaved 
out of the intertextual assemblage of all previous conditions the drawing surface is constituted as an 
accumulation of a number of sites. Moreover, the non-hierarchical relationship between these sites as 
intermediate states of representation, undermines the origin for the drawing. At once projected and 
projecting the drawing surface constitutes the drawing out of a reality that is not yet.59 To consider 
then this site of hyperreality, this space that lies beyond, surpasses the understanding of drawing as 
a mediative tool in architectural thinking. If the ‘subject-matter’ of architecture is constructed space, 
then we can perhaps redefine drawing not as a tool but as the locus of architecture: it is the primary 
space that is configured through architectural thinking, operative to future projections yet a real field 
of action for architecture.60 
Translated through a range of mental and physical sites, the drawing establishes the kind of site 
relations that can be found in site-specific art: phenomenological, discursive and even institutional. 
The consideration of site-specificity through the work of Miwon Kwon allows us to consider drawing 
as a site-specific spatial practice where the surface becomes the final site of representation, and this 
re-siting constitutes more than a form of installation. Rather, it is a gesture of active placement which 
occurs in time and across space, and which results in the formation of the space of drawing. 
In the essay ‘Dismantling the Frame: Site-Specific Art and Aesthetic Autonomy’, Jason Gaiger 
contradicts Kwon’s classification by proposing that “the reorientation of recent art practice toward site-
specificity is best understood as a progressive relinquishment of the principle of aesthetic autonomy”.61 
Gaiger’s argument suggests that this form of site-specificity, one that exceeds the function of localized 
display, diminishes the meaning of the work as a self-sufficient expression. In the case of architectural 
drawing however, no such diminution of self-sufficiency is at stake. On the contrary, the multiple 
associations that are produced through these emerging site-specificities are integral to the fulfilment 
of the drawing’s operation as a cumulative and generative agent of architectural thinking. Furthermore, 
the value and significance of the work is not driven by a teleology of aesthetics but rather by the 
drawing’s ability to assign spatial meaning to the multiplicity of signs that constitute it. The drawing 
is thus cumulative but self-sufficient in its ability to produce spatial meaning. This effect is projective 
but it appears to overcome the semiotic potential of projection as defined by architectural drawing 
conventions as it occurs both figuratively and analogically through a process that is not reductive but 
transformative. This process of spatial semiosis, of the semiotic production of a space, takes effect in 
the experience of drawing which occurs both in a material and a mental, projective, level.62 The surface 
of drawing becomes a field not of pure analogy but also of contingency and interpretation. Drawing 
emerges there on the surface as well in the spaces that it signifies, on the lines that purposefully guide 
the gaze as well as in the ‘gaps’ of signification that they reveal as a kind of semiotic “espacement” – 
the typographic opening of contingency as described by Ella Chmielewska.63 The material inscription 
of the surface has a semiotic effect and this semiosis, in turn, has a material effect on the space of 
drawing.
If the semiotic value of drawing is thus driven by the experience of drawing as space through the 
interaction with the surface, what is at stake in considering drawing as an experience of this space? 
Marco Frascari concludes his enquiry on the virtues of paper within architectural thinking as follows:
SURFACE
127
64  Frascari, ‘A Reflection on Paper’, p. 32.
What has this tracing on paper got to do with buildings? What makes these sheets relate to what 
we finally call ‘constructed’ architecture? Nothing: different matter, different dimensions, another 
substance. Should we take the real architecture to reside in stones, the bricks, or the paper? 
Conceivably nothing of these is architecture, it is something that escapes us when we describe it 
factually. It possesses, exactly, only the substance of a facture plus an extracorporeal essence - a 
‘subtle body’- foreshadowed by the badly inadequate character of the signs with which we attempt the 
impossible venture of ineffably representing that which cannot be desired […].64
Frascari’s conclusion suggests that both drawing and building are always partial, subtotals of 
architecture. The essence of architecture is hence found in the conjunction of the factual and this 
“extracorporeal essence”, which is always obscured in the sense that it is never fully revealed by the 
facture which is the drawing, or even the building. Indeed, any kind of space considered in its pure 
physicality would be nothing more than that physical presence and thus bound to remain partial as 
representation; it is pure object. Upon enabling a systematic re-organization of the traces of a reality 
that mark the presences and absences of an original site, the drawing is a drawer of curiosities, an 
archive and a display of the traces of these other sites. But any display, will remain partial and sterile 
while far from observation. The drawing may be separated from the site of origin but it can never 
be separated from the body. It is in fact a manifestation of architecture, but one which is completed 
by means of inhabitation. It is inhabitation that will facilitate the experience and interrogation of 
architectural space: the animation of representation. Re-sitings hence become re-sightings and even 
looking is performed as a surface effect. As this reading is performed through bodily interaction, 
through touch, vision and mental projection, the re-organizing is extended to the viewer and these re-
sightings reveal the possibilities of new spatialities. 
That is where this constructed space is fully in effect, at the conjunction of facture and inhabitation. 
Drawing is a superficial installation of writing that intrinsically resists its superficiality. Perhaps drawing 
could thus overcome its physical two-dimensionality, in order to unfold in a space that would allow 
for its immersive inhabitation; that would assert its situation and potentially assign material presence 
to its projections. Nevertheless, it would always remain attached to the surface: its semiotic powers 
reside more in the superficial rather than the architectural. 
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1  This term I am borrowing from Gilles Deleuze’s reading of Bergson and his idea 
of a ‘false movement’. Gilles Deleuze, Cinema 1: The Movement Image (1983), 
trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (London and New York: Continuum, 
2005), p. 2. 
i A Thesis on Movement
The installation The City [within] The Drawing was presented at the Tent Gallery, at the Edinburgh 
College of Art, in March 2015 [C1-C2]. The aim of this installation was to respond to the series of 
drawings/installations that had been produced over the course of the research, and to bring together 
the various themes that these had foregrounded in a conclusive piece. Unlike the preceding installations 
this one was not posed as an expanded form of drawing, but as an installation combining drawing with 
modelled elements. 
This thesis set out to question the material and temporal limits of conventional codes of architectural 
drawing, by drawing connections between the concepts of space and representation through the idea 
of movement. In this context, movement stood to represent both material and conceptual notions of 
multiplicity and displacement. For the purposes of this thesis, central to this understanding of movement 
as oscillating between matter and concept has been the theory of Henri Bergson. This served as an 
entrance point to the understanding of space-time in modernity, as well as to highlight the contrast 
between stasis and movement as a kind of ‘illusion’. This illusion – or rather abstraction, according to 
Bergson, is derived from the limitations of visual perception and shapes our understanding of notions 
of extensity (and therefore space), as removed and separated from duration (a spatiotemporal concept 
of becoming). This idea of a ‘false image’,1 and therefore of a false understanding of movement as being 
opposed to a condition of stasis has been at the basis of this research. One of the main arguments of 
this thesis has been that a condition of difference and becoming – as kinds of movement – is inherent 
and not merely operative but, as we saw through Catherine Ingraham, constitutive of architecture. 
Throughout the project, this false understanding of movement has been reflected in contrasts of order 
and disorder – or in Diana Agrest’s terms ‘orderlessness’ – whereby expressions of architecture, both 
as constructed space and as a conceptual creative practice, are consistently analysed and understood 
through dualisms of absolute conditions of movement and stasis, such as order and event, the formal 
and the informal, the individual and the standard, the disciplinary conventional and the arbitrary 
irrational. 
Within the disciplinary realm of architecture the false opposition between movement and stasis, was 
anchored in this thesis upon another ‘opposition’: the city and its image in architectural representation. 
The city, posing as an extreme kind of spatial construction, is commonly considered as a place of 
high complexity, within which emerge ‘illegible’ and ‘opaque’ conditions, whereas architecture and 
the abstraction of the city in architectural drawing conventions are presented as stable and coherent 
images of this overwhelming complexity. The transition therefore from the experience of the city 
to its normative representational counterpart can be considered in this way as a fixing of the city’s 
movement, thus revealing the discrepancy between the real and the representation.
In the first part of the thesis, this discrepancy was challenged through an examination of the ways in 
which both city and drawing could be understood as ‘kinetic’ conditions. A series of cultural modes 
of production were used to map out the changing modes of perceiving of and relating to the city, as 
they developed out of the technological expansion of vision as well as the transformation of the urban 
condition across modernity. Eventually these practices sketched out a notion of urban kineticism, 
where the only emerging opposition was the one drawn in the negotiation between the city and its 
consistently proliferating mediation through virtual modes of representations, between physical and 
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virtual modes of inhabitation. These new modalities of perception can perhaps be best summarized 
through Jonathan Beller’s notion of the cinematic mode of production, which ties succeeding media 
such as television and digital networks to the immersive effects of cinema. The city is therefore drawn 
as a condition of congested representations where the pursuit of the real, through the intensification 
of perception is compromised and upended by the displacement of the subject into increasingly 
dematerialized spatial practices. These, in turn, undermine normative conceptions of presence and 
representation. The virtual manifestations of space that are forged out of the cinematic and the digital 
suggest a displacement of modes of inhabitation into a visually consumed virtuality, which is produced 
out of acts of simulation rather than representation, and in this way construct and formulate not 
representations but effects of consciousness. The thesis argued that as both the spatial and the urban 
are being redefined, and particularly through a proliferation of imagery – where notions of language 
and ‘translation’ appear as inadequate to convey the ‘spectacular’ exchanges taking place between 
the real and the virtual – architecture too needs to redefine its modes of representation, if it is to 
maintain its role as constitutive agency of space within the urban. 
The effects of this recourse to the virtual upon architectural thinking were traced in the thesis through a 
comparison of the ‘cartographic’ and ‘geographic’ strategies of architectural design and representation 
that emerged over the last forty years. These are considered to reflect the pressure initially exerted 
upon architectural practice by the so-called crisis of representation drawn out of the philosophical and 
political debates of the 1960s, through opposing strategies of representation and simulation. On one 
hand, the cartographic, as defined by Mark Dorrian, can be associated with post-structuralist notions 
of language and representation that suggest an understanding of drawing itself as a kinetic and 
spatial process, where the subject is not displaced but dispersed through the participation in a utopic 
multiplicity of spaces. The abstraction of the representational codes, what Louis Marin describes as 
the “gap” of representation, becomes operative in a process of signification through difference. On 
the other hand, the geographic, as introduced by David Gissen, asserts its validity through an iconic 
semblance, which immobilizes the operative movement of representation as a transition between the 
real and the virtual. In effect, the geographic and its digital successors remove what Marin frames as 
the dual register of drawing as representation and territory, as both the description of an exteriority of 
referents and the interiority of its own narrative. 
City and drawing can therefore be understood as being both characterised by such a duality of 
register. The former due to its textual nature, which is entailed not only in its complexity but also in the 
processes of representation through which this complexity is structured and enacted. The latter, due 
to its function as index and icon, therefore as at once same and other to a referent reality.  When the 
discrepancy between the real and the representational is then projected upon notions of legibility and 
translation, it is this common textuality that has in this thesis been considered as providing a common 
frame and ground for the transition from city to drawing. The thesis proposed that this transition can 
be fulfilled not through structuralist notions of translation that anticipate the ideal of an absolute 
representation, which stabilises the object, but through an understanding of the city and drawing as 
intertextual spaces, within which operations of description and narrative become interchangeable, 
equally real and equally imaginary. Louis Marin’s notion of the utopic text, points to an understanding 
of representation that is manifested in the city and in the drawing as a multi-spatial rather than 
a-spatial condition, which is forged at the interplay of multiple readings and multiple writings. The 
dual register of ‘languages’ of representation, such as the codes of architectural drawing, can then 
be considered as a factor of instability, which is not however a liability for the integrity of meaning. 
[C1] Day view through the gallery
[C2] Night view through the gallery
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Rather, this duality motivates a process of a representation that is just as (inter) textual as its object. 
Representation emerges then as operative for the definition of the real and the motivation of the 
speculative.
ii The Drawing Within
The second part of the thesis, the Speculum, mapped out the process of representing the city of 
Edinburgh through a series of transcriptive operations. The understanding of drawing as not merely 
a representation but also as a distinct intertextual spatiality, was expressed through the physical 
expansion of drawing into three-dimensional space by means of installation. This move, which was 
initially an intuitive choice, proved useful in uncovering the process of drawing as a kind of situated 
experience; where reading and writing the drawing can be understood as an immersive form of 
inhabitation, while the interiority of architecture’s own codes of signification is also revealed as being 
in a productive exchange with external notions of agency and convention. 
Drawing from radical practices of ‘documentation’ that challenged notions of subjectivity and 
objectivity, such as Salvador Dalí’s paranoid critical methods of perception, or the zero-degree writings 
of Georges Perec, these ‘drawings’ sought to challenge the biases that govern normative architectural 
representations through an alternative form of urban representation. In Weaving Lines/Looming 
Narratives, focus was shifted from the static to the transitive elements of space, thus questioning 
notions of presence in relation to perception and representation. The idea of a more ’inclusive’ 
representation, consequently raised an issue of semiotic integrity for architecture and its forms of 
notation. This was further questioned, through text, by reflecting on Catherine Ingraham’s theorizing 
of architecture’s own mode of operation, which foregrounded the idea of a concealed constitutive act 
of movement and displacement as being found at the basis of architectural thinking. Whereas then 
architecture’s ‘integrity’ and ‘propriety’ appear to be anchored on notions of convention that present 
themselves as static and immutable connections to an idea of origin, it has been argued in this thesis 
– through Gilles Deleuze’s questioning of the Platonic subordination of the copy to the original – 
that architecture’s fixing of convention is itself a concealment of architecture’s true operation, as a 
constitutive act of representation that proceeds through difference and invention. As Ingraham writes, 
“to architect is to make [my emphasis] proper”, that is to constitute and define the proper from within 
architecture’s own cunning workings, where cunning stands for the craft of invention that is inherent 
within any kind of textual representation and signification. Thus, Weaving Lines/Looming Narratives 
introduced into the linear code of architectural drawing the transitive aspects of a small urban site by 
not displacing convention altogether, but its predefined boundaries.
Whereas Weaving Lines/Looming Narratives, as a first experiment towards this alternative 
representation of the urban, focused on processes of notation and inclusion that regarded the internal 
constitution of the ground of representation, in the two following installations, Kaleidoscopic City and 
Draw of a Drawing, issues were raised of the external ‘structures’ that come to inform and interact 
with that ground. In Kaleidoscopic City, this was expressed through a critical engagement with the 
scopic regimes that have historically infiltrated the modalities of urban representation with specific 
ideological and epistemological agendas. This raised questions about the ways in which the image, and 
by extension what is understood as the very ‘presence’ of the city, are in fact constructed out of both 
material and conceptual operations. This was reflected on the false opposition between movement and 
THE CITY [WITHIN] THE DRAWING
135
stasis in two ways. On one hand, by revealing the instability of presence as a kind of origin; on the other, 
by positioning the notion of the scopic regime within a frame of specificity that stretched to include 
varying attitudes of perception – from individual experience to the collective memory and systemic 
conventions – as equally operating within the cumulative vision of architectural drawings. By scaling 
the transcription of the city down to the size of a ‘manageable’ and portable object, and compressing it 
to the two-dimensionality of the surface, Draw of a Drawing brought the drawing of Edinburgh – which 
had been gradually constructed out of the operations of the two preceding installations – closer to the 
physical instantiation of normative forms of drawing. This continued the discussion on the exchanges 
that occur between the material and the mental by framing the concept of specificity through the 
current discourse on notions of site in contemporary art. Miwon Kwon’s expansion of the site as origin 
to include phenomenological as well as institutional and discursive frames, helped introduce into the 
hybrid space of drawing the effects of the multiple spaces that condition its formulation, as distinct 
sites and in a sense as distinct and multiple origins. Vilém  Flusser’s analysis of writing as a process 
in which the material situation informs the concept of signification, foregrounded the material and 
corporeal aspects of signification, while highlighting within this multiplicity of ‘origins’ the drawing’s 
function as a continuous spatiality that dialectically expands between the projective and the projected, 
the material and the conceptual. It is only through the – still partial – material situation of the drawing 
that the various ‘situations’ that comprise the itinerary from the real to the drawing are capable of 
forging a cumulative representation, which is capable of ‘bringing’ things to architecture’s ‘field’ of 
visibility and action. This representation is not then singular nor static, but in turn constituting a 
mutable site of inhabitation for the architect.
 
iii The City Within
In the introduction to this thesis I provided a definition of the terms that compose ‘kinematography’, 
but not explicitly of the term itself. This composite term etymologically could be interpreted in two 
ways: as a writing through and a writing of movement. The City [within] the Drawing, as a culmination 
of this thesis is posed as a ‘kinematography’. The three preceding installations, together attempted to 
forge an alternative kind of urban representation by gradually building upon a reconsideration of not 
merely previously established conventions but of the overall understanding of convention as an actor 
of order and stability within architectural representation. The City [within] The Drawing is a cumulating 
transcription within which all installations are embedded and working upon one another [C3]. 
To write, to draw, or to represent, as has been illustrated in multiple occasions in this thesis, is always 
in a sense to move and to be moved, to destabilize, to interact and to change position. This has 
been illustrated in this thesis through Jacques Derrida’s concept of differánce as the possibility of 
difference and deferral of meaning in writing, as well as Roland Barthes concept of the text, and even 
his analysis of the photographic image in texts such as Camera Lucida. Considered as such, drawing 
is a not only  a ‘topical’ but also a ‘tropical’ condition, within which emerge various tropes, various 
kinds of (what has been at times described in this thesis as) ‘specificity’ – derived from the notion 
of site-specificity and meaning the condition of referring to specific origins or situations. These have 
been defined in the context of this thesis in relation to ‘situations’, which may refer to locality, visuality, 
language and – as we have seen with regard to the disciplinary linearity of architecture – even modes 
of mobility. If then a condition of movement is indeed inherent within the workings of architectural 
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thinking and drawing, even if concealed, perhaps the concept of an architectural kinematography 
as a writing through movement is in fact redundant; in the same way that conceptions of order and 
discipline, when considered through the idea of drawing as a mutable cumulative spatiality can become 
interchangeable with notions of chance and diversion – for instance, when the chanceful walking of 
an individual becomes equally important to the designed materiality of a skyscraper, or when the flight 
of a seagull becomes equally significant to a regime of representation. What this kinematography has 
offered however, is the writing of movement, and thus the registering of this redundancy as proof of 
the fallibility of representation’s – and by extension – architecture’s stasis. This does not simply regard 
the uncovering of the city as a kinetic space that expands beyond its built instantiations. Rather it 
regards the uncovering of drawing as a space within which this movement is enabled, and which is 
also itself enabled by the inhabitation of the architect/reader. Such an understanding of drawing offers 
the possibility of displacing the ideal static: the convention as the stronghold of both the real and the 
discipline. 
The consideration of drawing as a central space of action for architectural practice thus opens up 
convention as a field in its own right, which cannot be bypassed but can be, respectively with drawing, 
not only inhabited but, consequently, reconfigured. The projective and linear core of architectural 
representation has persisted, as a sign itself of the integrity of architecture as discipline, despite 
the impact upon architectural thinking and making of cultural inventions and media (such as paper, 
the print or even cinema). Already from the brief references that have been made in this thesis to 
digital modes of representation, the effect of their relevant media and modes of operation upon 
architectural practice is evident, and anticipated in the use of their computational and simulative 
abilities in architectural representation and design. An investigation of the possibilities offered for 
informing convention and the respective ‘domestication’ of the digital field as a medium of architectural 
representation – as opposed to either a skeumorphic simulation of pre-existing modes, or a means to 
modelling and computational calculation – could present an opportunity for the continuation of these 
explorations.
This last installation cumulatively addressed the negotiations that emerge between the actuality of the 
city and its representations. Drawing from the previous installations it engaged with representation as 
an act of inhabitation, which involved the spatial experience of both city and drawing. The City [within] 
The Drawing explored the issue of the ‘material’ trace of not only the city, but also the observer and 
the notation itself. Upon embedding its preceding acts, it addressed the urban as a transitory condition 
between order and event. 
Inscribed elements printed across suspended layers of clear acetate presented a constellation of 
marks that corresponded to specific trajectories, relationships of vision, and transformations of the 
materiality of both the city and the preceding installations, which as we have seen grafted conventional 
codes from dance notation, geological mapping and celestial cartography into architectural convention 
[C4-C5]. 
Reterritorialized in a provisional way upon a transparent substrate material, these signs were 
constantly repositioned against the city and the space of the gallery through the relational movement 
of the viewers. The nesting of the drawing’s earlier phases within one another, through the layering 
of the transcribed traces, was extended to the city, through the transparency of the drawings and the 
gallery [C6-C7]. The multiple layers of the drawing carried the presence of the previous installations, 
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not as mere signs but as distinct situated spatialities, collating their graphic marks with markings and 
scars from their previous physical locations. Stenciled-on polyester sheets introduced the elements 
of these previous situations as opaque areas that fused the transparent layers with the neutral ‘white’ 
of the gallery; the locality of this last installation. On the floor, lacking transparency, the signs of 
the various layers became fixed upon the surface of the gallery, yet were once more transformed by 
coming together upon a single surface [C8-C9].  It is there, on the single surface of the floor, that part 
of the cumulative drawing came to be seen. From there, modelled elements ‘pushed through’ the two-
dimensionality of the surface, to reveal in space the ‘city’ that emerged from within the drawing: one 
which is at once other and same to its onlooker [C8-C10]. The City [within] The Drawing did not pose 
as one drawing, but was rather concerned with the situating of the city and the drawing in relation to 
one another. Its main contribution to the representation of the city was rather a model than a drawing, 
which did not propose a representation but instead sought an affirmation of presence; of the presence 
of the drawing’s concealed spatiality and movement. The city that is situated within the drawing, 
unlike Borges’ map it does not attain its hyperreality through exactitude but through difference and 
separation. 
As relations are persistently reconfigured by observation, a condition emerges where city and spectator 
are mutually situated in shifting relations to one another through the agency of the installation, which 
acts as a 'mediating object' [C11-C12]. In this recursive process between sites of origin and sites of 
representation, the installation offered an opportunity to immerse oneself in, or rather inhabit, a ‘space 
of representation’ as the material recoding of the city within an expanded field – that is, within a 
representational field that now incorporates the kind of objects and conditions upon whose exclusion 
its coherence had previously depended. This space of the drawing is ever-singular, ever-specific and 
therefore unrepresentable. Like the city within, it is ‘situated’ in the real city as an origin, but it is 
also situated in a number of other sites that have informed its making. These installations have not 
substituted drawing but have instead extended its understanding by offering insights into this notion 
of drawing’s projective spatiality. For this, they can never be considered as anything other than views 
into my own ‘specific’ movement into a space of drawing, yet views that in their physical instantiations 
can be themselves inhabited and reanimated.
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[C4] TheCity [within] The Drawing: Planar traces of the preceding 
installations on the transparent surfaces
[C5] Draw of a Drawing in The City [within] The Drawing
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[C6] TheCity [within] The Drawing: Interior view
[C7] Draw of a Drawing was embedded in The City [wihtin] The Drawing
not by transcription on the transparent acetate sheets but also by standing 
physically as a key for the installation
144
THE CITY [WITHIN] THE DRAWING
145
[C8] The City Within where surface elements are materialized in plaster 
and visual relations are concretized in sanded acrylic, emerging from The 
Drawing on the floor
[C9] The Drawing detail
[C10] The City Within details
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[C11] Views of The City [wihtin] The Drawing from the city
[C12] View from the installation to the city through The City Within model
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[C14] The Installations Within the Drawing 
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